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 Abstract  
This thesis consists of six chapters that examine issues on intangible capital and economic 
development. Chapter 1 assesses the role of intangible capital in sectoral economic 
growth in China based on data from Input-Output Tables, and identifies the type of 
disaggregated intangible capital that has the largest effect on economic growth in each 
sector group. Chapter 2 studies the determinants of intangible investment in Chinese firms 
as well as the relationship between firm-level productivity and various types of intangible 
investment, and finds that firm size, human capital and institutional quality as well as 
market competition all play important roles in determining firms’ intangible investment. 
Chapter 3 investigates the role of organization capital in the production of Chinese listed 
firms, compares the contributions of organization capital to firms’ financial performance 
between listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs and finds that SOEs invest 
more in organization capital but have lower returns from the investment. Chapter 4 
analyses the effect of intangible capital in reducing sectoral energy intensity as well as 
how this effect varies across sectors and economies of different development stages, 
which provides some useful policy implications. Chapter 5 compares the changing output 
elasticity as well as heterogeneity in the productivity spillover effect of intangible capital 
across various sectors and economy of different income level, and finds some interesting 
patterns. Chapter 6, which is the last chapter, revisits the lost decades of the Japanese 
economy based on an extended neoclassical growth model with intangible investment 
incorporated and finds that unmeasured intangible investment actually plays an important 
role in explaining the business cycles during the Japanese lost decades. 
 
 
 
 Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 
1. Intangible capital and China’s economic growth: Evidence from Input-Output Tables ................. 8 
1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 8 
1.2 How do we conduct growth accounting with sectoral data?.................................................. 13 
1.3 Intangible capital and TFP growth ............................................................................................... 18 
1.4 Growth accounting incorporating intangible capital ............................................................... 26 
1.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 30 
1.6 Appendix A Industry classification .............................................................................................. 36 
1.7 Appendix B Sensitivity analysis................................................................................................... 39 
1.8 Appendix C Hausman test for Table ........................................................................................... 39 
2. Determinants of intangible investment and its impacts on firms’ productivity: Evidence from 
Chinese private manufacturing firms ................................................................................................................. 40 
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 40 
2.2 Theoretical framework for analysing firms’ behaviour in intangible investment ............. 44 
2.3 Data and empirical strategy ........................................................................................................... 48 
2.4 Pattern of intangibles investment in China ................................................................................ 56 
2.5 Firm-level evidence ......................................................................................................................... 59 
2.6 Conclusion and policy implications ............................................................................................ 69 
3. Organization investment in a transitional economy: The role of ownership control type ............ 77 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 77 
3.2 The role of organization capital in production: Evidence from Chinese listed companies
 80 
3.3 Employee turnover and efficiency of organization capital in Chinese SOEs: A simple 
model 85 
3.4 Empirical evidence from Chinese listed firms .......................................................................... 92 
3.4.1 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 92 
3.4.2 Summary statistics ............................................................................................................. 94 
3.4.3 Results .................................................................................................................................. 95 
3.5 Conclusions and policy implications ........................................................................................... 99 
4. Intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity: Evidence from 40 economies between 1995––
2007 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 105 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 105 
4.2 Measuring sectoral energy intensity and intangible capital ................................................ 109 
4.2.1 Sectoral energy intensity ............................................................................................... 109 
4.2.2 Intangible capital ............................................................................................................. 111 
4.3 Intangible capital and energy intensity: A theoretical analysis .......................................... 113 
4.4 Data source and empirical strategy ........................................................................................... 116 
4.4.1 The WIOD and the Penn World Table 8.1 ................................................................. 117 
4.4.2 Empirical strategy ........................................................................................................... 117 
4.4.3 Descriptive analysis ........................................................................................................ 120 
4.5 Empirical results ........................................................................................................................... 121 
4.5.1 An overall picture ........................................................................................................... 121 
4.5.2 Fully analysing the heterogenous impacts: a multilevel regression approach .. 126 
 4.6 Conclusion and policy implications ......................................................................................... 131 
4.7 Appendix A .................................................................................................................................... 137 
4.8 Appendix B .................................................................................................................................... 138 
5. Intangible capital, productivity spillover and economic growth: Cross-country evidence ....... 139 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 139 
5.2 Intangible capital: definition and measurement ..................................................................... 143 
5.3 Empirical strategies and data sources ...................................................................................... 145 
5.3.1 Empirical strategies ........................................................................................................ 145 
5.3.2 Data sources and summary statistics .......................................................................... 148 
5.4 Empirical results ........................................................................................................................... 149 
5.5 Discussions and Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 160 
5.6 Appendix A .................................................................................................................................... 166 
6. Unmeasured investment and the puzzling Japanese lost decades ................................................... 167 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 167 
6.2 Predictions of the basic theory without intangible investment........................................... 173 
6.3 Evidence of decreased intangible investment ........................................................................ 179 
6.4 Predictions of the extended theory with intangible investment ......................................... 181 
6.5 Results with alternative model settings ................................................................................... 191 
6.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 193 
6.7 Appendix A Data and parameters .............................................................................................. 194 
6.8 Appendix B Varying the depreciation rate of intangible capital ........................................ 198 
6.9 Appendix C Simulation results of models with tangible capital adjustment costs ........ 200 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................. 206 
List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................ 211 
List of variables .................................................................................................................................................... 212 
 
1 
Introduction  
‘Why are some nations rich and others poor?’, this is the big question that has bothered 
economists for decades. The most obvious answer is differences in labour productivity. 
In the past, we thought it was physical capital that led to the differences in labour 
productivity. However, in recent decades, some nations, some industries and some firms 
do not have a high amount of physical capital but they do demonstrate a high level of 
labour productivity. The first thought that comes to our mind is that it might be due to 
intangible capital, and the newest national account system (SNA08) as well as firm 
accounting standard have already captured some parts of it. However, due to the 
conservative nature of the national account and firm accounting standard, there is still a 
significant amount of intangible investment that remains unmeasured. Specifically, the 
firm accounting standard normally only capitalizes development costs that lead to 
measurable economic value. For research costs that improve knowledge and efficiency of 
firms but the economic value of which cannot be measured accurately, the firm 
accounting standard directly treats them as expenses. Although the new national account 
system SNA08 begins to capitalize R&D costs, other intangible capital such as 
organization capital, brand equity and staff training that significantly contributes to the 
value of firms has not been considered as capital. Moreover, there are still many 
developing economies that have not yet adopted SNA08, which means that their national 
account data excludes R&D expenditure as measured GDP. Therefore, a comprehensive 
system for measuring intangible capital, and relevant measurement technique are needed. 
Corrado et al. (2009) propose such a system, and they find that as much as 800 billion 
USD of intangible investment has been excluded from published US data (as in 2003). 
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There is a growing amount of literature based on or relevant to the study by Corrado et 
al. (2009), which can be divided into several streams. First, the measurement of intangible 
investment and its contributions to economic growth. For example, at national level, 
Fukao et al. (2009), van Ark et al. (2009), Corrado and Hulten (2010), Hulten and Hao 
(2012), and Chun and Nadiri (2016) have discussed the measurement of intangible 
investment and its contributions to economic development in Japan, Europe, the US, 
China and Korea respeciviely; at sectoral level, Corrado et al. (2014) and Chun and Nadiri 
(2016) provide data on intangible capital for various sectors across certain developed 
economies. Second, discussion of the role of intangible capital in firms’ valuation and 
performance, such as organization capital (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005; Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou, 2013; Tronconi and Marzetti, 2011) and customer capital (Gourio and 
Rudanko, 2014a). Third, adding intangible capital to solve some macroeconomic issues. 
For instance, McGrattan and Prescott (2010) explain why the basic real business cycle 
model fails to explain the fluctuations of the US economy during the 1990s and early 
2000s by revealing that unmeasured intangible investment grew much more than that of 
measured output and therefore measured productivity during the research period was 
underestimated; Goodridge et al. (2013) argue that inconsistent movement between hours 
growth and output growth in the UK after the Global Financial Crisis is because 
unmeasured intangible investment led to underestimated productivity growth; Gourio and 
Rudanko (2014b) demonstrates in their preliminary study that intangible investment can 
partially explain the movement of the labour wedge in business cycles. 
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Although many aspects of intangible capital have been well studied, there are still some 
important questions yet to be answered. For example, although unique features in 
developing economies such as underdeveloped institutions may interact with intangible 
capital, the role of intangible capital in developing economies has not been well 
documented due to the lack of data. Moreover, intangible capital as a production factor is 
changing the production structure of various sectors across the world and thus may impact 
the energy efficiency of those sectors, but relevant studies on the relationship between 
intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity as well as the heterogeneity of this 
relationship are rare. Furthermore, while intangible capital as a source of growth as well 
as its productivity spillover has been confirmed, the heterogeneity in its output elasticity 
and productivity spillover effect across sectors and economies has not received much 
attention. Finally, although some new macroeconomics theories with intangible capital 
incorporated have been proposed, they have rarely been tested widely. This thesis aims to 
fill the above gaps in the literature on intangible capital. 
 
The first three chapters of this thesis focus on intangible capital in China. Chapter 1 
assesses the role of various intangible capital in sectoral productivity and sectoral 
economic growth in China. By taking advantage of China’s Input-Output Tables, a dataset 
of intangible capital for 100 sectors from 1997 to 2012 is constructed. Detailed analyses 
are conducted for aggregate intangible capital as well as its disaggregated components 
including computerized information, innovative property and economic competency 
across four sector groups (agriculture, light industry, heavy industry as well as service). 
It is found that growth in intangible capital explains almost 20% of the total factor 
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productivity (TFP) growth over the period 1997 to 2012. At the sector level, it is revealed 
that different types of intangible capital play different roles across the four sector groups. 
Chapter 2 analyses the determinants and impacts of intangible investment in China using 
a firm-level dataset extracted from the World Bank China Enterprise Survey 2012. It is 
discovered that more human capital, larger firm size and better institutional quality 
generally increase the propensity and the amount of intangible investment, and yet fiercer 
market competition generally decreases both the propensity and the amount to invest in 
intangibles. The disaggregated components of intangibles are found to be positively 
correlated with firm productivity, and there is complementarity between software 
investment and organization investment. Chapter 3 studies the interaction between 
organization capital and firm human management practice using data from Chinese listed 
firms. Organization capital, unlike physical capital, is likely to be influenced by the 
human management practice of a firm. The listed firms of China provide a valuable 
sample for studying the interaction between human management practice and the 
efficiency of organization capital given that there exists a large number of listed state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). The study finds that organization capital is indeed an 
important production factor in Chinese listed firms, and SOEs invest more in organization 
capital due to low employee’ turnover but have a lower efficiency in organization capital 
compared with private enterprises.  
 
The other three chapters include issues on intangible capital related to energy intensity, 
macroeconomics and productivity. Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between 
intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity and its heterogeneity across sectors and 
5 
economies. Although intangible capital has been well documented to be essential for 
economic and productivity growth, relevant studies on its role in improving energy 
intensity are rare. This chapter establishes a relatively robust causal relationship between 
intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity, based on a rich dataset of 40 economies 
derived from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) spanning across 13 years (1995 
– 2007). The qualitative and quantitative interactions of this relationship with income 
level and sectoral heterogeneity are also revealed. Chapter 5 examines the heterogenous 
output elasticity and productivity spillover effect of intangible capital between sectors 
and economies. It is found that intangible capital significantly contributes to both output 
growth and productivity spillover, and both effects demonstrate an inverted U-shape 
relationship with income level and significantly vary across sectors. Chapter 6 surveys 
why the basic neoclassical growth model fails to explain the lost decades of the Japanese 
economy and demonstrates how the extension of intangible capital and non-neutral 
technology greatly improve the simulation results, which highlights the importance of 
intangible investment in Japanese business cycles. 
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1. Intangible capital and China’s economic growth: Evidence 
from Input-Output Tables* 
 
This study uses data from Input-Output Tables and a methodology adopted from Corrado 
et al. (2009) to provide empirical evidence of the role of intangible capital in China by 
industrial sector. In doing so it offers a first and new methodology for measuring the role 
of intangible capital in a country where data on intangible capital are insufficient. It finds 
that growth in intangible capital explains almost 20% of the total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth over the period 1997 to 2012. Moreover, these effects of intangible capital remain 
robust under various forms of sensitivity analysis including bootstrap, Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) approach and changes in the depreciation rate. At the sector level, we find 
that research and development (R&D), which embodies innovation, plays a more 
important role in agriculture than economic competency and computerized information; 
but that the role of economic competency is more important than that of R&D and 
computerized information in the services and light industry sectors.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
China has enjoyed rapid growth since its reform and opening up policies were 
implemented in 1978. Real GDP per capita of China in 1978 was only one-fortieth of 
the US level and one tenth of the Brazilian level (Zhu, 2012). By 2015 however, China 
had real GDP per capita that was almost equal to one fourth of the US level and at the 
same level as Brazil1. Growth in total factor productivity (TFP) has played a critical role 
                                                   
* This chapter is also published as a book chapter in China Update 2017. 
1 GDP per capita using PPP approach (constant 2011 international currency), data from International 
Comparison Program database, the World Bank. 
9 
in China’s growth miracle. According to Zhu (2012), positive change in TFP accounts 
for 78% of the growth in China’s GDP per capita between 1978 and 2007. The 
transition from the planned economy to the market economy is a major source of TFP 
growth and has significantly improved China’s TFP, but this source of TFP growth 
cannot last forever since return from earlier reforms is diminishing.  
 
From the year 2012, Chinese economic growth has been slowing down and has entered 
a stage called the ‘New Normal’. The Chinese official definition of the ‘New Normal’ is 
that China will maintain stable and relatively lower growth compared with earlier 
growth rates. What could be the new source of growth of China in the stage of the ‘New 
Normal’? The script on the back of an iPhone may provide a hint. It reads, ‘Designed by 
Apple in California. Assembled in China.’ Payment to Chinese labour and profits of 
non-Apple companies respectively account for only 1.8% and 9.2% of the value added 
of an iPhone while profits of Apple takes up 58.5% of the total value added in 2010, 
according to Kraemer et al. (2011). This striking fact has an important implication: the 
distribution of value added in the global value chain is favourable to those who own the 
product design and hence the market power instead of those who manufacture the 
products.  
 
Product design and market power embody a broader concept called intangibles (Corrado 
et al., 2009). Intangible capital consists of the stock of immaterial resources that enter 
the production process and are important for the creation or improvement of products as 
well as production processes (Arrighetti et al., 2014). In this study, intangible capital is 
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defined in a broad way, following Corrado et al. (2009). Specifically, it includes 
innovative property (R&D), computerized information (software, database etc.) and 
economic competency (brand equity and organization capital). Intangible capital has 
been playing an increasingly important role in boosting productivity and economic 
growth since the ‘IT revolution’. In developed economies, the relative use of tangible 
capital is decreasing while the relative use of intangible capital, such as production 
technologies, product design, market power, and intangibles embodied in employees 
and firm structure, has been increasing (Chun and Nadiri, 2016; Corrado and Hulten, 
2010; Fukao et al., 2009; Marrano et al., 2009; Miyagawa and Hisa, 2013; van Ark et 
al., 2009).  
 
The literature on intangible capital is significant, and includes discussion of intangible 
capital as a source of growth in various countries at national level and industry level 
(Borgo et al., 2013; Chun and Nadiri, 2016; Corrado et al., 2013; Corrado and Hulten, 
2010; Fukao et al., 2009; Haskel and Wallis, 2013; Marrano et al., 2009; Miyagawa and 
Hisa, 2013; van Ark et al., 2009), discussion of intangible capital in firms’ valuation and 
productivity (Arato and Yamada, 2012; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005; Clausen and Hirth, 
2016; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2014, 2013; Gourio and Rudanko, 2014a; Tronconi 
and Marzetti, 2011), and discussion of incorporating intangible capital to solve 
macroeconomic puzzles (Goodridge et al., 2013; Gourio and Rudanko, 2014b; 
McGrattan and Prescott, 2014, 2010). However, studies on intangible capital in China 
are scarce both due to the lack of data and the newer importance of intangible capital to 
the economy. Hulten and Hao (2012) calculate the intangible capital of China between 
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2000 and 2008 and conduct growth accounting of national data using the income share 
method. The authors gather only nine observations, which is not sufficient for a 
comprehensive analysis. Given China’s shifting growth model and the possibility of 
utilizing alternative data sources, it is timely to further investigate the role of intangible 
capital in China’s growth.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first empirical test of how intangibles 
enhance economic growth at sectoral level in China. In contrast to national-level study, 
industry-level study has the advantage of generating more observations and thus allows 
more statistical degrees of freedom to analyse how different categories of intangible 
capital impact on economic growth. This will provide a better way to assess the role of 
intangibles in an economy. 
 
We divided one hundred sectors from China’s Input-Output Tables of 1997, 2002, 2007 
and 20122 into four subgroups: agriculture, light industry, heavy industry and service, 
to alleviate the problem of parameter heterogeneity between sectors. The selected Input-
Output Tables are constructed using data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics and 
Input-Output Survey. The measurement of intangible investment in this study follows 
the literature in capitalizing either intangible intermediates or intangible expenditure. 
Use of intermediates from input-output tables to estimate intangibles is common in 
previous literature3, including Chun and Nadiri (2016), Corrado et al. (2014) and 
                                                   
2 The reason we exclude the Input-Output Tables for 1987 and 1992 is that these two earlier tables are 
inaccurate and include few of the intangible intermediates. 
3 Intangible investment produced within firms is not reflected in input-output tables. However, as long as 
the ratio of actual intangible expenditure to the intangible expenditure manifested in the input-output 
12 
Miyagawa and Hisa (2013). 
 
Different from Corrado et al. (2009), Fukao et al. (2009) and Hulten and Hao (2012), 
this study, however, uses a proxy approach. That is, using the entries relevant to 
intangible investment as proxies, and assuming that the ratios of intangible investments 
to the proxies remain constant over time. Using the proxy approach and assuming the 
ratio of true value to proxies constant overtime is also common in the literature on 
intangible capital. For example, Gourio and Rudanko (2014a) proxy the Selling & 
General Administration (S&GA) expense for investment in customer capital; Tronconi 
and Marzetti (2011) and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2014) proxy S&GA expense for 
investment in organization capital. Although this assumption is often found to be 
invalid, it is the best this study could adopt based on the available data; if this 
assumption is true, the study will avoid the inaccurate measuring problems found in 
Corrado et al. (2009) and Fukao et al. (2009).  
 
When conducting growth accounting, we adopt the Cobb-Douglas parameter estimation 
based on econometrics instead of income/cost shares, along the lines of Niebel et al. 
(2017). The advantage of this approach is to allow for the existence of error terms. The 
income share method used by Corrado et al. (2009), Fukao et al. (2009), and Hulten and 
Hao (2012) may, in contrast, underestimate the contribution of resource reallocation to 
economic growth when the economy is in disequilibrium, according to Nadiri (1970). In 
the case of a transitional economy like China, the economy is likely to remain in 
                                                   
tables remains constant over time, the coefficients in the empirical analysis will not be biased.  
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disequilibrium over time. Therefore, the income share method is not suitable in the case 
of China. Our choice of econometric approach allows for an error term, which alleviates 
the problems arising from disequilibrium.  
 
Our study also conducts bootstrap regressions to confirm the robustness of the results, 
which is new to the existing literature. Limited by the time span (T=4), the standard 
system GMM approach is not suitable for this study. Bootstrap is the only feasible 
method given data limitations. Studies on intangible capital often suffer from the 
problem of small samples. Bootstrap regressions alleviate this problem to some extent. 
Moreover, the depreciation rate of intangible capital is debatable. To confirm the 
significance of the impacts of intangible capital, we will conduct a sensitivity analysis 
by experimenting with various depreciation rates. 
 
This study consists of five sections. In the next section, the methodology of growth 
accounting at the industry level is discussed, and a traditional growth accounting 
excluding intangible capital is conducted. Section 3 provides empirical evidence on the 
relationship between intangible capital and total factor productivity (TFP). In section 4, 
a growth accounting incorporating intangible capital is conducted. Section 5 draws the 
conclusion. 
 
1.2 How do we conduct growth accounting with sectoral data? 
Growth accounting often utilises the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝑎𝑘𝐿𝑎𝑙, 
14 
where Y is GDP, A stands for the total factor productivity, and K represents the capital. 
If the object is a nation, then we directly take the logarithm of both sides and then run a 
regression. The parameters 𝑎𝑘 and 𝑎𝑙 can be estimated in this way. However, with 
sectoral data, there is a problem: the parameters of each industry may vary. If a pooled 
regression is conducted, the heterogeneity of parameters will cause bias of the estimates. 
Moreover, each industry may have its own initial TFP value, which implies different 
intercepts of various industries. To cope with the problem of parameter heterogeneity, 
we categorize industries according to similarities in parameters following previous 
literature such as Harris and Robinson (2002). In this study, the subgroups are defined 
as follows: light industry, heavy industry, agriculture and service
4
. Then, we assume a 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑘𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑙                           (1) 
Y𝑖𝑡 is the value added of sector i at time t; A𝑖𝑡 is the TFP of sector i at time t; K𝑖𝑡 is 
the capital by traditional definition (excluding most of the intangibles); L𝑖𝑡 is the 
number of labour input. 𝑎𝑘 and 𝑎𝑙 are the capital and labour elasticities of output 
respectively. Due to sectoral heterogeneity, the initial values of TFP may be different 
across sectors. We therefore assume: 
A𝑖𝑡 = A𝑖0𝑒
𝛾𝑡 
Take the logarithm of both sides: 
lnY𝑖𝑡 = lnA𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑘lnK𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑙lnL𝑖𝑡              (2) 
The equation can be estimated by either the fixed effects model or the random effects 
model, depending on whether A𝑖0 varies from sector to sector within a subgroup.  
                                                   
4 The list of subgroups is demonstrated in Appendix A. 
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A key issue in production function estimation is, however, correlation between the un-
observable productivity shocks and input levels. An industry responds to positive 
productivity shocks by expanding output and input. Negative shocks lead an industry to 
reduce output and input usage. When true, ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of 
production functions are likely to be biased, which leads to biased estimates of 
productivity. Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) develop an estimation approach using 
investment as a proxy for these un-observable shocks. More recently, Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) (LP) point out that investment is lumpy. If this is true, then the investment 
proxy may not smoothly respond to productivity shocks. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
suggest that using intermediate input can solve this problem. Therefore, here we also 
adopt growth accounting without intangibles5 using the LP approach. The proxy used in 
this study is the usage of electricity, heating, fuel and water intermediates at 1997 
constant prices6. 
 
The growth rate of TFP is backed out as: 
𝑔_𝑡𝑓𝑝 = 𝑔𝑦 − 𝑎𝑘𝑔𝑘 − 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑙                 (3) 
Capital and labour inputs are not available at a sectoral level as detailed as the one in 
China’s Input-Output Tables. Luckily, China’s Input-Output Tables have two variables: 
the total wages of labour and the depreciation of capital. We adjust the nominated 
                                                   
5 The LP approach allows only one capital variable. However, when incorporating intangible capital, 
there are at least two capital variables. Therefore, we do not conduct growth accounting with intangible 
capital using the LP approach. 
6 Deflators are obtained from National Bureau of Statistics of China and the World Input Output 
Database (WIOD). 
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depreciation of capital to real depreciation using the Price Index of Investment in Fixed 
Assets from National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
Assume a constant depreciation rate θ as is the convention in previous literature: 
θK𝑖𝑡 = real depreciation𝑖𝑡                    (4) 
Then, it is clear that real depreciation𝑖𝑡 has a strictly linear relationship with K𝑖𝑡 and 
therefore is a perfect proxy for capital. As for the quantity of labour, we have: 
L𝑖𝑡 =
total wage𝑖𝑡
average wage𝑖𝑡
                            (5) 
Total wage𝑖𝑡 is from China’s Input-Output Tables and average wage𝑖𝑡 is from the 
Labour Statistics Yearbook of China. However, the sectoral classification in the Labour 
Statistics Yearbook of China is not as detailed as that in China’s Input-Output Tables. 
Therefore, the average wage of the upper level of classification is used as a proxy for 
the average wage of individual sectors7. 
Substitute K𝑖𝑡 in (2) with (4), 
lnY𝑖𝑡 = lnA𝑖𝑡 − 𝑎𝑘ln(θ) + 𝑎𝑘ln Capital_proxy𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑙lnL𝑖𝑡         (6) 
It is clear that substituting the capital proxy (real depreciation𝑖𝑡) for K𝑖𝑡 is appropriate 
because the coefficient of real depreciation𝑖𝑡 is the same as that of K𝑖𝑡. The 
depreciation rate θ becomes a part of the intercept. The growth rate of K𝑖𝑡 that is used 
for the calculation of TFP is exactly the same as the growth rate of real depreciation𝑖𝑡. 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in regressions, over the 
                                                   
7 The proxy is based on an assumption that the ratio of the average wage of a lower level sector to that of 
its upper level sector remains constant over time. If this assumption holds, then the constant ratio 
becomes a part of intercept similar to equation (6). Then the coefficient of the proxy is the same as the 
true coefficient. 
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period 1998 to 2012. It is clear that the ranges of value added, capital proxy, labour and 
different categories of intangible capital are large. This sample consists of 100 sectors in 
China across four years and therefore has nearly 400 observations. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
ln(Value added) overall 15.83  1.21  12.29  19.21  N =400  
between 
 
1.07  13.10  18.55  n =100  
within 
 
0.59  12.31  17.94  T =4 
ln(Capital proxy) overall 13.99  1.30  9.71  18.86  N =398  
between 
 
1.08  11.35  17.57  n =100  
within 
 
0.75  9.92  16.87  T-bar =3.98 
ln(Labour) overall 5.39  1.27  1.06  9.72  N =398  
between 
 
1.22  1.33  9.63  n =100  
within 
 
0.38  1.71  6.88  T-bar =3.98 
ln(Intangible capital) overall 13.22  1.85  8.58  17.79  N =398  
between 
 
1.20  10.57  15.84  n =100  
within 
 
1.41  10.20  16.97  T-bar =3.98 
ln(R&D capital) overall 10.22  2.38  2.67  15.65  N =394  
between 
 
1.68  3.76  13.37  n =99  
within 
 
1.70  6.57  13.48  T-bar =3.98 
ln(EC capital) overall 12.93  1.82  8.46  17.65  N =398  
between 
 
1.18  10.24  15.56  n =100  
within 
 
1.38  9.82  16.74  T-bar =3.98 
ln(CI capital) overall 9.94  2.26  1.07  15.55  N =397  
between 
 
1.86  3.59  14.25  n =100  
within 
 
1.29  5.86  13.24  T-bar =3.97 
Notes: EC stands for economic competency and CI stands for computerized information. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
The results for growth accounting are displayed in Table 2. According to Hausman tests 
(please see Appendix C), random effects models are appropriate to study agriculture and 
light industry sectors, and fixed effects models are used for the heavy industry and 
services sectors. Both labour and depreciation are highly economically and statistically 
significant, and remain robust when using bootstrap regressions. A 1% change in capital 
stock is associated with 0.42%, 0.67%, 0.70% and 0.64% changes in value added in 
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agriculture, heavy industry, light industry and service respectively. A 1% change in 
labour is associated with 0.57%, 0.26%, 0.13% and 0.22% changes in value added in 
agriculture, heavy industry, light industry and service respectively. The growth rate of 
TFP is calculated according to equation (3).  
 
Table 2 Regression results for growth accounting without intangibles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Agriculture Heavy industry Light industry Service 
VARIABLES RE RE 
bootstrap 
LP RE RE 
bootstrap 
LP FE FE 
bootstrap 
LP FE FE 
bootstrap 
LP 
ln(Capital) 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.62*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.39** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.60*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.42** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.08) (0.07) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.19) 
ln(Labour) 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.34** 0.26** 0.26* 0.30*** 0.13** 0.13** 0.29*** 0.22** 0.22** 0.44*** 
 (0.0979) (0.133) (0.133) (0.123) (0.147) (0.116) (0.0577) (0.0577) (0.0505) (0.0796) (0.0989) (0.0585) 
Constant 6.48*** 6.48***  4.99*** 4.99***  5.37*** 5.37***  5.60*** 5.60***  
 (1.27) (1.11)  (0.87) (0.65)  (0.50) (0.50)  (0.48) (0.62)  
Observations 20 20 20 138 138 138 144 144 144 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.79 0.79  0.81 0.81  0.88 0.88  0.86 0.86  
Number of id 5 5  35 35  36 36  24 24  
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of 
bootstrap replications: 400 for normal bootstrap, 250 for LP. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
1.3 Intangible capital and TFP growth 
According to Corrado et al. (2009), intangible investment consists of computerized 
information, innovative property and economic competency. Traditionally, intangible 
investment is classified as intermediate or expenditure and is therefore not manifested in 
national accounts. However, investment is the action of sacrificing today’s consumption 
for increasing consumption in the future, according to Hulten (1979) and Corrado et al. 
(2009). Moreover, the effects of the intangible expenditure mentioned above last more 
than one year and therefore those expenses should be capitalized.   
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We follow the literature to measure intangibles by capitalizing intangible intermediates 
or intangible expenditure. Specifically, this study obtains relevant intermediate data 
from China’s Input-Output Tables and assumes the ratio of the intermediate to the true 
intangible investment remains constant over time. The proxy approach is commonly 
adopted in measuring intangible investment and is well founded. For example, Gourio 
& Rudanko (2014) proxy the Selling & General Administration (S&GA) expense for 
customer capital investment; and Tronconi & Marzetti (2011) and Eisfeldt & 
Papanikolaou (2014) proxy S&GA expense for organization capital investment. Table 3 
presents our proxies for intangible investment. 
 
 
Table 3 Categories of intangible investment 
 Proxy Comments 
1.Computerized information 
(mainly software) 
Computer services and software 
intermediate 
Include software 
2.Innovative property   
(a)Scientific R&D Research industry intermediate Include R&D expenditure 
(b)Non-scientific R&D 
3.Economic competencies   
(a)Brand equity (mainly 
advertising) 
(b)Firm-specific resources 
(Organization capital and staff 
training) 
Culture, arts, radio, movie and 
television industry intermediate 
Include parts of advertising 
expenditure 
Business service industry 
intermediate 
Include advertising expenditure 
and organization investment 
Education industry intermediate Include staff training  
Notes: The intangible investment classification follows Corrado et al. (2009). 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
 
Following Corrado et al. (2009), intangible investment is deflated to 1997 constant price 
using the GDP deflator8. Since the interval of each Input-Output Table is five years, we 
                                                   
8 The GDP deflator is obtained from the World Bank. 
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interpolate the missing data within the interval by assuming the growth rate is constant 
within the five-year interval. The depreciation rate of the intangible capital is set 
according to Corrado et al. (2009): 20% for R&D, 33% for computerized information, 
60% for brand equity, and 40% for firm-specific resources. Based on these, we assume 
40% for overall intangible and 50% for economic competency intangible. Intangible 
capital in 1997 was set to zero, and therefore 1998 is the first year for which this study 
calculates the intangible capital. According to Corrado et al. (2009), the year that initial 
capital stocks are zero has little effect on growth accounting analysis because 
depreciation rates are high and much previous capital has been depreciated away by the 
date we start the analysis, i.e., the year 1998. Moreover, the amount of intangible capital 
in China was considerably smaller in the 1990s, as manifested by low R&D (0.57% of 
GDP in 19969 and unavailable before 1996) and software use. Therefore, setting 
intangible capital in 1997 to zero will not cause significant problems.  
 
Table 4 shows the trend of the sectoral average ratio of intangible to tangible. The 
amount of tangible capital is derived based on an assumed depreciation rate of 5%10. 
The amount of intangible capital is calculated using the method explained above. 
Accompanying China’s rapid economic growth over the last two decades is a significant 
rise in its intangible-tangible ratio. However, compared with more advanced economies, 
the intensity of using intangible capital in China’s production is still low and therefore 
there is great room for catch-up in the future. For example, the intangible-tangible ratios 
                                                   
9 Data obtained from the World Bank. 
10 5% is the most commonly used depreciation rate for the Chinese economy. 
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of Japan, the US, the UK in 2007 were 17%, 22% and 24%11 respectively. Please note 
that parts of the proxies include expenditures that are not intangible investment and 
exclude those that are produced within firms. This suggests that the actual intangible-
tangible ratio might be lower or higher than the figures in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Increasing trend of intangibles in China  
1998 2002 2007 2012 
Sectoral average intangibles 1,573,790 8,880,930 24,017,800 59,924,580 
Sectoral average tangibles 216,289,200 333,212,600 697,231,200 1280,413,600 
Ratio 0.7% 2.7% 3.4% 4.7% 
Unit: thousand RMB 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. Raw data obtained from China’s Input-Output Tables. 
 
Since TFP is the portion of output that cannot be accounted for by input (Comin, 2006), 
we should be careful when linking TFP to intangible capital. Change in TFP is possibly 
caused by changes in human capital and institutional quality. Changes in human capital 
and institutions are often not sector-specific, which can be controlled for at the national 
level. To capture human capital and institutional quality changes, this study uses two 
proxies. The first is GDP per capita and the second is time dummy that captures time 
effects. The positive correlation between economic development, human capital and 
institutional quality has been well documented (Weede et al., 2002; Gwartney et al., 
2004), which forms the basis of using GDP per capita as the proxy for human capital 
and institutional quality. The time dummy provides a different overall TFP growth rate 
for each year so we can separate TFP growth at the national level from that caused by 
changes in intangible capital within individual industries. To control for the scale of an 
industry, the indicator of intangible capital is the ratio of intangibles to tangibles instead 
                                                   
11 Tangible capital data is obtained from the Penn World Table 8.1 and intangible capita data is obtained 
from the cross-country intangible investment data website (http://www.intan-invest.net/).  
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of the absolute amount of intangibles. Table 5 demonstrates the relationship between the 
growth rate of TFP and the growth rate of the intangible to tangible ratio. Please note 
that there are two types of total factor productivity: one is TFP derived from RE/ FE 
models and the other is TFP, LP derived from the LP models, which are used to check 
the robustness of our results.     
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Table 5 Relationship between intangible-tangible ratio and growth of TFP  
 ∆ln (TFP) ∆ln (TFP, LP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  VARIABLES OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
∆ln (Intangible/tangible) 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
∆ln (GDP per capita) 0.42*** 0.42** 0.56***    0.30** 0.30** 0.39***    
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.20)    (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)    
Constant -0.33*** -0.33** -0.45*** -0.16** -0.16* -0.23** -0.12 -0.12 -0.19* 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Observations 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.30 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Number of id  100 100  100 100  100 100  100 100 
Notes: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses except OLS, OLS is with robust standard error. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of bootstrap replications: 400 for 
normal bootstrap, 250 for LP. TFP denotes the total factor productivity derived from RE/FE models while TFP, LP denotes the total factor productivity derived from LP 
models. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
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Importantly, the growth rate of the intangible-tangible ratio is economically and 
statistically significant across all specifications. A 1% growth in the intangible tangible 
ratio is associated with 0.26%, 0.26%, 0.31%, 0.26%, 0.26%, 0.31% growth in TFP 
respectively according to models (1) – (6). A 1% growth in the intangible-tangible ratio 
is associated with a 0.14%, 0.14%, 0.16%, 0.14%, 0.14%, 0.16% growth in TFP, LP 
respectively according to models (7) – (12). Growth of the intangible tangible ratio also 
explains a significant amount of TFP change, respectively at 17% according to model 
(4) and at 11% according to model (10)12. The significant impact of intangibles on TFP 
is consistent with the findings of Corrado et al. (2014). Corrado et al. (2014) regress 
TFP on intangibles, ICT and other variables and find that intangible capital is the only 
one that is significant. With GDP per capita and time effects as the control variables and 
the fixed effects estimator, the intangible to tangible ratio is still statistically and 
economically significant, which suggests that the finding is robust. Based on the above 
evidence, we thus conclude that intangible capital does play a significant role in China’s 
productivity increase. 
 
Another interesting question to ask is how the contributions of different categories of 
intangible capital to TFP growth differ. Table 6 shows the results of the effects of 
different intangible capital on TFP growth. When using TFP derived from RE/ FE 
models, all categories of intangible capital play important roles in the growth of TFP, 
being robust across all the models. Specifically, according to model (4), a 1% increase 
                                                   
12 The square of partial correlation coefficient between ∆ln (TFP)/∆ln (TFP, LP) and ∆ln (Intangible/
tangible) is the percentage of variance in ∆ln (TFP)/∆ln (TFP, LP) that can be explained by 
∆ln (Intangible/tangible) in a model specification. Therefore, the 17% and 11% here are the squares of 
partial correlation coefficients between the two variables of interest in model (4) and model (10). 
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in the ratio of computerized information capital to tangible capital is associated with 
0.08% of growth in TFP; a 1% growth in the ratio of R&D capital to tangible capital is 
associated with 0.11% of growth in TFP; a 1% growth in the ratio of economic 
competency capital to tangible capital is associated with 0.13% of growth in TFP. This 
is consistent with Chun et al. (2012) who find that innovative property is the most 
significant among all sorts of intangible investments when they are used to explain the 
growth of TFP in the Japanese economy. However, when the method of deriving TFP 
changes from FE/RE models to LP models, the results differ. Although the scale of the 
coefficients has not changed dramatically, the statistical significance has. Computerized 
information capital is no longer significant, and economic competency is insignificant 
when year effects not controlled. R&D capital remains generally significant. When it 
comes to the scale of the effects, according to model (8), a 1% growth in the ratio of 
computerized information capital to tangible capital is associated with a 0.03% increase 
in TFP, LP; a 1% growth in the ratio of R&D capital to tangible capital is associated 
with a 0.04% increase in TFP, LP; a 1% growth in the ratio of economic competency 
capital to tangible capital is associated with a 0.11% increase in TFP, LP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Impact of growth of different categories of intangible-tangible ratio on growth 
of TFP 
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 ∆ln (TFP) ∆ln (TFP, LP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE 
∆ln (CI/Tangible) 0.07** 0.07** 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆ln (R&D/Tangible) 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.04 0.04* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
∆ln (EC/Tangible) 0.08* 0.08* 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.05 0.05 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -0.05 -0.05 -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.07* 0.07** -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.21 0.21 0.31 0.31 
Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Number of id  98  98  98  98 
Notes: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses except OLS, OLS is with robust standard error. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster robust standard error is unavailable when using FE models due to 
insufficient rank and therefore FE models are not used. CI stands for computerized information (mainly 
software); R&D stands for innovative property; EC stands for economic competency. TFP denotes the 
total factor productivity derived from RE/FE models while TFP, LP denotes the total factor productivity 
derived from LP models. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
1.4 Growth accounting incorporating intangible capital 
According to Corrado et al. (2009), the production function could be written as below 
when intangible capital is incorporated: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝑎𝑘𝐼𝑎𝑖𝐿𝑎𝑙  
where I is the intangible capital stock and ai is the output elasticity of intangible capital. 
When intangible expenditure is viewed as investment, it should be counted as value 
added according to the national account identity (Corrado et al., 2009). Therefore, when 
conducting growth accounting with intangible capital, an even more accurate 
measurement of intangible investment is required. In this study, however, we do not 
know the ratio of true intangible investment to the proxies. One feasible action is to 
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assume 100% as the base case13.  
 
Table 7 demonstrates the results of growth accounting incorporating intangible capital. 
The impacts of intangibles on economic growth of all the subgroups are economically 
and statistically significant. A 1% increase in intangible capital is respectively 
associated with 0.16%, 0.22%, 0.14% and 0.24% output growth in agriculture, heavy 
industry, light industry and service. This indicates that intangible capital has become an 
important source of growth in the Chinese economy. 
 
Table 7 Results of growth accounting with intangibles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Agriculture Heavy industry Light industry Service 
VARIABLES RE RE bootstrap RE RE bootstrap FE FE bootstrap FE FE bootstrap 
ln(Tangibles) 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.29** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) 
ln(Labour) 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) 
ln(Intangibles) 0.16*** 0.15** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) 
Constant 5.68*** 5.65*** 6.56*** 6.56*** 6.36*** 6.36*** 6.09*** 6.09*** 
 (0.38) (0.54) (0.74) (0.83) (0.39) (0.39) (0.49) (0.68) 
Observations 20 20 138 138 144 144 96 96 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 
Number of id 5 5 35 35 36 36 24 24 
Notes: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses except OLS, OLS is with robust standard error.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
As mentioned earlier, intangible capital can be divided into computerized information, 
innovative property and economic competency. A question to be investigated is whether 
their roles differ across industries. To answer this question, we first assume a production 
                                                   
13 The value of proportion does not matter for the results. When varying the proportion, the results remain 
similar. For details of how the proportion is changed, please see Appendix B. 
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function in which intangible capital is decomposed: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝑎𝑘𝐼𝐶𝑎𝑖1𝑅𝐷𝑎𝑖2𝐸𝐶𝑎𝑖3𝐿𝑎𝑙 
where CI stands for computerized information (mainly software); RD stands for 
innovative property (R&D); EC stands for economic competency; 𝑎𝑖1, 𝑎𝑖2 and 𝑎𝑖3 
are the output elasticities of the three inputs respectively.  
 
Table 8 shows the results of growth accounting using the above production function. 
Not all categories of intangible capital are significant (e.g. economic competency within 
agricultural sector; R&D within services). One reason might be the strong positive 
correlation between different categories of intangible capital due to their co-movement. 
However, from the results in Table 8, we are able to obtain some information on the 
roles of different intangible capital in different industries. In agriculture, R&D is 
significant and positive. A 1% increase in R&D capital is predicted to increase a sector’s 
value added by 0.15%. The coefficients of economic competency and computerized 
information are small, which may indicate that their effects are trivial. In heavy 
industry, all are economically and statistically significant. A 1% increase in R&D, 
economic competency and computerized information is associated with 0.13%, 0.11% 
and 0.04% growth in value added respectively. In light industry, both R&D and 
economic competency capital are significant. A 1% growth in R&D and economic 
competency is respectively correlated with 0.08% and 0.14% increases in value added. 
The coefficient of computerized information capital is insignificant and small. 
Therefore, economic competency capital is likely to play the most important role in 
China’s light industry among the three categories of intangible capital. In services, only 
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economic competency is significant. A 1% increase in economic competency capital is 
associated with 0.25% of value added growth. The coefficients of both R&D and 
computerized information capital are insignificant and small in value, which may imply 
that economic competency is the most important category of intangible capital in 
service.  
 
Table 8 Results of growth accounting with detailed intangible capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Agriculture Heavy industry Light industry Service 
VARIABLES RE RE bootstrap RE RE bootstrap FE FE bootstrap FE FE bootstrap 
ln(Tangibles) 0.35*** 0.35 0.22*** 0.22** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
 (0.08) (0.27) (0.09 (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
ln(Labour) 0.52*** 0.52** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 
 (0.06) (0.21) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) 
ln(RD) 0.15*** 0.15 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.15) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
ln(EC) 0.02 0.02 0.11*** 0.11** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ln(CI) -0.06*** -0.06 0.04** 0.04** -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 6.57*** 6.57*** 7.02*** 7.02*** 6.78*** 6.78*** 6.05*** 6.05*** 
 (0.81) (1.70) (0.60) (0.79) (0.39) (0.43) (0.41) (0.67) 
Observations 20 20 137 137 144 144 92 92 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Number of id 5 5 35 35 36 36 23 23 
Notes: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses except OLS, OLS is with robust standard error. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CI stands for computerized information (mainly software); R&D stands for 
innovative property; EC stands for economic competency.  
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
Intangible capital and its various forms – technology, product design, marketing and 
organizational development – is the foundation of knowledge economies. According to 
our results, China, a transitional economy, has started to benefit from the rapid growth 
of intangible capital. Using China’s Input-Output Tables of various years, this study 
provides an important insight into the role of intangible capital in different industries in 
the context of an emerging knowledge economy. It is specifically found that growth in 
intangible capital is significantly associated with TFP growth in China, and explains 
almost 20% of the TFP growth over the sample period. The results are generally robust 
across the different model specifications. 
 
This study also reveals the relative importance of different categories of intangible 
capital in different industries. In agriculture, R&D is likely to play a critical role, but the 
role of other intangible capital is relatively trivial. To the heavy industry sector, R&D, 
computerized information (mainly software) and economic competency all are 
important to growth, but R&D is the most important. While the effects of both 
economic competency and R&D are significant to the growth of light industry, R&D is 
more significant. Last but not least, in service, the role of economic competency is 
critical while others are relatively unimportant. In other words, the role of R&D is 
important across all non-service industries while the role of economic competency is 
paramount across all non-agriculture industries. 
 
The usage of intangible capital in production in China, however, remains relatively 
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small compared with that in advanced economies. In 2007, the intangible-tangible ratio 
in China was approximately 3.4%. This compares to the same ratio for Japan, the US, 
the UK being 17%, 22% and 24% respectively. This is consistent with China’s role at 
the assembly end of global value chains and the fact that the investment in design / 
intellectual property / brands remains the preserve of more developed economies. Given 
that the productivity boost from ‘reform and opening up’ is diminishing and China has 
entered the ‘New Normal’, it is evidently time for China to invest in new sources of 
growth – and clearly intangible capital is one of them.  
 
The transformation from ‘made in China’ to ‘designed in China’ has a long way to run, 
but the shifts in the intangible to tangible ratio identified here suggest that China is 
catching up to frontier economies. Given the gradually increasing intangible capital in 
China, there is every reason to believe that rapid growth in intangible capital will 
become an increasingly important driver of China’s economic growth. 
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1.6 Appendix A Industry classification 
 
Name Subgroup 
1 Farming Agriculture 
2 Forestry Agriculture 
3 Livestock products Agriculture 
4 Fisheries Agriculture 
5 Agricultural services Agriculture 
6 Coal mining and processing Heavy industry 
7 Petroleum and natural gas extraction Heavy industry 
8 Ferrous metals mining and processing Heavy industry 
9 Non-ferrous metals mining and processing Heavy industry 
10 Non-metal minerals mining and processing Heavy industry 
11 Processing of petroleum and nuclear fuel Heavy industry 
12 Processing of coke Heavy industry 
13 Manufacture of chemical raw materials Heavy industry 
14 Manufacture of fertilizer Heavy industry 
15 Manufacture of pesticide Heavy industry 
16 Manufacture of organic chemical products Heavy industry 
17 Manufacture of rubber Heavy industry 
18 Manufacture of plastics Heavy industry 
19 Manufacture of cement and asbestos products Heavy industry 
20 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products Heavy industry 
21 Iron steel products Heavy industry 
22 Smelting of steel Heavy industry 
23 Smelting of alloy iron Heavy industry 
24 Smelting of non-ferrous metals Heavy industry 
25 Processing of non-ferrous metals Heavy industry 
26 Manufacture of boiler, engines and turbine Heavy industry 
27 Manufacture of metalworking machines Heavy industry 
28 Manufacture of other general industrial machinery Heavy industry 
29 Manufacture of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishing machinery 
Heavy industry 
30 Manufacture of other special industrial equipment Heavy industry 
31 Manufacture of railway equipment Heavy industry 
32 Manufacture of automobiles Heavy industry 
33 Manufacture of ships equipment Heavy industry 
34 Manufacture of other transportation equipment Heavy industry 
35 Manufacture of generator Heavy industry 
36 Recycling and disposal of waste Heavy industry 
37 Production and distribution of electric power Heavy industry 
38 Production and distribution of gas Heavy industry 
39 Production and distribution of tap water Heavy industry 
40 Construction Heavy industry 
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41 Crops, cooking oil and feed processing Light industry 
42 Manufacture of sugar Light industry 
43 Processing of meat Light industry 
44 Processing of aquatic products Light industry 
45 Processing of other food Light industry 
46 Manufacture of alcohol Light industry 
47 Manufacture of drinks and tea Light industry 
48 Manufacture of tobacco Light industry 
49 Manufacture of textiles from cotton Light industry 
50 Manufacture of textiles from wool Light industry 
51 Manufacture of textiles from fibre and silk Light industry 
52 Manufacture of knit products Light industry 
53 Manufacture of textile products Light industry 
54 Manufacture of textile, apparel, footwear, and caps Light industry 
55 Manufacture of leather, fur, feather and related products Light industry 
56 Processing of timber, manufacture of wood bamboo, 
rattan, palm and straw products 
Light industry 
57 Manufacture of paper and paper products Light industry 
58 Printing and recorded media Light industry 
59 Manufacture of articles for culture, education and sport 
activity 
Light industry 
60 Manufacture of chemical products for daily use Light industry 
61 Manufacture of other chemical products Light industry 
62 Manufacture of medicines Light industry 
63 Manufacture of chemical fibres Light industry 
64 Manufacture of glass and glass products Light industry 
65 Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware Light industry 
66 Manufacture of fireproof products Light industry 
67 Manufacture of metal products Light industry 
68 Manufacture of household electric appliances Light industry 
69 Manufacture of other electric machinery and equipment Light industry 
70 Manufacture of computers Light industry 
71 Manufacture of communication and other electronic 
equipment 
Light industry 
72 Manufacture of other household electronic appliances Light industry 
73 Manufacture of electronic element and devices Light industry 
74 Manufacture of measuring instruments Light industry 
75 Manufacture of articles equipment for culture, education 
and sport activity 
Light industry 
76 Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing Light industry 
77 Railway transport Service 
78 Road transport Service 
79 Pipeline transport Service 
80 Air transport Service 
81 Water transport Service 
38 
82 Storage Service 
83 Postal services Service 
84 Telecommunications Service 
85 Catering Service 
86 Finance Service 
87 Insurance Service 
88 Real estate Service 
89 Accommodation Service 
90 Resident services and other services Service 
91 Entertainment Service 
92 Polytechnic services Service 
93 Health care Service 
94 Education Service 
95 Sports Service 
96 Social welfare Service 
97 Culture, arts, Radio and television Service 
98 Research and experimental development Service 
99 Geological prospecting Service 
100 Public administration and social organization Service 
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1.7 Appendix B Sensitivity analysis 
The depreciation rate of intangible capital is often not well grounded, both in this study 
and previous studies. To check the robustness of the results, a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted. The changes in parameters in this study are comprehensive and in two 
directions: either increase or decrease. If the changes in both directions make little 
difference, then the contributions of the intangible capital to economic growth are 
believed to be robust. 
 
Table B1 Changes of parameters in sensitivity analysis 
 Base 
case 
Case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Proxy ratio 100% 50% 150%         
𝛅(𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐢𝐛𝐥𝐞) 40%   60% 20%       
𝛅(𝐑𝐃) 20%     10% 40%     
𝛅(𝐄𝐂) 50%       25% 75%   
𝛅(𝐂𝐈) 33%         11% 66% 
Notes: Proxy ratio refers to the ratio of the actual intangible investment to the proxy; δ refers to the 
depreciation rate; RD stands for R&D capital; EC stands for economic competency capital; CI refers to 
computerized information capital (mainly software). 
Source: Author’s own construction. 
 
All the sensitivity analysis results are available upon contacting the author. The changes 
in parameters do not change the significance and signs of the intangibles and the 
changes in regression coefficient is only slight. Therefore, the impacts of intangible 
capital on productivity are considerably robust. 
 
1.8 Appendix C Hausman test for Table 
Table C1 Hausman test for various sectors 
Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
Sector Agriculture Light industry Heavy industry Service 
Prob>chi2 0.2897 0.4841 0.0122 0.0769 
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2. Determinants of intangible investment and its impacts on 
firms’ productivity: Evidence from Chinese private 
manufacturing firms* 
 
Using data from the China Enterprise Survey 2012 conducted by the World Bank, this 
study examines the determinants of intangible investment and its impacts on firms’ 
productivity by private manufacturing firms in China, thus shedding light on recent 
development of intangibles in one of the largest emerging economies in the world. It is 
found that more human capital, larger firm size and better institutional quality increase 
the propensity and amount of intangible investment, and yet fiercer market competition 
generally decreases both the propensity and the amount to invest in intangibles. We also 
provide evidence that the disaggregated components of intangibles are positively 
correlated with firm productivity and there is complementarity between software 
investment and organization investment. Implications for policies to enhance investment 
in intangibles are identified from the empirical results. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Intangible capital consists of the stock of immaterial resources that enter the production 
process and are important for the creation or improvement of products as well as 
production process (Arrighetti et al., 2014). Examples of intangible capital include 
research and development (R&D) investment, advertising, organization capital, staff 
training, technology licences, patents, and copyrights (Corrado et al., 2013). It has been 
                                                   
* This chapter is also published in China and World Economy. 
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identified in the existing literature that intangible capital is playing a growing role in 
determining firm productivity and thus the performance of local economies (Marrocu et 
al., 2012). These mechanisms are at play especially strongly in developed economies 
where competition is mainly based on ideas and innovation and hence firms are 
incentivized to invest resources in developing intangibles. Corrado et al. (2009) estimate 
that the total value of intangible capital in the United States was approximately $3.6 
trillion by the early 2000s, suggesting that intangible investment accounted for over 10 
to 20% of US output growth during that period. Similar phenomena are found in other 
countries including Japan, Korea, a number of OECD economies and China (Awano et 
al., 2010; Borgo et al., 2013; Chun and Nadiri, 2016; Corrado et al., 2013; Corrado and 
Hulten, 2010; Fukao et al., 2009; Haskel and Wallis, 2013; Li and Wu, 2017; Marrano et 
al., 2009; Miyagawa and Hisa, 2013; van Ark et al., 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that recent literature has devoted increasing effort to defining and measuring intangible 
capital and studying its effects on productivity growth (Bontempi and Mairesse, 2007; 
Marrocu et al., 2012).  
 
Apart from measuring intangible capital and its effects on productivity, the mechanisms 
that drive firms to invest in intangibles have increasingly received attention from 
researchers and policy makers (Ebner and Bocek, 2015; Hughes et al., 2006; OECD, 
2011, 2010). Arrighetti et al. (2014) use data for Italian firms to examine the 
determinants of firms’ investment in intangibles and reveal that a firm with a larger size, 
more human capital and more organizational complexity is more likely to invest in 
intangibles. However, studies on why firms invest in intangibles in emerging economies 
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are scarce. Compared with developed economies, emerging economies are often 
regarded to be operating at the lower end of the global value chain, thus requiring 
relatively small intangible capital stock for production activities. Intangible capital often 
plays an important role in firms’ profitability and competitiveness (Marrocu et al. 2012). 
In order to climb up the global value chain, however, firms in developing economies 
need to increase their intangible capital stock, which helps boost competitiveness of 
products as well as productivity of firms. Therefore, understanding the drivers 
underlying firms’ investment in intangibles in an emerging economy provides useful 
information to policy makers who hope to support firms’ investment in intangibles and 
enhance technological and industrial upgrading of the economy.  
 
Another motivation that prompts us to examine intangible investment in an emerging 
economy is that the market environment of emerging economies is often different from 
that in developed economies. Emerging economies tend to have lower human capital 
and underdeveloped institutions. Moreover, because of the lack of core technology and 
patents, firms herein tend to be faced with intense competition on a cost-cutting basis. It 
is therefore important that we examine the determinants of firms’ intangible investment 
in an emerging economy and reveal how the mechanisms may differ from those in 
developed economies. 
 
China, one of the largest emerging economies in the world, shares many characteristics 
featured in other emerging economies. To be specific, China has relatively low human 
capital, underdeveloped institutions, and most of its products face a highly competitive 
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market. China has relatively low intangible capital stock as well. The intangible tangible 
ratios1 of Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom are 17%, 22%, and 24%2 
respectively, while that of China was less than 4% in 20073. Using cross-sectional firm-
level data from the China Enterprise Survey 2012 conducted by the World Bank, this 
study identifies a theoretical framework underlying firms’ intangible investment, tests 
the determinants of firms’ intangible investment derived from the theoretical 
framework, and lastly examines the relationship between intangible investment and firm 
productivity. 
 
To our best knowledge, this study is the first to examine the determinants of different 
types of intangible investment by Chinese firms and to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of how various components of intangible investment impact on firm-level 
productivity. In contrast to previous studies on developed economies such as Arrighetti 
et al. (2014), this study highlights the importance of institutional quality and market 
competition in the context of an emerging and developing economy, and reveals that 
both factors significantly affect the decision to invest in intangibles.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the determinants of intangible investment by a firm. Section 3 describes data 
and the empirical strategy and provides summary statistics. Section 4 presents the 
pattern of intangibles investment in China. Section 5 presents the empirical results on 
                                                   
1 Intangible tangible ratio refers to the ratio of intangible capital to tangible capital. 
2 Tangible capital data is obtained from the Penn World Table 8.1 and intangible capital data is obtained 
from the cross-country intangible investment data website (http://www.intan-invest.net/).  
3 Unpublished manuscript of the authors of this paper. 
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the determinants of intangible investment and how this investment impacts on firm 
productivity. Section 6 draws the conclusion and policy implications from our findings. 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework for analysing firms’ behaviour in intangible 
investment 
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework on firms’ intangible investment and 
derive the hypotheses to be tested with firm-level data in the next section. Assume that a 
firm produces goods and services according to the following production function: 
Y = A(IC, H, θ)F(L, K) 
where Y is value added produced by the firm; H is human capital; L is labour; K is 
physical capital; A is total factor productivity; IC is intangible capital; and 𝜃 represents 
other factors determining total factor productivity. F is a continuous function of L and K 
with F′ > 0 and F′′ < 0, which reflects diminishing marginal returns of labour and 
capital input. Total factor productivity A is an increasing function of intangible capital, 
human capital and other factors, which reflects the fact that intangible capital and 
human capital improve the efficiency and total factor productivity of a firm. The 
productivity boost from intangible capital and human capital follows diminishing 
marginal return. That is, 
∂A
∂IC
> 0, 
∂2A
∂2IC
< 0, 
∂A
∂H
> 0, 
∂2A
∂2H
< 0 and 
∂A
∂IC ∂H
=
∂A
∂H ∂IC
> 0. 
The quality of the human resources employed by firms is a key condition both for the 
generation of new intangible assets and the exploitation of existing intangible assets 
(Abramovitz and David, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2004). Given the fact that the 
production of intangible capital such as R&D and organization capital requires high-
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skilled workers, increases in human capital lowers the costs of investing in new 
intangible capital as well as the cost of using existing intangible capital.  
 
If a firm has sufficient funds, whether it invests in intangible capital or not depends on 
the relative marginal return of intangible capital compared with that of tangible capital4.  
The marginal return from investing in intangible capital is  
∂Y
∂IC
= F(L, K)
∂A(IC, H, θ)
∂IC
 
The marginal return from investing in tangible capital is  
∂Y
∂K
= A(IC, H, θ)F𝐾(L, K) 
Then the difference in marginal return between intangible and tangible capital (DMR) is 
  DMR = F(L, K) ∂A(IC,H,θ)
∂IC
− A(IC, H, θ)FK(L, K)                (1) 
Higher DMR indicates that a firm is more likely to invest in intangible capital instead of 
tangible capital.  
From equation (1), we obtain 
∂DMR
∂K
= FK(L, K)
∂A(IC, H, θ)
∂IC
− A(IC, H, θ)FKK(L, K) > 05 
Intuitively, as the tangible capital of a firm increases, the marginal return of tangible 
capital falls. Meanwhile, as intangible capital improves productivity, that is 
∂A(IC,H,θ)
∂IC
>
0, return of an additional unit of intangible capital increases as the amount of tangible 
capital increases. Both of these two effects cause increased DMR as tangible capital 
grows. As a result, higher tangible capital leads to an increase in DMR, making it more 
likely that the firm invests in intangibles.  
                                                   
4 Tangible capital is also called physical capital. 
5 Noting that FKK(L, K) <0 and A(IC, H, θ) > 0 and therefore FK(L, K)
∂A(IC,H,θ)
∂IC
 and 
−A(IC, H, θ)FKK(L, K) are both positive. 
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This mechanism is summarized as Hypothesis 1 below: 
Hypothesis 1. A larger firm is more likely to invest in intangible capital, with firm size 
measured by the fixed assets (tangible capital) of the firm.  
 
Besides firm size, human capital might also influence firms’ decisions about intangible 
investment. Higher human capital lowers the costs of producing new intangible capital 
and improves the efficiency of using existing intangible capital and therefore raises the 
probability of investing in intangible capital. One example that reflects such 
complementarities between human capital and intangible capital is the large amount of 
human resources employed in direct R&D activities (Liu et al., 2000). More examples 
include the use of advanced software and the introduction of new management 
practices, which all need to be carried out by people with high levels of education. 
With F(L, K) > F𝐾(L, K)
6 and 
∂A
∂IC ∂H
>
∂A
∂H
7, we obtain 
∂DMR
∂H
=
∂A
∂IC ∂H
F(L, K) −
∂A
∂H
F𝐾(L, K) > 0 
which is summarized as Hypothesis 2 below: 
Hypothesis 2. A firm with more human capital is more likely to invest in intangible 
capital.  
 
Institutional quality is another important factor influencing the investment in intangible 
                                                   
6 This is often true in this context. Use the Cobb-Douglas form production function as an example: 
F(L, K) = L𝛼𝐾𝛽 and F𝐾(L, K) = βL
𝛼𝐾𝛽−1. Noting that β < 1 and K > 1, so we have F(L, K) >
F𝐾(L, K). 
7 This is likely to be true because this study focuses on whether a firm invests in intangible capital or not. 
For those that have not invested in intangible capital yet, IC = 0 and thus 
∂A
∂IC ∂H
 is likely to be 
sufficiently large to ensure 
∂A
∂IC ∂H
>
∂A
∂H
. 
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capital. The features of innovation activities as a form of risky investment make them 
particularly sensitive to institutional quality (Jorde and Teece, 1990). Zhou (2014) finds 
that low institutional quality is harmful to R&D investment, using data from Chinese 
firms: in an area where intellectual property is not properly protected, a firm has a 
higher probability of losing some of the intangible capital it produces because its 
designs, R&D and business secrets are more likely to be stolen, which in turn deters 
R&D investment. Mathematically, we add the institutional component into equation (1) 
by modelling it as a rate of survival, and then we have 
DMR = 𝐼𝑄 × F(L, K)
∂A
∂IC
− A(𝐼𝐶, 𝐻, 𝜃)F𝐾(L, K) 
where 𝐼𝑄 is the institutional quality, which indicates the survival rate of intangible 
capital vulnerable to thefts or knockoffs and enters the equation as a probability and 
hence a multiplicative term. Therefore, 𝐼𝑄 × F(L, K)
∂A
∂IC
 is the expected marginal return 
of intangible investment. Then we obtain 
∂DMR
∂IQ
= F(L, K)
∂A
∂IC
> 0  
which forms the basis for Hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3. Lower institutional quality reduces the probability of a firm investing in 
intangible capital vulnerable to thefts or knockoffs.  
 
Another factor to be considered is market competition. The impact of competition on 
firms’ effort to innovate is not yet conclusive in the literature. Some studies have found 
that market competition exerts a negative effect on firms’ incentives to increase their 
R&D efforts (Loury, 1979; Martin, 1993), while others find that only firms with low 
R&D productivity tend to exhibit a lower level of R&D efforts when facing increased 
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market competition (Lee, 2009). A non-linear relationship (inverted U-shape 
relationship) is also proposed by a previous study based on UK data (Aghion et al., 
2005) but a later study (Hashmi, 2013) finds the non-linear relationship non-exists in 
US data. While the theories of Aghion et al. (2005) and Hashmi (2013) both agree that 
firms are less likely to engage in innovation activities when facing a competitive 
market, their main difference is whether the relationship between competition and 
innovation within moderate to medium competition is negative or not, which needs 
further evidence from other economies. In China, firms facing a competitive market are 
likely to earn a low markup from innovating and often earn zero economic profit and 
hence are not able to fund investment in intangibles. In contrast, firms facing an 
oligopoly market are likely to earn a high markup from innovation, and thus more likely 
to invest in intangibles. Firms facing a market between oligopoly and competitive might 
demonstrate a medium propensity to invest in intangibles. This mechanism is 
summarized in Hypothesis 4.  
Hypothesis 4. Firms facing a competitive market are less likely to invest in intangible 
capital while firms facing an oligopoly market are more likely to invest in intangible 
capital, compared with firms facing a market between competitive and oligopoly. 
 
2.3 Data and empirical strategy 
Data used in this study were retrieved from the China Enterprise Survey 2012 
conducted by the World Bank. This dataset covers data in 2011 and consists of 1,523 
private sector8 manufacturing firms from 25 major cities9 in China, with observations 
                                                   
8 Using firms from the private sector has the advantage of better reflecting the economic incentives of 
firms because state-owned firms may invest in intangibles for political purposes. 
9 The 25 cities are as follows: Hefei, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Foshan, Dongguan, Shijiazhuang, 
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covering all manufacturing industries10. The observations are distributed relatively 
evenly across cities, with approximately 50 observations per city and 100 observations 
per stratified sector
11
. The sample was selected using stratified random sampling, which 
ensures that the sample is unbiased. This dataset provides valuable measurements of 
intangible investment as well as firm-level information necessary for the estimation of 
the production function. 
 
The definition of intangible investment used in this study follows that of Corrado et al. 
(2009). The advantage of using this definition is that it covers a broad range of 
expenditure that boosts firm productivity and is therefore a relatively comprehensive 
definition. According to Corrado et al. (2009), intangible capital consists of three main 
categories: computerized information (mainly software), intellectual property (R&D) 
and economic competency (advertising, staff training and organization capital). 
Regarding firms’ intangible investment behaviour, there are two interesting questions to 
answer. One is what determines whether a firm invests in a specific type of intangible or 
not and the other is what determines the amount of investment in a specific type of 
intangible. The unique feature of this firm-level survey is that it includes various 
questions that are highly related to intangible investment. For example, whether a firm 
invests in internal R&D or not is manifested by the question ‘In the last three years, did 
                                                   
Tangshan, Zhengzhou, Luoyang, Wuhan, Nanjing, Wuxi, Suzhou, Nantong, Shenyang, Dalian, Jinan, 
Qingdao, Yantai, Shanghai, Chengdu, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wenzhou. 
10 The industry classification is as follows: food, tobacco, textiles, garments, leather, wood, paper, 
recorded media, refined petroleum product, chemicals, plastics & rubber, non-metallic mineral products, 
basic metals, fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, electronics, precision instruments, 
transport machines, furniture, recycling. 
11 Stratified sector classification is a less detailed classification that includes Food, Textiles, Garments, 
Chemicals, Plastics & rubber, Non-metallic mineral products, Basic metals, Fabricated metal products, 
Machinery and equipment, Electronics, Motor vehicles and Other manufacturing. The use of stratified 
sectors is to avoid the problems of insufficient observations in certain industries. 
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this establishment spend on research and development activities within the 
establishment?’ Table 1 summarizes different measurements of intangible investment to 
facilitate future use of the dataset by other researchers. 
 
Table 1 Measuring intangible investment behaviour 
Category Variable types Relevant questions in the questionnaire 
R&D (Overall) Dichotomous and 
continuous     
CNO.3, CNO.4, CNO.5, CNO.6 
R&D (Internal) Dichotomous and 
continuous 
CNO.3, CNO.4 
R&D (Outsourced) Dichotomous and 
continuous 
CNO.5, CNO.6 
Organization investment12 Dichotomous and 
continuous 
CNo14b, CNo14c, CNo14d, 
CNo15b, CNo15c, CNo15d 
Software investment Dichotomous CNo12e 
Notes: The questionnaire used in the Chinese enterprises survey can be downloaded from 
http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1559.  
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
 
Before we start to explore the intangible investment of firms, it is helpful to examine the 
relationship between intangible investment and firm productivity. We assume a typical 
firm has two inputs – physical capital and labour. The translog approach (Kim, 1992) is 
then used to estimate total factor productivity (TFP) of the firm. Compared with the 
Cobb-Douglas approach, the translog approach removes assumptions of constant output 
elasticities. Specifically, the model specification is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽𝑙𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖
2 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖
2 + 𝑎 + 𝜀𝑖               (2) 
All variables are in natural logarithm values. y is the value added, measured as revenue 
minus cost of intermediate input; k is physical capital; l is labour; 𝑎 is the intercept 
                                                   
12 Organization investment is defined as investment in operation and management improvement as well 
as staff training. Advertising has not been included due to insufficient data. 
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term, which captures the baseline productivity of all firms. Physical capital is measured 
by the reported fixed assets, and labour is measured by the reported number of full-time 
employees. TFP is measured by the error term 𝜀𝑖. 
 
As discussed in section 2, firm-level evidence for emerging countries on how intangible 
capital contributes to TFP growth is rare. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
relationship between TFP and intangible investment using data from Chinese firms. Due 
to data availability, software investment and organization investment are in the form of 
dummy variables. Besides intangibles, information and communication technology 
(ICT) capital (Atzeni and Carboni, 2006) and exports (Arnold and Hussinger, 2005; 
Wagner, 2007) have also been found to have significant impacts on firms’ productivity 
and therefore control variables for ICT investment and export are necessary for the 
empirical model. Moreover, Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) argue that the use of new 
software is often accompanied by organizational redesign and changes in the skill mix 
of employees based on data from US firms. Adopting new software indicates changes in 
the production process, which requires investment in organization. It is important to 
examine whether such a complementary relationship is present in the case of Chinese 
firms. Therefore, an interaction term between organization investment and software 
investment is also included in the empirical model. The model specification is hence as 
follows: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑇_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅&𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 
+𝛽5𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 × 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑎 + 𝜀𝑖    (3)                  
where 𝐼𝑇_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 is the annual costs of IT equipment investment divided by the 
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fixed assets; 𝑅&𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 is internal R&D expenditure13 divided by the fixed 
assets; 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm invests in software or 
not; 𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a dummy indicating whether a firm invests in organization 
capital or not; 𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 is the interaction term between 
𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒; 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 is a dummy indicating whether a firm exports 
or not; 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 consists of a number of dummies indicating the industry a 
firm belongs to; 𝑎 is the intercept term. Of all the variables, 𝐼𝑇_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 
𝑅&𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 are in natural logarithm values.  
 
To study the determinants of intangible investment, we adopt two steps. The first is to 
study the propensity to invest in intangibles and the second is to study the quantity of 
investment. Four factors discussed in section 2 will be examined. They include human 
capital, market competition, firm size and institutional quality. That is, 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒_𝑑𝑝,𝑖 = 𝛽1ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽3𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑦_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 +
𝑎 + 𝜀𝑖                                                              (4)                               
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒_𝑞𝑝,𝑖 = 𝛽1ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽3𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑦_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 +
𝑎 + 𝜀𝑖                                                              (5)                                                             
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒_𝑑𝑝,𝑖 stands for whether firm i invests in intangible investment p or not; 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒_𝑞𝑝,𝑖 refers to the amount firm i invests in intangible investment p; 
                                                   
13 The reason we exclude outsourced R&D is that it significantly limits the number of observations due 
to too many zero observations. 
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ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 is the average human capital of a firm, measured by the average 
educational years of permanent workers; 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a dummy 
indicating whether a firm faces a competitive market or not, measured by whether a 
firm reports its number of competitors as too many to count
14
; 𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑦_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 is a 
dummy indicating whether a firm faces an oligopoly market or not, measured by 
whether a firm reports its number of competitors as no more than five or not
15
; 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is 
the firm size, measured by the fixed assets of a firm; 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is local institutional 
quality, measured by the NERI Index of Marketization for China’s provinces published 
by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Fan et al., 2011). The NERI Index 
of marketization is a common tool used as an indicator of China’s provincial institution 
quality. It consists of five dimensions: how strong the government intervention is, how 
intensive the economic activities of non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOE) is, 
development of the product market, development of the factor market, and development 
of the legal system and intellectual property protection. The surveyed enterprises are all 
located in the capital city or major cities of a province and therefore it is appropriate to 
use the provincial index to represent the institutional quality of a city. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 
indicates whether a firm exports or not, which is an important control variable. Many 
studies find that whether a firm exports or not is positively correlated with its 
innovation (Baldwin and Gu, 2004; Becker and Egger, 2013; Roper and Love, 2002; 
Wakelin, 1998) and therefore controlling for export is necessary. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 
symbolizes the industry fixed effect. Of all the variables, ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 and 
                                                   
14 Different firms might have different standard for ‘too many to count’. However, this variable at least 
indicates whether a firm views itself as facing a competitive market. 
15 One of the key features of an oligopoly is that the market is dominated by a small number of firms. 
Five is a reasonable threshold and varying the threshold number does not change the results. 
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𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 are in natural logarithm values while others are dummies. 
 
Some key variables of interest might be subject to endogeneity. Firms may only report 
the competitors that produce similar products but neglect the producers of relevant 
substitutes and complements. Similar products might often require a similar level of 
intangible investment (entry barrier), which leads to estimation being biased. The 
reported number of competitors might also be determined by intangible investment 
levels because firms might only consider firms with similar intangible investment levels 
as competitors. When it comes to institutional quality, it may be associated with 
unobserved social-economic characteristics that might be correlated with intangible 
investment. Nee and Opper (2012) also suggest that institutional quality might be 
endogenously determined by the needs of firms: when increasing number of firms are 
engaged in innovation activities, government may have incentives to establish proper 
institutions to accommodate the changes.  
 
Therefore, two sets of instruments are respectively proposed to partially resolve the 
relevant issues. First, the percentage of total annual sales of goods paid after delivery 
(firms as the seller, selling final products) and the percentage of materials or services 
input paid after delivery (firms as the buyer, buying intermediate goods). On the one 
hand, these two variables provide information on the common payment type within the 
industry, which is often custom-based and not able to be influenced by an individual 
firm in the short run; on the other hand, they reveal objective historical information on 
competition within the final product market and intermediate product market, with both 
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substitutes and complements being considered. Moreover, there is no direct link 
between these two variables and intangible investment except through market 
competition, which is an important criterion that instruments must satisfy. Second, the 
mortality rates during the Great Famine (1959 – 1961) are used as instruments for 
institutional quality, following Wang et al. (2014). As Wang et al. (2014) argue, a 
region’s ability to fight natural disasters is correlated with its institutional quality at the 
time. According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), institutions are path dependent and 
thus a region with weaker institutions in the past is likely to have weaker institutions 
today. Furthermore, the mortality took place during the planned economy period when 
all economic activities were guided by the central government instead of market forces, 
which is uncorrelated with today’s social-economic characters that might be associated 
with intangible investment. As a result, mortality rates during the Great Famine are 
qualified instruments for institutional quality in this context. 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. Heterogeneity of 
firms in their investment in intangibles can be seen from the range of the statistics. 41% 
of the firms have invested in R&D recently and most of the R&D is internal since the 
ratio of firms with overall R&D investment and the ratio of firms with internal R&D 
investment are considerably close. When it comes to organization and software 
investment, 77% and 45% of the firms have invested, respectively. 67% of the firms 
face a competitive market while 7% of the firms face an oligopoly market. The variation 
in firm size as manifested by labour quantity and tangible quantity is large.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics (overall) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
R&D (Overall, dichotomous) 1,550 0.406452 0.491329 0 1 
R&D (Overall, continuous) 1,024 1987827 3.01e+07 0 9.00e+08 
R&D (Internal, dichotomous) 1,550 0.388387 0.487541 0 1 
R&D (Internal, continuous) 1,550 1548257 1.17E+07 0 3.00E+08 
R&D (Outsourced, dichotomous) 1,550 0.107742 0.310154 0 1 
R&D (Outsourced, continuous) 1,550 657719.4 1.54E+07 0 6.00E+08 
Organization investment 
(Dichotomous)  
1,550 0.767097 0.422818 0 1 
Organization investment 
(Continuous)  
1,550 1.628387 0.862282 0 3 
Software (Dichotomous) 1,550 0.445161 0.497144 0 1 
ln(VA) 1,545 16.32839 1.63567 11.28978 24.15725 
ln(K) 1,346 15.44729 1.857326 5.713733 25.10554 
ln(L) 1,550 4.451218 1.285376 1.609438 10.31642 
ln(Human capital) 1,530 2.298944 0.198954 0 2.890372 
Competitive 1,550 0.671613 0.469778 0 1 
Oligopoly 1,550 0.066452 0.24915 0 1 
ln(IQ) 1,550 2.259194 0.172053 1.983756 2.4681 
ln(RD_intensity) 459 -2.4982 1.83159 -6.95655 3.35241 
ln(IT_intensity) 1,169 -3.81444 2.130712 -10.5969 7.408631 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
2.4 Pattern of intangibles investment in China 
To shed more light on the pattern of Chinese firms’ investment in intangibles, we look at 
both the geographical and sectoral distribution of intangibles. Figures 1 to 3 
demonstrate the percentage of firms investing in intangibles in various cities in China. 
The larger the size of the circle, the higher the percentage of firms with positive 
investment in intangibles. From Figure 1, we can see that the percentage of firms 
investing in R&D is higher in Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta than those in 
northern China. Firms in Chengdu, Shenyang, Qingdao, Tangshan and Shijiazhuang 
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have significantly lower percentages compared with other cities in this sample. Figure 2 
shows that the percentage of firms investing in organization capital is relatively more 
even across different cities. Figure 3 shows that software investment has a similar 
pattern to R&D investment. Overall, firms in Chengdu, Shenyang, Qingdao, Tangshan 
and Shijiazhuang have low intangible investment percentages among all cities. 
 
Figure 1 Percentage of firms investing in R&D (City level) 
 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
 
Figure 2 Percentage of firms investing in organization capital (City level) 
 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
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Figure 3 Percentage of firms investing in software (City level) 
 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
 
Figure 4 depicts the percentage of firms investing in intangibles in various sectors. 
Amongst the three components of intangibles, organization investment is most evenly 
distributed across sectors and most commonly made by firms compared with the other 
two components, with about 70% of firms investing in organization capital. Software 
investment is less evenly distributed across sectors compared with organization 
investment, and around 50% of firms invest in software. There is higher variation 
between sectors in the percentage of firms with positive R&D investment. Among all 
sectors, fabricated metal products, basic metals, garments and textiles have low 
percentages of R&D investment. 
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Figure 4 Percentage of firms investing in intangibles (sectoral level) 
 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
With the above knowledge of the overall pattern of intangibles investment by firms in 
China, we will now conduct firm-level analysis to delve into the underlying economic 
mechanisms of firms’ investment in intangibles.  
 
2.5 Firm-level evidence 
In this section, we report the empirical findings on testing the four hypotheses about the 
determinants of intangible investment developed in section 2 and how intangibles 
impact firm productivity. Probit regressions are used to examine how determinants 
influence the probability of investing in intangibles, while Tobit regressions are adopted 
to examine how determinants affect the amount of intangible investment, accounting for 
the zero-value observations of intangible investment. Table 3 illustrates the determinants 
of software investment and organization investment while Table 4 presents the 
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determinants of R&D investment, both in the form of marginal effects. All the factors 
mentioned in section 2 are found to play an important role in determining intangible 
investment.
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Table 3 Determinants of software investment and organization investment (marginal effects) 
 Probit Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES software software(IV) organization organization(IV) organization organization(IV) 
HC 0.248*** 0.132*** 0.0710 0.171 0.226 0.171 
 (0.0802) (0.0362) (0.0562) (0.114) (0.146) (0.114) 
CM -0.0956*** -0.418*** -0.113*** -0.174*** -0.180*** -0.174*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0146) (0.0284) (0.0541) (0.0691) (0.0541) 
Oligo 0.136** 0.205*** -0.129** -0.459*** -0.242* -0.459*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0412) (0.0511) (0.101) (0.130) (0.101) 
Size 0.0476*** 0.0275*** 0.0367*** 0.135*** 0.165*** 0.135*** 
 (0.00719) (0.00435) (0.00626) (0.0123) (0.0158) (0.0123) 
Institution 0.111 0.225*** -0.132* -0.499*** -0.686*** -0.499*** 
 (0.0776) (0.0760) (0.0723) (0.136) (0.173) (0.136) 
Export 0.118*** 0.0592*** 0.0650** 0.146** 0.185** 0.146** 
 (0.0330) (0.0186) (0.0315) (0.0581) (0.0745) (0.0581) 
Observations 1,297 1,298 1,297 1,298 1,298 1,298 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
HC stands for human capital; CM refers to whether a firm faces a competitive market or not; Oligo indicates whether a firm faces an oligopoly market or not; Size is the size of a firm, 
measured by the amount of fixed asset; Institution stands for the institution score of the province where a city is located.  
Source: Authors’ own calculation.  
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Table 4 Determinants of R&D investment (marginal effects) 
 Probit Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES R&D R&D(IV) internal 
R&D 
internal 
R&D(IV) 
outsourced 
R&D 
outsourced 
R&D(IV) 
R&D R&D(IV) internal 
R&D 
internal 
R&D(IV) 
outsourced 
R&D 
outsourced 
R&D(IV) 
HC 0.0942 0.275 0.155** 0.461** -0.164*** -0.998*** -1.960e+07 1.074e+06 1.76E+06 1.657e+06 -4.892e+07*** -2.114e+06 
 (0.0646) (0.190) (0.0638) (0.193) (0.0498) (0.216) (2.046e+07) (5.074e+06) (1.73E+06) (1.723e+06) (1.179e+07) (2.292e+06) 
CM -0.0767*** 0.0434 -0.0891*** 0.205 -0.0186 -0.0714 -1.988e+07* -991,190 6.31E+05 1.660e+06 -5.789e+06 1.308e+06 
 (0.0294) (0.333) (0.0289) (0.305) (0.0198) (0.464) (1.106e+07) (2.464e+06) (8.16E+05) (0) (6.213e+06) (1.114e+06) 
Olio 0.154*** 0.965*** 0.147*** 0.686* 0.0528 0.485 7.067e+07*** 2.158e+07*** 5.88E+06*** 6.460e+06*** 3.228e+07*** 8.465e+06*** 
 (0.0563) (0.324) (0.0556) (0.360) (0.0345) (0.335) (1.788e+07) (4.988e+06) (1.53E+06) (2.125e+06) (9.795e+06) (2.512e+06) 
Size 0.0759*** 0.226*** 0.0744*** 0.223*** 0.0250*** 0.141*** 1.925e+07*** 2.698e+06*** 1.47E+06*** 1.458e+06*** 8.039e+06*** 661,531*** 
 (0.00735) (0.0219) (0.00722) (0.0226) (0.00543) (0.0264) (2.597e+06) (567,584) (1.86E+05) (184,388) (1.471e+06) (246,948) 
Institution 0.302*** 1.089*** 0.327*** 1.015*** 0.00984 1.079*** 7.434e+07** 1.082e+07* 2.55E+06 2.625e+06 1.102e+07 2.885e+06 
 (0.0734) (0.318) (0.0725) (0.324) (0.0491) (0.412) (3.056e+07) (6.181e+06) (2.04E+06) (2.793e+06) (1.686e+07) (3.805e+06) 
Export 0.117*** 0.339*** 0.107*** 0.319*** 0.0838*** 0.467*** 4.991e+07*** 7.526e+06*** 2.96E+06*** 2.699e+06*** 2.723e+07*** 2.034e+06* 
 (0.0308) (0.0954) (0.0303) (0.0947) (0.0182) (0.112) (1.083e+07) (2.738e+06) (8.79E+05) (909,370) (6.082e+06) (1.166e+06) 
Observations 1,297 1,298 1,297 1,298 1,297 1,298 930 900 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
HC stands for human capital; CM refers to whether a firm faces a competitive market or not; Oligo indicates whether a firm faces an oligopoly market or not; Size is the size of a firm, 
measured by the amount of fixed asset; Institution stands for the institution score of the province where a city is located.  
Source: Authors’ own calculation.  
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On Hypothesis 1, the results show that a firm of a larger size is more likely to invest in 
intangibles. On average, a 1% increase in firm size is respectively associated with a 0.05 
percentage point increase in the probability of investing in software, a 0.07 percentage 
point increase in the probability of investing in R&D, a 0.08 percentage point increase 
in the probability of investing in internal R&D, a 0.03 percentage point increase in the 
probability of investing in outsourced R&D and a 0.04 percentage point increase in the 
probability of investing in organization capital. If considering the results based on 
instruments, the probability change is larger for R&D and organization investment but 
smaller for software investment. Intangible capital can be used firm-wide and has 
economy of scale. Therefore, it is not surprising that a firm of larger size is more likely 
to invest in intangibles. 
 
On Hypothesis 2, it is found that human capital significantly increases the propensity of 
investing in software and internal R&D but insignificantly increases overall R&D and 
significantly decreases outsourced R&D. On average, a 1% increase in average 
educational years of permanent workers is respectively associated with a 0.25 
percentage point increase in the probability of investing in software, a 0.09 percentage 
point increase in the probability of investing in R&D, a 0.16 percentage point increase 
in the probability of investing in internal R&D, a 0.16 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of investing in outsourced R&D and a 0.07 percentage point increase in the 
probability of investing in organization capital. When it comes to IV regressions, the 
results are generally robust although the coefficient is smaller for software investment 
while larger for R&D and organization investment. While human capital generally 
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promotes intangible investment, it encourages a firm to internalize its R&D, as 
indicated by the negative sign of the outsourced R&D. A possible reason is that human 
capital lowers the costs of R&D and therefore a firm is less likely to outsource its R&D.  
 
Looking at Hypothesis 3, we find that institutional quality significantly affects 
intangible investment. A 1% increase in institutional quality is associated respectively 
with a 0.11 percentage point increase in the probability of investing in software, a 0.30 
percentage point increase in the probability of investing in R&D, a 0.33 percentage 
point increase in the probability of investing in internal R&D, a 0.01 percentage point 
increase in the probability of investing in outsourced R&D and a 0.13 percentage point 
decrease in the probability of investing in organization capital. The results from the IV 
approach remain generally robust with the effects larger in all types of intangible 
investment. While better institutional quality leads to a higher propensity to invest in 
intangibles, better institutional quality decreases the propensity of investing in 
organization capital. One possible reason for this is that the baseline operation 
efficiency is correlated with the external institutional quality. Firms do not exist in 
vacuum and therefore are influenced by the external environment. The effects of 
external environment on firms’ innovation activities or organization investment have 
been well documented (Damanpour and Schneider, 2006; Kong, 2008). However, the 
effects of external institutional quality on organization investment have not been well 
studied. Institutional quality, including the degree of government intervention in 
enterprise activities, spillover effects of the advanced management practices from FDI, 
law enforcement and rule awareness are likely to significantly impact on the baseline 
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operation efficiency. Specifically, when governments constantly intervene in the 
operational activities of enterprises, when the spillover effects of advanced management 
practices from FDI are high, or when the rule awareness of workers is low, enterprises 
are more likely to invest in organization capital to improve operational efficiency. 
Therefore, when external institutional quality is low, the return from organization 
investment is likely to be high and thus the probability of investing in organization 
capital is high; when external institutional quality is high, the return from organization 
investment is likely to be low and thus the probability of investing in organization 
capital is low. 
 
In terms of Hypothesis 4, the results suggest that a firm facing a competitive market has 
a lower probability of investing in intangibles as well as a lower amount of investment 
in intangibles than a firm facing moderate market competition. On average, a firm 
facing a competitive market respectively has a 9.6 percentage point lower probability of 
investing in software, a 7.7 percentage point lower probability of investing in R&D, a 
8.9 percentage point lower probability of investing in internal R&D, a 1.9 percentage 
point lower probability of investing in outsourced R&D and a 11.3 percentage point 
lower probability of investing in organization capital according to Table 3 and 4. When 
it comes to firms facing an oligopoly market, on average they have a 13.6 percentage 
point higher probability of investing in software, a 12.9 percentage point lower 
probability of investing in organization capital, a 15.4 percentage point higher 
probability of investing in R&D, a 14.7 percentage point higher probability of investing 
in internal R&D and a 5.28 percentage point higher probability of investing in 
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outsourced R&D. If we look at the coefficients from the instrumental regressions, the 
results change slightly with larger impacts for software and organization investment. 
The impacts on R&D investment become insignificant for firms facing a competitive 
market while they become larger for firms facing an oligopoly market. The outcomes 
suggest a negative relationship between market competition and most intangible 
investment except organization investment, and an inverted U-shape relationship 
between market competition and organization investment. A possible reason for this is 
that the boost to product markup from most intangible capital is smaller when market 
competition is fierce (low R&D productivity, consistent with Lee, 2009), which 
indicates a generally negative relationship between market competition and most 
intangible investment. One exception is organization capital, which often helps reduce 
operating costs instead of increasing product markup. When competition is too fierce, 
firms might lack relevant economic resources to invest in organization, and when 
competition is limited (oligopoly), firms might tend to increase product markup by 
investing in other types of intangibles instead of cutting costs through organization 
investment. As a result, propensity to invest in organization may peak when firms are 
facing moderate competition. As mentioned earlier, the existing literature has 
intensively discussed the impacts of market competition on innovation. Some argue that 
fierce market competition erodes returns from innovations (Loury, 1979; Martin, 1993; 
Roberts, 1999) while others argue that the effects of market competition are beneficial 
for innovation (Bertschek, 1995; Blundell et al., 1995; Lee and Wilde, 1980; Nickell, 
1996) or the effects are two-sided (Aghion et al., 2005; Lee, 2009). However, empirical 
evidence for emerging economies is lacking. This finding contributes to this strand of 
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literature by providing new evidence from Chinese firms. 
 
Apart from the four hypotheses mentioned earlier, exporting has been found to be an 
important factor of intangible investment behaviour, which is consistent with the 
existing literature (Baldwin and Gu, 2004; Becker and Egger, 2013; Roper and Love, 
2002; Wakelin, 1998). Export firms on average have an 11.8 percentage point higher 
probability of investing in software, a 6.5 percentage point lower probability of 
investing in organization, an 11.7 percentage point higher probability of investing in 
R&D, a 10.7 percentage point higher probability of investing in internal R&D and an 
8.38 percentage point higher probability of investing in outsourced R&D. 
 
When it comes to the amount of intangible investment, the results are similar, including 
those derived from IV regressions. According to Tables 3 and 4, size remains 
significant, which indicates a positive correlation between size and the amount of 
intangible investment. As for human capital, it generally increases the amount of 
intangible investment, but its effect is either weakly significant or insignificant. Higher 
institutional quality is likely to increase R&D expenditure, including overall, internal 
and outsourced expenditure, but the effect is either insignificant or weakly significant. 
However, higher institutional quality significantly reduces the intensity of organization 
investment, which is consistent with the results of probit models. The effects of market 
competition on intangible investment are generally insignificant except on organization 
investment and R&D. The effects of export remain robust across all models.
68 
Table 5 shows the relationship between various intangible investments and TFP of 
firms. The contributions of various intangible investments to TFP29 are generally 
significant across all models. According to models (1) to (4) in Table 5, a 1% increase in 
IT equipment intensity and R&D intensity is respectively associated with 0.09% and 
0.15% increase in firm productivity; a firm with software investment on average has 9% 
higher productivity than that without; a firm with organization investment on average 
has 10.5% higher productivity than that without; an export firm on average has 15% 
higher productivity than that without. If all types of intangible investments are 
incorporated in the estimation, software investment and export become insignificant. 
Moreover, the interaction between software investment and organization investment is 
also significant, which indicates a complementary effect between these two factors. 
Specifically, the productivity boost from organization investment of a firm with 
software investment is 0.63 higher than that of a firm without software investment and 
vice versa; investing in software without investing in organization capital even has a 
negative effect on firm productivity.
                                                   
29 TFP of firms is calculated using the translog approach according to equation (2) and results are 
available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 5 Intangible investment and TFP 
 log(TFP) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
log(IT_intensity) 0.0944***    0.0704** 0.0701** 0.0737** 0.0811** 
 (0.0141)    (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0325) (0.0327) 
log(R&D_intensity)  0.150***   0.0982*** 0.0940*** 0.0942*** 0.0897** 
  (0.0251)   (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.0352) 
software   0.0907*   0.142* 0.0830 -0.506** 
   (0.0520)   (0.0854) (0.0883) (0.233) 
Organization    0.105*   0.345*** 0.204* 
    (0.0557)   (0.111) (0.116) 
Organization*software        0.632** 
        (0.246) 
Export 0.148** 0.157* 0.160** 0.167*** 0.138 0.115 0.102 0.114 
 (0.0635) (0.0888) (0.0635) (0.0632) (0.0944) (0.0988) (0.0979) (0.0982) 
Constant 0.0512 0.0952 -0.262 -0.313 0.103 0.00883 -0.280 -0.146 
 (0.189) (0.284) (0.195) (0.203) (0.292) (0.289) (0.302) (0.304) 
Observations 1,165 458 1,342 1,342 405 405 405 405 
R-squared 0.075 0.137 0.035 0.035 0.154 0.159 0.170 0.176 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
2.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
Intangibles have been identified as an important source of productivity improvement 
and economic growth for developed economies. The determinants of firms’ investment 
in intangibles are mostly researched for these economies as well. In this paper, we 
contribute to this strand of literature by focusing on the case of China, one of the largest 
emerging economies. We describe the pattern of intangible investment by Chinese 
firms, reveal the determinants of intangible investment and analyse how intangibles 
affect firm productivity.  
 
The results of our estimates confirm the four hypotheses developed from the theoretical 
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framework in section 2. We find that human capital, size and institutional quality 
generally increase both the propensity and quantities of intangible investment and 
market competition generally decreases the propensity and quantities of intangible 
investment, which is consistent with Loury (1979), Martin (1993) and Hashmi (2013) 
but different from Aghion et al. (2005). Specifically, firms facing an oligopoly market 
are more likely to invest in intangibles while firms facing a competitive market are less 
likely to invest in intangibles. The only exception is organization investment, where an 
inverted U-shape relationship with market competition is identified. This indicates that 
the propensity to invest in organization capital may peak when firms are facing 
moderate market competition. Evidence on the propensity is more statistically robust 
than that on quantities. One interesting finding is that higher human capital is associated 
with a lower propensity for outsourced R&D, which is consistent with the assumption in 
section 2 that higher human capital can lower the costs of producing intangible 
investment. Another interesting discovery is that better institutional quality is associated 
with lower organization investment. A possible reason for this is that institutional 
quality is associated with the baseline organization capital and further investment is 
unlikely to improve productivity much if the baseline capital is high.  
 
Having explored the determinants of investment in intangibles, this study continues to 
examine the positive impacts of various intangible investment and ICT investment on 
the productivity of Chinese firms. It is found that the three components of intangibles, 
that is, software investment, R&D investment and organization investment, as well as 
ICT investment, are significantly positively correlated with firm productivity, and there 
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is a complementary effect between organization investment and software investment.  
 
Our findings also provide important implications for policy-making in emerging 
economies. Emerging economies are often trying to climb up the global value chain and 
therefore need to accumulate intangible capital to improve value added of product and 
productivity. Policies that encourage firms to build up proprietary technology and 
knowledge of production and thus enable firms to move away from highly competitive 
segments of the market, increase education and human capital, and improve institutional 
quality such as strengthened protection of property rights in general and intellectual 
property rights in particular, are likely to encourage intangible investment by firms and 
boost the productivity of firms as a result. 
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3. Organization investment in a transitional economy: The 
role of ownership control type 
Organization capital as an important production factor has been well studied in 
developed countries but has received little attention in transitional economies. This 
study aims to fill this gap with data from Chinese listed firms. First, this study confirms 
the importance of organization capital in firm production in China by providing some 
empirical evidence. Second, this study confirms the interaction between ownership 
control type and organization capital in the context of a transitional economy. The study 
finds that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) invest more in organization capital due to low 
employee turnover but have a lower effect of organization capital in improving firms’ 
performance compared with that of private enterprises. This finding is supported by a 
simple theoretical model as well as empirical evidence and strengthens the importance 
of deepening the SOE reforms in China. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Intangible capital has become an increasingly important production factor in determining 
economic growth in recent years. It is therefore not surprising that the literature has 
devoted much attention to its role in economic growth (Awano et al., 2010; Borgo et al., 
2013; Chun and Nadiri, 2016; Corrado et al., 2013; Corrado and Hulten, 2010; Fukao et 
al., 2009; Haskel and Wallis, 2013; Marrano et al., 2009; Miyagawa and Hisa, 2013; van 
Ark et al., 2009). Organization capital, which is an important component of intangible 
capital, has also received much attention (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005; Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou, 2014, 2013; Tronconi and Marzetti, 2011). Different from other intangible 
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capital, organization capital is embodied in firms’ key employees, which indicates that 
firms risk losing some of this capital when key employees leave (Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou, 2013). Given the fact that organization capital is embodied in firms’ key 
employees, it is likely that the decision to invest in organization capital is affected by 
employee turnover, and the contribution of organization capital to firms’ productivity is 
influenced by firms’ institutions. For instance, if turnover of employees in a firm is high, 
then the firm may be less willing to invest in organization capital; if a firm has institutions 
that prevent incompetent key employees from being demoted or fired, the efficiency of 
organization capital is likely to be low. However, interactions between organization 
capital, turnover of employees and institutions of firms have received little attention and 
this study aims to fill this gap.  
 
Testing the effects of employee turnover on organization capital investment as well as the 
impacts of institutions on the efficiency of organization capital requires significant 
heterogeneity in institutions and employee turnover. The prevalent existence of state-
owned enterprises1 (SOEs) in a transitional economy like China provides a valuable 
opportunity to study these interactions. There is still a large group of SOEs listed in the 
stock market of China. In 2012, the market value of those companies accounted for 51.4% 
of the total market value of the Chinese stock market (The Central People’s Government 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2013). SOEs in China have features that are 
significantly different from those of private enterprises. The current human management 
practice in SOEs, at least partly, inherits the life-long job security, seniority-based 
                                                   
1 SOEs in this paper are defined as firms controlled by central or municipal governments. 
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promotion and wage, and the extensive in-company welfare programs including housing, 
schooling, medical care et cetera from the pre-reform human management practice, and 
as a result the employees in SOEs demonstrate high organization commitment and the 
turnover of employees is relatively low (Yu and Egri, 2005). The key employees in SOEs, 
on the one hand, enjoy favourable salary remuneration as business leaders while on the 
other, are often deeply integrated into China’s nomenklatura system2 and bianzhi system3: 
they have ranks as the government officers and can become a government officer of the 
same rank (Brødsgaard, 2012). Consistent with Yu and Egri (2005) and Brødsgaard 
(2012), Shen and Lin (2009) also find that the top management turnover is significantly 
smaller in SOEs than private enterprises after controlling other variables using data from 
Chinese listed companies. What can be inferred from the literature? It is possible that the 
institutions embodied in the ownership control types lead to the differences in employee 
turnover as well as the potential differences in organization capital efficiency. In this study, 
I focus on one aspect of the institutions, that is, human management practice. The 
aforementioned human management practice implies that the life-long job security 
provided by SOEs makes it difficult to demote or fire incompetent key employees. Based 
on this implication, I construct a simple theoretical model to analyse how this feature of 
SOEs causes low employee turnover as well as lower organization capital efficiency and 
then conduct empirical analysis to test the hypothesis derived from this simple model 
using data from Chinese listed firms.  
                                                   
2 The nomenklatura system refers to the Communist Party's governance to make appointments to key 
positions throughout the governmental system, as well as throughout the party's own hierarchy. 
3 Bianzhi system is a list of authorized personnel, as well as their duties and functions in government 
bodies, state enterprises and service organizations. Bianzhi applies to all the formal employees while 
nonmenklatura applies to the key positions. For details of the bianzhi system, please see Brødsgaard 
(2002). 
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Before studying the aforesaid interaction between organization capital and institutions, it 
is helpful to first confirm the role of organization capital in firm-level production in China, 
which is another contribution of this study. Although organization capital has been well 
documented in developed economies, relevant studies on developing economies are rare. 
Developing economies, different from developed economies, often have underdeveloped 
institutions and low human capital as well as low intangible capital stock. Organization 
capital as one category of intangible capital may therefore exert a different effect given 
the different context embodied in developing economies and this study will provide 
relevant firm-level evidence. 
 
This essay is organized as follows. The next section measures firm-level organization 
capital in Chinese listed firms and confirms its role as a critical production factor; section 
3 is a simple theoretical model on how the features of SOEs in China lead to lower 
employee turnover, higher organization investment as well as lower efficiency of 
organization capital; section 4 provides empirical evidence for higher organization capital 
investment as well as lower efficiency of organization capital in SOEs; section 5 is the 
conclusion and provides policy implications. 
 
3.2 The role of organization capital in production: Evidence from 
Chinese listed companies 
Before studying the interaction between the firm ownership control type and organization 
capital, it is important to confirm the role of organization capital in firm-level production 
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in China. Therefore, an extended Cobb-Douglas production function with organization 
capital is assumed and the logarithm of both sides is taken. The following is obtained 
Qit = Ait + 𝛽𝑜lnOit + 𝛽𝑘lnKit + 𝛽𝑙lnLit 
Q𝑖𝑡 denotes the annual sales of a firm, O𝑖𝑡 denotes the organization capital of a firm, 
Kit denotes the book assets of a firm and Lit denotes the number of employees of a firm. 
Moreover, for comparison, a standard Cobb-Douglas production function is also assumed 
as follows 
Qit = Ait + 𝛽𝑘lnKit + 𝛽𝑙lnLit 
The notations are similar to the extended production function. Several estimation methods 
are used including Pooled OLS (POLS), fixed effects (FE) and the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) (LP) approach. Compared with POLS and FE, the LP approach addresses the 
problem of estimation bias caused by unobservable productivity shocks. A key issue in 
production function estimation is the correlation between the un-observable productivity 
shocks and input levels. A firm responds to positive productivity shocks by expanding 
output and input. Negative shocks lead to an industry reducing output and input usage. 
When true, ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of production functions are likely to be 
biased, which leads to biased estimates of productivity. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
address this problem by introducing a proxy for productivity shocks and then use the 
GMM estimation method. The proxy used in this study is the percentage change in total 
assets, which includes information on current investment4 as well as the retained profits 
that are likely to respond positively to the productivity shock.  
 
                                                   
4 Current investment is commonly used as a proxy for productivity shocks in Olley and Pakes (1996). 
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Data and methodology 
Data in this study is mainly from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR). Although the stock market of China was established in December 
1990, the data in this study spans from 1999 to 2013, the reason for which is that data 
before 1999 misses key variables used to measure organization investment. Measurement 
of organization capital follows relevant accounting and financial literature on 
organization capital (Black and Lynch, 2005; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013) by using 
firms’ selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expense as the proxy for organization 
capital investment. The perpetual inventory method is adopted to derive the amount of 
organization capital. The rationale behind using SG&A expenditure to measure 
organization capital is that a large part of it is related to the wage of management workers, 
staff training, consulting and IT expenses that form organization capital. The Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) is used as the deflator in this study following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2013). Mathematically, the perpetual inventory method is summarized as follows 
O𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)O𝑖𝑡−1 +
SG&A𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡
 
where 𝛿  is the depreciation rate of organization capital, which is 15% 5  following 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the consumer price index
6. To implement the 
law of motion of organization capital, an initial stock of organization capital has to be 
chosen and the method to calculate it follows Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) by using  
O0 =
𝑆𝐺&𝐴1
𝑔 + 𝛿
 
𝑔 is chosen according to the average real growth rate of firm-level SG&A in the same 
                                                   
5 The depreciation of 15% is equal to the depreciation rate used by the BEA in its estimation of R&D 
capital in 2006 and changes in the depreciation rate from 10% to 50% do not change the results (Eisfeldt 
and Papanikolaou, 2013). 
6 The base year is 1990. 
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industry7. Compared with Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) who use the average real 
growth rate of overall firm-level SG&A, the method used in this study better reflects the 
growth pattern of organization capital investment within a specific industry and is 
therefore likely to be more accurate. Observations with zero organization capital are 
dropped following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). 
 
Production function estimation 
Due to differences in production structure, observations are split 8  into two groups, 
namely, non-service and service groups9 , which ensures the results are robust across 
different industries. Table 1 reports the results for the non-service group while those for 
the service group are reported in Table 2. These two tables tell a consistent story and 
several points deserve mention. First, organization is a significant production factor 
across all models as well as the two industrial groups. Second, adding organization capital 
consistently drags down the coefficients of both tangible capital and labour and the drag-
down is larger for labour, which indicates that although organization capital is positively 
correlated with both labour and tangible capital, it correlates more with labour. Third, the 
input elasticity of organization capital is higher in the service-group than the non-service 
group, which is consistent with the labour-intensity feature of the service group.  
 
What do all these points imply? While organization capital is an important production 
                                                   
7 The industry classification is obtained according to the level 2 classification of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock exchange, which divides all firms into 160 industries. 
8 The output elasticity of production factors is likely to differ between the two groups. Estimating 
separately would reveal the potential heterogeneous role of organization capital. 
9 Since the list of industry classification includes 160 industries, the division of non-service and service 
groups is available upon contacting the author. 
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factor in China, it interacts more with labour, which is consistent with the fact that 
organization capital is embodied in key employees.  
 
Given the scarcity of studies of organization capital in developing economies, it is 
beneficial to compare the results of Table 1 and 2 with counterparts for developed 
economies. The benchmark for comparison is obtained from Tronconi and Marzetti 
(2011). Tronconi and Marzetti (2011) use data from European listed firms and conduct 
similar analysis as this study. One of the significant differences in the input elasticity 
between European firms and Chinese firms is that input elasticity of capital is much 
higher while the input elasticity of labour is much lower in Chinese firms. However, the 
difference in input elasticity of organization capital is relatively small between Chinese 
firms and European firms. Some implications may be drawn from these two findings. The 
significant differences in the input elasticity of capital and labour might be due to 
differences in industrial components and production structure between China and Europe. 
However, the role of organization capital that is embodied in key employees is similar, at 
least during the data period of the two studies. 
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Table 1 Production function estimation: non-service group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS FE FE LP LP 
log(K) 0.930*** 0.765*** 0.804*** 0.713*** 0.838*** 0.833*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0189) (0.0235) (0.0267) (0.0586) (0.0490) 
log(L) 0.208*** 0.131*** 0.152*** 0.120*** 0.204*** 0.125*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0158) (0.0174) 
log(OC)  0.281***  0.253***  0.318*** 
  (0.0193)  (0.0323)  (0.0187) 
Constant -0.851*** -0.694*** 2.595*** 1.017**   
 (0.283) (0.252) (0.472) (0.488)   
Observations 10,685 10,685 10,685 10,685 6,929 6,929 
Number of id N/A N/A 1,880 1,880 N/A N/A 
R-squared 0.830 0.848 0.796 0.803 N/A N/A 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OC refers to 
organization capital. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
Table 2 Production function estimation: service group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES POLS POLS FE FE LP LP 
log(K) 0.756*** 0.613*** 0.784*** 0.711*** 0.854*** 0.870*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0271) (0.0562) (0.0567) (0.112) (0.147) 
log(L) 0.348*** 0.195*** 0.281*** 0.222*** 0.348*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0279) (0.0353) (0.0370) (0.0291) (0.0322) 
log(OC)  0.406***  0.352***  0.448*** 
  (0.0396)  (0.0717)  (0.0421) 
Constant 1.883*** 0.219 1.825 -1.441   
 (0.463) (0.453) (1.286) (1.199)   
Observations 3,665 3,665 3,665 3,665 2,355 2,355 
Number of id N/A N/A 619 619 N/A N/A 
R-squared 0.722 0.756 0.659 0.669 N/A N/A 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OC refers to 
organization capital. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
3.3 Employee turnover and efficiency of organization capital in 
Chinese SOEs: A simple model 
After confirming the importance of organization capital in the production of Chinese 
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listed firms, this section discusses the interaction between organization capital and 
institutions. Before proceeding, it is necessary to first define the efficiency of organization 
capital. The efficiency of organization capital in this study refers to the contribution of a 
unit of organization capital to firms’ performance. As mentioned before, organization 
capital is embodied in key employees and therefore its efficiency is likely to be influenced 
by institutions. The institutional features of SOEs are distinct from those of private 
enterprises. SOEs in China are supervised by the local or central government through the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and at least 
partially inherit the human resource management practice from the Chinese governments. 
Specifically, Chinese SOEs are deeply integrated into the bianzhi system. Once an 
employee is recruited as a formal employee and enters the bianzhi system, it is extremely 
difficult to demote or fire that employee unless she or he commits serious mistakes. When 
it comes to private enterprises, it is easier to demote or fire an employee. How does the 
difference in human resource management practice lead to the possible difference in the 
efficiency of organization capital? It is necessary to consider the features of the job market. 
In reality, the job market is information asymmetric and therefore an employer can hardly 
understand the true value of an employee until the employee has worked for some time. 
As a result, it is necessary for the employer to adjust the payment to the employee after 
observing the true value of the employee. However, the human resource management 
practice in SOEs increases the difficulty in adjusting the payment and thus influences the 
efficiency of the economic resources paid to the key employees. 
 
Motivated by the difference in human resource management practice between SOEs and 
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private enterprises in China as well as inspired by the analytical framework of Greenwald 
(1986), a simple two-period model is proposed for analysis. The agents in this model are 
management workers who enter the labour force for management positions at the 
beginning of period one. There are two types of firms recruiting management workers in 
the job market, namely, SOEs and private enterprises. During period one, workers are 
hired and work over period one. At the end of period one, they may choose to either 
remain with their initial employers or change jobs. After working two periods, all 
employees retire. This temporal sequence of events is shown in Figure 1. Next, a few 
assumptions are made. 
 
Figure 1 Timeline of the two-period model 
 
Assumption 1. Each worker L𝑖 is characterized by a partly observable ability measured 
by θ𝑖. Potential employers can observe the ability with an error before employing but 
can observe the true value after one period of employment. The error obeys a uniform 
distribution within (−α,α) for the whole population but is fixed for an individual. The 
observed ability is denoted by θ̅𝑖 = θ𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖 in period one, where 𝑟𝑖 is the fixed error 
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term of individual i.  
 
Assumption 2. A firm offers wage based on the ability θ̅𝑖 it observed. Denote 𝑤(θ̅𝑖) 
as the wage function. The definition of 𝑤(θ̅𝑖) is as follows: 
𝑤(θ̅𝑖) = 𝜎θ̅𝑖; 
where 𝜎 is a constant wage coefficient for a worker’s ability. However, the salary of a 
worker in a SOE is not able to be decreased in period two if the worker chooses to 
remain. 
 
Assumption 3. A worker randomly enters a management position of a private enterprise 
or an SOE if the wage offered is the same.  
 
Assumptions 4. The efficiency of organization capital is measured by the ratio of total 
ability to the total wage for management positions, that is, 
E =
∑ θ𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
, 
where 𝐼 is the index set of management workers of a firm in a single period. 
 
Assumption 1 captures the fact that employers can observe the ability of the employees 
by some signals such as education, performance at interview, et cetera but the observation 
is biased. Assumption 2 captures the difference in the wage policy between private 
enterprises and SOEs. In SOEs, once the salary is set it cannot be decreased. Assumption 
3 captures the feature of the contingent nature of job seeking10. Assumption 4 expresses 
                                                   
10 Job market candidates are myopic and cannot foresee what will happen in period two at the beginning 
of period one. This is a relatively strong assumption that aims to simplify the model.  
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the efficiency of firms’ organization capital in terms of ability per unit of currency.  
 
At the beginning of period two, an employee decides whether to remain in the original 
firm or not. The decision rule is to choose the path that maximizes the wage in period two. 
According to assumption two, employers know the true ability of employees at the 
beginning of period two. In private enterprises the wage of workers will be adjusted to 
reflect their true ability while in SOEs only the wage of undervalued workers will be 
adjusted to reflect their true ability because wage cannot be decreased in SOEs. If they 
choose to leave an enterprise and enter the job market again, they will be offered a salary 
based on their observed ability, that is, 𝑤(θ𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖) and a non-zero reallocation cost 𝑐 
will be incurred11. Thus, the net benefit of quitting in private enterprises is: 
𝑤(θ𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖) − 𝑤(θ𝑖) − 𝑐 
That of quitting in SOEs is: 
{
𝑤(θ𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖) − 𝑤(θ𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖) − 𝑐 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖 > 0
𝑤(θ𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖) − 𝑤(θ𝑖) − 𝑐     𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖 < 0
 
Recalling that the form of wage function is assumed in assumption 2, then the net 
benefit of quitting in a private enterprise is: 
𝜎𝑟𝑖θ𝑖 − 𝑐 
and an individual in a private enterprise quits if 
𝑟𝑖 >
𝑐
𝜎
 
The ratio of quitting workers in private enterprises therefore depends on the distribution 
of the error term. Recalling that 𝑟𝑖 is assumed to obey a uniform distribution
12 within 
                                                   
11 The reallocation cost is caused by job market friction. Job market friction is the friction in the form of 
information gathering delay and turnover cost which is commonly observed (Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1999). Therefore, a reallocation cost should be included in this model. 
12 The distribution itself does not influence the implications of the model and just changes the ratio of 
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(−α,α), then the ratio of quitting in private enterprises is 
{
α𝜎 − 𝑐
2α𝜎
      𝑖𝑓 𝑐 < α𝜎 
0           𝑖𝑓 𝑐 ≥ α𝜎 
  
In SOEs, the net benefit of quitting is: 
{
−𝑐                   𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖 > 0
−𝑟𝑖𝜎 − 𝑐              𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖 < 0
, 
It is obvious that quitting always generates a negative net benefit, and as a result no 
workers will quit in SOEs under the model settings13, which forms the first proposition 
of this study: 
 
Proposition 1. Private enterprises have higher employee turnover than SOEs if job 
market friction is not extremely large, that is, 𝑐 < α𝜎. As a result, SOEs are likely to 
invest more in organization capital compared with their private counterparts14. 
 
α𝜎 is the quitting gain from information asymmetry for individuals with the largest 
deviation between true ability and observed ability and 𝑐  is the cost from quitting 
(caused by job market friction). This proposition highlights the low employee turnover in 
SOEs that might lead to a higher organization capital investment in SOEs than in private 
enterprises. 
 
The organization capital efficiency of the remaining employees in a typical SOE, 
                                                   
quitting in private enterprises. Therefore, uniform distribution is chosen for simplicity. 
13 Quitting due to personal reasons has not been accounted for because the aim of this study is to 
compare the difference in quitting between private enterprises and SOEs. If I follow the assumption of 
Greenwald (1986) by assigning the same probability of quitting due to personal reasons, it will not change 
the difference in quitting between the private enterprises and SOEs. 
14 The simple model does not include a component modelling how firms invest in organization because it 
is unlikely to provide additional information by adding a decision function with employee turnover. 
Therefore, a logic-based approach is used. 
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expressed in the form of total ability ∑ θ𝑖𝑖∈𝐼  divided by total payment to the remaining 
employees ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 , is derived as follows 
E𝑠 =
∑ θ𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
=
∑ θ𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
∑ 𝜎θ𝑖 +
1
4 𝛼𝜎𝑁(𝐼)𝑖∈𝐼
 
where the subscript 𝑠  denotes SOEs, 𝑁(𝐼)  is a function denoting the number of 
workers in the index set 𝐼 of remaining management workers in a firm in period two and 
1
4
𝛼𝜎𝑁(𝐼)15 is the excess payment for the remaining overvalued management workers. 
 
The organization capital efficiency of the remaining employees in a typical private 
enterprise is: 
E𝑝 =
∑ θ𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
=
∑ θ𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
∑ 𝜎θ𝑖𝑖∈𝐼
=
1
𝜎
 
where the subscript 𝑝 denotes private enterprises. Obviously, E𝑠 < E𝑝 and therefore 
the second proposition is summarized as follows: 
 
Proposition 2. SOEs have lower organization capital efficiency than private enterprises, 
which is caused by the excess payment for the remaining overvalued16 management 
workers. 
 
Up to this point, I have not yet accounted for the lower sensitivity of earnings to 
performance (Yu and Egri, 2005) as well as the lower risk in SOEs due to soft budget 
constraints (Kornai et al., 2003) than in private enterprises, which is likely to cause less 
turnover of employee and less efficiency of organization capital. However, this simple 
                                                   
15 Noting that half of remaining employees in a typical SOE are overvalued with an average amount of 
1
2
𝛼. 
16 Overvalued means a worker is being paid at a rate higher than that appropriate to her/his ability. 
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model does provide a clue as to how the institutions in SOEs are able to lower employee 
turnover and impair the efficiency of their organization capital. Empirical evidence for 
the above propositions will be demonstrated in the sections below. 
 
 
3.4 Empirical evidence from Chinese listed firms 
 
3.4.1 Methodology 
SOEs are likely to invest more in organization capital and the efficiency of organization 
capital in the SOEs is likely to be lower, as per the propositions in section 3. To test these 
propositions, one needs to first measure intensity of organization capital as well as 
ownership control type of a firm and then construct an interaction term between 
ownership control type and organization capital. The following demonstrates details on 
this process. 
 
Measuring intensity of organization capital. There are two ways to measure organization 
capital intensity. The first is to use the ratio of organization capital to book assets17 as 
done by Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). The second is to directly use organization 
capital but add the book assets as a control variable. In this study, both measurements are 
adopted to ensure the robustness of results. 
 
Measuring ownership control type. Measurement of ownership control type is based on 
the proportion of state-owned shares. Traditionally, holding 20% or more of the shares is 
                                                   
17 The ratio of organization capital to book asset has been winsorized at level 1% and 99% to alleviate the 
effects of the outliers. 
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viewed as being able to effectively control a firm when shares are not concentrated. 
Therefore, this study defines listed companies with more than 20% of shares owned by 
the state as SOEs. While this definition is correct in most cases, there are still some cases 
where a listed company is controlled by a private investor though the state-owned shares 
ratio is more than 20%, or a listed company is controlled by the state though the state-
owned shares ratio is less than 20%. To alleviate potential worries on the threshold of 
defining an SOE, this study conducts sensitivity analysis by changing the threshold to 
either 10% or 30%18. Changing the threshold to 50% or more is inappropriate because 
most of the listed SOEs have a state share ratio less than 50%.  
 
Measurements of firm performance. Three measurements that are commonly used in the 
financial literature are used in this study, including return of asset (ROA) and operation 
cash flow of asset (CFOA) and Tobin’s Q. Return of asset is used to measure the 
profitability of a company while operation cash flow of asset is a measurement of profit 
quality, and Tobin’s Q is a growth indicator from the perspective of the stock market. The 
logarithms of the above measurements are taken for the convenience of comparison19. 
 
Control variables. The main control variables are those commonly used in the financial 
literature, including size, leverage, and fixed industry-level characteristics as well as 
external shocks. Size measured by the book assets controls for the economy of scale. 
                                                   
18 Varying the threshold to 10% or 30% does not change the results. The results of the sensitivity analysis 
are available upon contacting the author. 
19 ROA and CFOA may have negative values if an enterprise has a loss or the revenue quality of an 
enterprise is poor. Taking the logarithm of ROA and CFOA means dropping all the negative and zero 
observations. However, the results do not change if the levels of ROA and CFOA are used. 
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Leverage measured by the ratio of total debts to total assets reflects the capital structure 
effect. Different industries may have different characteristics in organization capital 
intensity and therefore 159 industry dummies are added according to the level two 
industry classification20 of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. To 
control for potential systematic shocks, year effects are also controlled. 
 
3.4.2 Summary statistics 
Table 3 demonstrates the summary statistics for organization capital (OC), SOE dummy, 
book assets and leverage. This sample consists of 2,510 listed firms and an average time 
span of around 6 years. The amount of organization capital is significant in Chinese listed 
firms, with a mean of RMB 6,560,018 for the non-service group and a mean of RMB 
4,305,280 for the service group. However, compared with book assets, the mean of which 
is RMB 7,460,000,000 for the non-service group and RMB 6,560,000,000 for the service 
group, the amount of organization capital is still much smaller than that of book assets. 
This is consistent with the production structure in China: physical capital still plays an 
important role in production while management is less important. In a developed 
economy such as the US, the median organization capital to physical capital ratio is as 
high as 1.079 (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). The possible explanation is as follows: 
first, the labour wage is low in a developing country compared with the costs of machines, 
buildings et cetera; second, China is likely to have more secondary industries than the US 
and therefore requires more equipment and buildings than the US. According to the mean 
of SOE dummy, approximately 37% of observations are classified as SOEs. The average 
                                                   
20 This classification divides all the firms into 160 industries. I drop one dummy to prevent collinearity. 
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leverage, which is measured by the mean of debt to asset ratio, is not high, at 45% for the 
non-service group and at 79% for the service group. The sample in this study is generally 
reasonable and representative, with both sufficient observations of SOEs and private 
enterprises, as well as observations of generally normal leverage. 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics 
Non-service group 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
OC overall 6560018 52800000 453.70  2.08E+09 N =   11082  
between 
 
45500000 103484.20  1.55E+09 n =    1886  
within 
 
19200000 -699000000 8.07E+08 T-bar = 5.88 
SOE dummy overall 0.36  0.48  0.00  1.00  N =   11082  
between 
 
0.36  0.00  1.00  n =    1886  
within 
 
0.33  -0.57  1.27  T-bar = 5.88 
Book assets overall 7.46E+09 4.92E+10 17900000 2.34E+12 N =   11082  
between 
 
4.7E+10 153000000 1.53E+12 n =    1886  
within 
 
1.79E+10 -5.26E+11 8.22E+11 T-bar = 5.88 
Leverage overall 0.45  1.05  0.00  96.96  N =   11082  
between 
 
0.70  0.01  28.27  n =    1886  
within 
 
0.82  -27.41  69.15  T-bar = 5.88 
Service group 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
OC overall 4305280 18600000 43109.62  5.52E+08 N =    3916  
between 
 
16100000 52870.06  3.49E+08 n =     624  
within 
 
7932396 -220000000 2.07E+08 T-bar = 6.28 
SOE dummy overall 0.39  0.49  0.00  1.00  N =    3916  
between 
 
0.35  0.00  1.00  n =     624  
within 
 
0.35  -0.53  1.32  T-bar = 6.28 
Book assets overall 6.56E+09 2.13E+10 84823.6 4.79E+11 N =    3916  
between 
 
1.57E+10 159000000 2.14E+11 n =     624  
within 
 
1.32E+10 -1.12E+11 3.63E+11 T-bar = 6.28 
Leverage overall 0.74  14.19  0.01  877.26  N =    3916  
between 
 
5.11  0.02  125.91  n =     624  
within 
 
13.13  -124.72  752.09  T-bar = 6.28 
Notes: SOE dummy=1 if SOE and SOE dummy=0 if private enterprise. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
3.4.3 Results 
Organization capital investment 
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Table 4 reports the results on differences in organization capital investment between SOEs 
and private enterprises. Both measurements of organization capital indicate that SOEs 
invest more in organization capital than private enterprises, which is consistent with 
proposition 1. Specifically, on average SOEs have 3% more organization capital or a 3% 
higher ratio of organization capital to book assets than private enterprises. When it comes 
to firm size, a larger size is associated with a larger amount of organization capital but 
with a lower ratio of organization capital to book assets. This might indicate that while 
larger firms need more organization capital, the relationship is concave. The reason might 
be that organization capital, as a type of intangible capital, can be simultaneously used in 
several activities (McGrattan and Prescott, 2014, 2010) and thus have an economy of 
scale. Leverage is positively correlated with both the absolute amount of organization 
capital and the ratio of organization capital to book assets. High leverage often indicates 
a firm is expanding and therefore the firm might require more organization capital. 
 
Table 4 Differences in organization capital investment between private enterprises and 
SOEs 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ln(OC) ln(OC/K) 
SOE 0.0369*** 0.0334*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0128) 
Size 0.789*** -0.187*** 
 (0.00749) (0.00560) 
Leverage 0.00971*** 0.00118*** 
 (0.00158) (0.000332) 
Constant -2.937*** -3.436*** 
 (0.157) (0.120) 
Observations 14,998 14,998 
R-squared 0.720 0.426 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Notes: Pooled OLS regression; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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The efficiency of organization capital 
Organization capital is embodied in key employees of a firm and thus its efficiency may 
be influenced by the institutions of the firm. In an SOE, due to the existence of the bianzhi 
system, it is difficult to demote or fire a formal employee. Moreover, because the main 
shareholder is the government and monitoring is relatively weak, the wage of managers 
is likely to be less sensitive to their performance compared with that of private enterprises, 
which provides fewer incentives for managers to work hard. To test whether ownership 
control type and its associated institutions influence the efficiency of organization capital, 
an interaction term between the logarithm of organization capital to book assets and a 
SOE dummy is incorporated into the model specifications.  
 
First, the role of organization capital in three performance measurements of listed firms 
is tested. According to (1), (2) and (3) in Table 5, an increase in the ratio of organization 
capital to book assets significantly improves firm performance. On average, a 10% 
increase in the organization capital book assets ratio is predicted to increase 1.67% in 
CFOA, 1.1% in ROA and 1.4% in Tobin’s Q.  
 
Second, the efficiency difference in organization capital of different ownership control 
types is tested. The interaction term is negative across (4), (5) and (6) and is significant 
in (4) and (5), which provides some evidence on proposition 2 that the efficiency of 
organization capital is lower in SOEs compared with that of private enterprises in China. 
On average, a 10% increase in the ratio of organization capital to book assets is correlated 
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with a 1.04% increase in CFOA for SOE and a 2.07% increase in CFOA for private 
enterprises; a 10% increase in the ratio of organization capital to book assets is correlated 
with a 0.824% increase in ROA for SOE and a 1.28% increase in ROA for private 
enterprises; a 10% increase in the ratio of organization capital to book assets is correlated 
with a 1.28% increase in Tobin’s Q for SOEs and a 1.47% increase in Tobin’s Q for 
private enterprises. 
 
The property rights theory of firms suggests that SOEs should perform less efficiently 
and profitably than private enterprises (Alchian, 1965). Although in some research SOEs 
have better performance than private enterprises because of the limited competition due 
to regulation in some industries, SOEs do perform worse than private enterprises under a 
competitive environment (Boardman and Vining, 1989). Unsurprisingly, Chinese SOEs 
are not an exception. On average SOEs perform worse than private enterprises after 
controlling for industry and year effects. The lower efficiency in organization capital is 
likely to be one of the contributors to the worse performance of SOEs than private 
enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to deepen SOE reforms in China to improve the 
efficiency of Chinese SOEs. 
 
Table 5 The role of organization capital in firm performance in the context of different 
ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Ln(CFOA) Ln(ROA) Ln(Tobin's Q) Ln(CFOA) Ln(ROA) Ln(Tobin's Q) 
Ln(OC/K)  0.167*** 0.110*** 0.140*** 0.207*** 0.128*** 0.147*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0124) (0.00819) (0.0189) (0.0149) (0.0101) 
Ln(OC/K) *SOE    -0.103*** -0.0456** -0.0186 
    (0.0244) (0.0207) (0.0123) 
SOE    -0.736*** -0.361** -0.153* 
    (0.176) (0.154) (0.0894) 
Size 0.0657*** 0.139*** 0.181*** 0.0660*** 0.141*** 0.183*** 
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 (0.0104) (0.0199) (0.00695) (0.0105) (0.0204) (0.00693) 
Leverage 0.000303 -1.736*** 0.0141*** 0.000425 -1.734*** 0.0141*** 
 (0.000794) (0.220) (0.00421) (0.000820) (0.221) (0.00421) 
Constant -3.664*** -4.824*** -3.209*** -3.379*** -4.451*** -3.173*** 
 (0.230) (0.346) (0.144) (0.246) (0.398) (0.156) 
Observations 11,366 13,308 14,998 11,366 13,308 14,998 
R-squared 0.087 0.179 0.314 0.088 0.179 0.314 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Pooled OLS regression; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
3.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
Physical capital is unlikely to be affected by institutions because, regardless of institutions, 
machines and equipment are likely to run the way they are designed. However, 
organization capital, which is capital embodied in the key employees of a firm, is likely 
to be affected by institutions. The prevalence of SOEs in China provides a rare 
opportunity for testing the role of institutions in investment and efficiency of organization 
capital. Based on data from Chinese listed firms, this study confirms the importance of 
organization capital as a production factor in China based on consistent evidence from 
OLS, fixed effects and the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) models. Service is likely to rely more 
on organization capital than non-service. The coefficients of organization capital in the 
production function are close to those of Tronconi and Marzetti (2011) but the ratio of 
organization capital to book assets is much smaller in China. 
 
A simple theoretical model capturing some important characteristics of the human 
resource management practice in SOEs is constructed in this study to discuss the source 
of low employee turnover and low efficiency of organization capital in SOEs. Demoting 
or firing a formal employee is difficult in SOEs and therefore the wage of employees 
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cannot be adjusted to reflect their true ability when they demonstrate ability lower than 
expected. The model argues that excess payments to employees whose ability is 
previously overestimated are one of the reasons that SOEs have relatively low employee 
turnover and relatively low organization capital efficiency. 
 
The empirical evidence is consistent with the predictions of the simple model. SOEs, on 
average, have around 3.5% more organization capital compared with private enterprises, 
which is likely to be a result of the relatively low employee turnover in SOEs. The result 
is robust across two measurements of organization capital: the level of organization 
capital and the ratio of organization capital to book assets, after controlling for size, 
leverage, industry and year effects. The difference in organization capital efficiency is 
also significant. SOEs on average have lower organization capital efficiency than private 
enterprises. The difference is robust across three key measurements of firm performance: 
CFOA (operation cash flow of asset), ROA (return of asset) and Tobin’s Q. 
 
This study provides an important basis for policies promoting organization investment in 
China. Organization capital has become an important production factor for China 
according to the results of this study, and a further increase in productivity requires further 
investment in organization capital. Moreover, this study reveals the importance of 
continuing reforms in SOEs of China. The efficiency of organization capital is relatively 
low in SOEs because human resource management practice is inflexible and external 
effective supervision is relatively weak. According to Zhang (2006), managers of SOEs 
are selected and reviewed by bureaucrats instead of capitalists, which indicates relatively 
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weak supervision from the bureaucrats because the bureaucrats do not own the capital of 
the SOEs. To improve the efficiency of organization capital in SOEs, the wage system 
and human resource administration system in SOEs should be more flexible and 
marketized, which would aim to reduce excess payments to employees as well as to 
provide more incentives for management to work hard. Specifically, the current bianzhi 
system in SOEs should be eliminated and contract-based employment should dominate. 
Once the bianzhi system is extinguished, direct interventions from the government and 
inflexibility in human resource management is minimized because the key employees in 
SOEs will no longer be parts of the bureaucratic system. Then firms can adjust excess 
payments to previously overpaid employees more easily. Moreover, further privatization 
is needed to allow private power to be involved in the corporate governance of SOEs. For 
instance, top managers of SOEs should be selected via the professional manager market 
instead of through appointment from the government. With supervision from private 
power, the efficiency of organization capital in SOEs is also likely to increase. 
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4. Intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity: Evidence from 40 
economies between 1995––2007* 
Intangible capital has been found to be an increasingly important source of productivity 
and economic growth. However, its effects on energy intensity have received little 
attention. Given the importance of reducing energy intensity, this study advances the 
understanding of the relationship between intangible capital and sectoral energy 
intensity by taking advantage of a rich dataset of 40 economies derived from the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD), spanning across 13 years (1995 – 2007). A relatively 
robust causal relationship between intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity has 
been identified. The qualitative and quantitative interactions of this relationship with 
income level and sectoral heterogeneity have also been revealed. It is found that the 
effect of intangible capital in reducing sectoral energy intensity generally diminishes 
along with increasing income level but moderate quadratic relationship is identified in 
some types of intangible capital. Finally, sectors where intangible capital has the largest 
and smallest effect are also pinpointed. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Intangible capital has been identified to have significant impacts on economic activities. 
Intangible capital is often defined as the immaterial resources that enter the production 
process and are of importance for the creation of new products as well as the 
improvement of existing products and the production process. Examples of intangible 
capital include research and development (R&D) investment, advertising (brand equity), 
                                                   
* This chapter has also been published in Energy Policy. 
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organization capital, staff training, technology licences, patents, and copyrights 
(Corrado et al. 2013). Numerous economists have devoted much effort to measuring it 
as well as evaluating its role from various perspectives, including studies on intangible 
capital as a source of growth in different economies at both national and sectoral level 
(e.g. van Ark et al. 2009; Corrado and Hulten 2010; Chun and Nadiri 2016), discussion 
on the role of intangible capital in firms’ valuation and productivity (e.g. Atkeson and 
Kehoe 2005; Arato and Yamada 2012; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013; Gourio and 
Rudanko 2014) and adding intangible capital to solve macroeconomic puzzles (e.g. 
McGrattan and Prescott 2010; Borgo et al. 2013; Gourio and Rudanko 2014a). 
 
While the economic effect of intangible capital has been well documented, its 
environmental counterpart has received little attention. One important environmental 
dimension is the change in energy intensity, or energy efficiency, associated with the 
increasing use of intangible capital. Energy intensity remains a concern of climate change 
and environmental scientists due to the fact that economic activities still primarily rely on 
fossil fuels (Wang et al. 2011; Zhang and Da 2015). Although renewable energy is 
growing over time, it is unlikely to take a leading role in the near future when facing the 
increasing energy demand. World energy consumption is forecast to increase by 48% by 
2040 and fossil fuels are likely to still account for more than 3/4 of the world energy 
consumption by then (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016). Air pollution from 
the consumption of fossil fuels has been an increasing health concern: it is now the fourth 
greatest risk factor for human health worldwide (International Energy Agency, 2016). 
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Energy efficiency (EE), often measured by energy intensity, is a cost-effective way to 
decouple economic growth from energy demand and its associated carbon emissions and 
other pollutions. Energy efficiency is regarded as a key policy to reconcile the increasing 
tension between economic growth and climate change mitigation around the world (Han 
et al., 2018). Decreasing energy intensity is a direct method to decouple economic growth 
from energy consumption and associated carbon emissions (Proskuryakova and Kovalev, 
2015). Reducing energy intensity is also considered to be an effective approach to 
mitigating climate change, addressing peak oil and improving energy security (Sadorsky, 
2013). The European Union (EU) has made energy intensity a key pillar of its climate 
change strategy (Löschel et al., 2015). Furthermore, the decline in sectoral energy 
intensity is found to be a major driver of the decline in aggregate energy intensity 
(Greening et al. 1997; Ma and Stern 2008; Sue Wing 2008; Voigt et al. 2014; Wang and 
Wei 2016), which indicates that it is important to study the factors that drive the dynamic 
of sectoral energy intensity. 
 
Although the role of intangible capital in economic and productivity growth has been 
widely discussed in the existing literature, a causal relationship between intangible 
capital and sectoral energy intensity has not yet been established. The literature often 
focuses on the role of R&D (Fisher-Vanden et al., 2004; Herrerias et al., 2016; Newell 
et al., 1999) but neglects the roles of other types of intangible capital in energy 
efficiency improvement. Furthermore, the heterogeneous effects of intangible capital on 
sectoral energy intensity in various sectors and economies of different development 
stages remain unknown.  
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This study aims to advance the knowledge of the role of intangible capital in affecting 
energy intensity by taking advantage of a rich worldwide dataset from the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD) developed within the 7th Framework Programme of the 
European Commission and providing a much more comprehensive analysis on the role 
of intangible capital in sectoral energy intensity.  
 
This study is important for both academic and policy areas. This study will advance the 
knowledge on the relationship between intangible capital and energy intensity and the 
heterogeneous effects of intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity across 
economies of different development stages as well as various sectors. The study is also 
useful to policy makers for better understanding the heterogeneous role of intangible 
capital in various economies and sectors. For example, this study will inform the 
industry and policy makers of a few new channels for reducing energy intensity in 
addition to R&D investment. The role of intangible capital in improving energy 
efficiency among countries at different development levels also can inform the global 
efforts on narrowing development gap (Sheng and Shi, 2013) and achieving the UN 
goals of Sustainable Energy for All. Pinpointing sectors can also suggest priority areas 
for investing in intangible capital across sectors for the purpose of reducing energy 
intensity.  
 
The contributions of this paper are fourfold. First, it constructs a large sectoral dataset of 
intangible capital across 40 economies that is suitable for econometric analysis for 
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future studies. Second, it innovatively establishes a theoretical causal relationship 
between intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity. Third, it provides new 
knowledge on the heterogeneous effects of intangible capital on sectoral energy 
intensity, which might generate important information for policy analysis. Analysis by 
sector and by economy is conducted to reveal how the effects of intangible capital vary 
in different sectors as well as at different development stages. Fourth, the effects of 
income on the reduction effect of intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity are 
identified. 
 
This essay is organized as follows: the next section describes the definition and 
measurement of sectoral energy intensity and intangible investment; section 3 discusses 
the theoretical linkage between intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity; section 
4 depicts the data and methodology; section 5 explains the empirical results; section 6 
draws the conclusion.  
 
4.2 Measuring sectoral energy intensity and intangible capital 
4.2.1 Sectoral energy intensity 
Two definitions of sectoral energy intensity co-exist in the literature: one is energy use 
divided by sectoral value added and the other is energy use denominated by sectoral 
gross output. Both methods have theoretical basis, and their uses depend on the method 
of decomposition applied. If aggregate energy intensity is decomposed using index 
decomposition analysis (IDA), then we have the following: 
𝐼 =
𝐸
𝑌
= ∑
𝑌𝑖
𝑌
𝐸𝑖
𝑌𝑖
𝑖
= ∑ 𝑆𝑖𝐼𝑖
𝑖
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I is the aggregate energy intensity in an economy of which the definition is aggregate 
energy use E divided by gross domestic product (GDP) Y of the economy. 𝑌𝑖 is the 
value added of sector i, 𝐸𝑖 is the energy use of sector I, and 𝑆𝑖 is the share of sector i 
in the aggregate economy. Obviously, the energy intensity of sector i, 𝐼𝑖, in this context 
should be defined as sectoral energy use divided by sectoral value added to avoid the 
double counting problem found with the other definition. 
 
If the aggregate energy intensity is decomposed using the structural decomposition 
analysis (SDA), then we have the following1: 
𝐸 = ε̂(I − A)−1?̂? 
E is the aggregate energy use; ε̂ is a diagonal matrix of energy intensity in different 
sectors; (I − A)−1 is the Leontief inverse; ?̂? is a diagonal matrix of the final demand. 
In this case, sectoral energy intensity is defined as sectoral energy use divided by 
sectoral gross output. 
 
In this study, the definition of energy intensity comes from the IDA method, that is, 
sectoral energy use divided by sectoral value added. The use of this definition is 
common in the existing literature (Zhang 2003; Ma and Stern 2008; Mulder and de 
Groot 2012; Wu 2012). The measurement of sectoral energy use is derived from the 
World Environmental Account in the WIOD. The sectoral energy use data in the WIOD 
is aggregated across 26 energy carriers and is measured in physical units (TJ). The 
sectoral value added is acquired from the World Supply and Use Tables in WIOD, 
                                                   
1 For the derivation of the SDA equation, please see appendix A. 
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which will be deflated to 1995 constant USD2.  
 
4.2.2 Intangible capital 
In the recent two decades, increasing effort has been devoted to finding suitable 
measures for intangible capital. Two common measures are currently being used. One is 
based on aggregate estimates derived from firm expenditures on ‘intangibles’ such as 
R&D, advertising and innovation (Corrado et al., 2009) while the other is mainly based 
on the reported intangible assets in firms’ balance sheets (Marrocu et al., 2012). The 
empirical evidence in both cases is unanimous in pointing at intangible capital as a key 
element in the modern knowledge economy. When it comes to intangible capital at 
sectoral level, it is more appropriate to adopt an expenditure-based approach and 
therefore this study follows the approach of Corrado et al. (2009).  
 
To estimate intangible capital stock, the first step is to measure the flow of intangible 
investment. Three types of intangible expenditure defined by Corrado et al. (2009) are 
derived from the intermediate statistics from the supply and use tables within the 
WIOD, which is summarized in Table 1. The accumulation of intangible capital follows 
the standard perpetual inventory method:   
IC𝑠,𝑡 = IC𝑠,𝑡−1(1 − 𝛿𝑠) + 𝐼𝑁𝑠,𝑡 
where IC refers to intangible capital; the subscripts s and t respectively denote 
intangible capital s and time; 𝛿 refers to depreciation rate; 𝐼𝑁 is intangible 
investment. To implement the law of motion of intangible capital, an initial value must 
                                                   
2 The deflation method used will be introduced in section 4.1. 
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be chosen, which is according to  
IC𝑠,0 =
𝐼𝑁𝑠,0
𝑔𝑠 + 𝛿𝑠
 
where 𝑔𝑠 is chosen to match the average real growth rate of the intangible investment s 
in a sector.  
 
Table 1 Measurement and depreciation rate of intangible investment 
Intangible investment Method    Depreciation rate3 
Computerized information Distribute the aggregate gross fixed investment 
in computerized information according to the use 
of ‘computer and related services’ intermediate 
0.33 
Innovative property Use ‘research and development services’ 
intermediate adjusted by the outsourcing ratio 
0.2 
Economic competency      
Brand equity (advertising) Use 60%4 of ‘other business activities’5 
adjusted by the outsourcing ratio 
0.6 
Organization capital and staff 
training6 
Use ‘education services’ intermediate adjusted 
by the outsourcing ratio 
0.4 
Notes: Outsourcing ratio is defined as the ratio of the value added to total intermediates. The reason why 
the intermediates statistics should be adjusted by the outsourcing ratio is that in the supply and use tables 
only outsourced intangible expenditure is counted, and directly using the intermediate statistics omits the 
internally produced intangible expenditure. 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
 
Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), the intangible capital IC is scaled by the 
real capital stock of a sector to alleviate possible estimation bias caused by productivity 
shocks, and the observations with zero intangible capital are dropped. Using the amount 
of tangible capital as the denominator for intangible capital also has the advantage of 
controlling for the size of a sector. Compared with the national level measurement of 
Corrado et al. (2009) and the literature following it, this measurement might be of lower 
                                                   
3 The depreciation rate follows Corrado et al. (2009). 
4 Corrado et al. (2009) estimate 60% of the advertising expenditure should be capitalized 
5 ‘Other business activities’ includes advertising as well as market research expenditure. 
6 Organization capital and staff training refers to firm-specific human and structural resources (Corrado 
et al. 2009), which can be indicated by the education expenditure of firms. 
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accuracy. The source of inaccuracy might be caused by the deviation of the measured 
outsourcing ratio from the actual outsourcing ratio, ‘other business activities’ 
intermediates including expenditure that is not intangible investment, the distribution of 
computerized information investment across sectors inconsistent with that of ‘computer 
and related services’ intermediate etc. However, since the econometrics approach used 
in this study has some tolerance of measurement error, the constructed dataset should 
satisfy the analysis requirements7. 
 
4.3 Intangible capital and energy intensity: A theoretical analysis 
Intangible capital, including innovations, could have significant effects on energy 
intensity reduction, or energy efficiency improvement. The role of innovations in energy 
intensity reduction has been well documented in the literature (Fisher-Vanden et al., 
2004; Herrerias et al., 2016; Newell et al., 1999). Hao and van Ark (2013), in their 
preliminary study on the correlation between intangible investment and sectoral energy 
intensity using data from nine developed European economies, argued that intangible 
investment can promote technical change, and innovations in energy conservation as 
well as less use of tangible capital that accounts for the largest proportion of energy 
consumption in production, thus reducing energy intensity. 
 
However, the theoretical relationship between other components of the intangible 
capital and energy intensity has not been discussed. Pricing power, improved 
operational efficiency resulting from organization capital and staff training and 
                                                   
7 If the measurement error is randomly distributed, it will not cause bias in the estimation results; if the 
measurement error is sector-specific, then it will be eliminated by the sector specific intercept. 
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computerized information can also exert significant impacts on lowering sectoral energy 
intensity and then air pollutant and carbon emissions. Motivated by the fact that 
intangible capital is a key production factor used by firms, this study proposes a simple 
theoretical analysis of the relationship between intangible capital and energy intensity. 
Before proceeding, energy intensity is defined as follows: 
I𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
Y𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
                               (1) 
where I𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 refers to the energy intensity of sector i in country (economy) j at time t; 𝐸𝑖𝑗 
is the energy use of sector i in country j; Y𝑖𝑗 is the value added of sector i in country j. 
That is, energy intensity is defined as the ratio of energy use to value added, which has 
been discussed in detail in section 2. 
 
Next, a production function based on the value added method is assumed as follows: 
Y𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐹𝑖(𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, 𝐾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, 𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)                 (2) 
where 𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the productivity of sector i in country j at time t; L, K, IC are 
respectively the labour input, tangible capital input and intangible capital input of sector 
𝑖 in country j; 𝐹𝑖(𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, 𝐾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, 𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) is the production function of sector 𝑖. Using value 
added as output and labour and capital as inputs at sectoral level is common in the 
existing literature and therefore well founded (Wei et al., 2007). 
 
Moreover, assume that using intangible capital does not consume extra energy, which is 
consistent with the nature of intangible capital8. Therefore, we have the relationship 
between intangible capital and sectoral level energy intensity based on equations (1) and 
                                                   
8 For example, using new design, R&D knowledge or new management practices does not consume 
energy. It is the tangible capital such as equipment and buildings that consume energy. 
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(2) as follows: 
∂(
𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
Y𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
)
∂𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= −
𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
Y𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
2 𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝜕𝐹𝑖(𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,𝐾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)
𝜕𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
< 0             (3) 
Equation (3) is the derivative of energy intensity with respect to intangible capital, 
which is negative. This indicates that an increase in intangible capital can lower sectoral 
energy intensity. The mechanism is intuitive: the increasing use of intangible capital 
increases the value added given other inputs remain constant but does not increase 
energy use, and therefore lower the energy intensity.  
 
Theoretically, intangible capital might have two channels to increase value added 
assuming constant other inputs. One is through increasing pricing power and then value 
added per unit of product. Not only product creation / improvement R&D but also brand 
equity is often found to be associated with the pricing power of firms and then value 
added per unit of products (Corrado et al., 2005; Jones and Williams, 2000). Since R&D 
as a source of pricing power has been well regarded, the following illustration mainly 
focuses on the brand equity. Brand equity is often found to create a price premium for a 
product. Advertising itself can alter the preference of consumers: they may perceive a 
well-advertised product with distinctive packaging as being of high quality. Specifically, 
Klein and Leffler (1981) argue that consumers often use advertising intensity as an 
indicator of quality. Kirmani and Wright (1989) then provide empirical evidence for this 
proposition, showing that consumers do perceive products with high advertising 
expenditure as of high quality and are therefore willing to pay a price premium.  
 
The other channel is through improving production efficiency and then increasing the 
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units produced given constant resource input. R&D, organization capital and software 
are found to enhance the production process and then the production efficiency 
(Corrado et al., 2005). Examples include new production protocols, and advanced 
management practice as well as well trained workers.  
 
In sections 4 and 5, we will test the empirical relationship between intangible capital 
and energy intensity. It is worth noting that this study works beyond establishing a 
causal relationship between intangible capital and sectoral energy intensity – 
heterogeneity in this relationship as well as the heterogeneous impacts of income level 
on sectoral energy intensity across economies and sectors are also examined. 
 
4.4 Data source and empirical strategy 
A dataset of intangible capital for 40 economies across 34 sectors from 1995 to 20079 is 
constructed based on data retrieved from the WIOD and the capitalization criteria for 
intangible capital of Corrado et al. (2009), which provides a solid basis for an insightful 
analysis of the heterogeneous impacts of intangible capital and economic development 
on sectoral energy intensity. Basic fixed effects regressions are then used to provide an 
overall picture of the roles of various intangible capital across service and non-service 
sectors and economies of high income and low income. The system GMM method is 
further utilized to establish a relatively robust causal relationship. Finally, multilevel 
regressions are conducted to identify the quantitative heterogeneity in the impacts of 
                                                   
9 The sector-specific deflator, which is derived from the supply and use tables in previous year price, is 
only available from 1995 to 2007. 
117 
various intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity. 
 
4.4.1 The WIOD and the Penn World Table 8.1 
The WIOD is built on national accounts data that was developed within the 7th 
Framework Programme of the European Commission. The WIOD database has two 
main advantages compared with previously available data sources. First, throughout the 
data collection efforts, harmonization procedures were applied to ensure international 
comparability of the data. This ensures data quality and minimizes the risk of 
measurement errors. Second, the WIOD includes sectoral price deflators, the use of 
which allows one to retain important information and the heterogeneity of the sectors 
with respect to price dynamics. This represents an improvement over the use of 
aggregate national price deflators. A complete list of the 34 sectors included in the 
database is shown in Appendix B.  
 
The intangible capital data is derived from the supply and use tables within the WIOD; 
the energy use data is obtained from the World Environmental Account. Real tangible 
capital stock at 1995 constant price is obtained from the Social Economic Account and 
is converted to 1995 constant USD. The Penn World Table 8.1 provides the data of GDP 
per capita (see Feenstra et al. (2015) for more detailed discussion). All data from the 
Penn World Table 8.1 is converted to 1995 constant USD based on the national price 
level and 1995 USD exchange rate. 
  
4.4.2 Empirical strategy 
The key variables of interest in this study are the intangible-tangible ratio and the 
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income level of an economy. To provide an overall picture of the heterogeneous impacts 
of intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity, several interaction terms and control 
variables are introduced. That is, an empirical model is assumed as follows 
𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1
𝐼𝐶𝑠,𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽2
𝐼𝐶𝑠,𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
× 𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽3
𝐼𝐶𝑠,𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
× 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑗,𝑡 ×
𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑗,𝑡 × 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,      (4) 
where 𝐼 is sectoral energy intensity, IC is intangible capital and TC is tangible capital. 
The subscript s represents intangible capital s; i, j, t respectively stand for sector i, 
country j and time t; 𝑔𝑑𝑝 deonotes the aggregate GDP of an economy, which is used to 
control for economy size; time refers to time fixed effects. 𝛼 is the intercept and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
is the error term. 𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 indicates whether an economy is low income or not, the 
classification of which follows that of the World Bank10. 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 denotes whether a 
sector is a service sector or not, the classification of which is demonstrated in Appendix 
B. 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is the year dummy, which controls for fluctuation in energy price as well as 
worldwide shocks. All variables are in the form of logarithm except for the dummy 
variables.  
 
To eliminate the possible estimation bias, we introduce the system GMM method. 
Although endogeneity is unlikely to be present in this case given that relevant variables, 
time fixed effects and individual sectoral fixed effects are controlled for, it is still 
possible that there are some unobservable factors that simultaneously affect the sectoral 
energy intensity and the intangible capital to tangible capital ratio and thus undermines 
the causal effects proposed in this study. For instance, some economy or sector-specific 
                                                   
10 Please see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519.  
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environmental policies might influence both the energy intensity and the intangible 
capital ratio; an increase in sectoral productivity might simultaneously decrease the 
sectoral energy intensity and change the intangible tangible ratio subject to the 
production structure of a sector. System GMM uses both lagged differenced variables 
and lagged variables as instruments, which can partially solve the endogeneity 
problems. Compared with differenced GMM, the system GMM method has better 
estimation efficiency because it additionally assumes that the first differences of 
instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects, which allows the 
introduction of more instruments and therefore improves estimation efficiency 
dramatically (Roodman, 2009). To test the validity of the instruments as well as the 
additional assumption on which system GMM is based, the Hansen (1982) J test and the 
Arellano-Bond test will be conducted.  
 
To further analyse the impacts of intangible capital across economies of different 
income levels and various sectors, multilevel analysis is then conducted. Multilevel 
analysis provides economy and sector-specific coefficients for variables of interest, 
which forms the basis of a more detailed study on the heterogeneous effects of 
intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity. Specifically, a two-level hierarchy 
structure is identified: the first is the economy level while the second is the sector level. 
The coefficient of a specific sector therefore consists of three components: the 
worldwide average, the deviation due to the economy it belongs to and the deviation 
caused by sector-specific factors. Additional regressions will also be conducted to study 
the quantitative interactions between the economy and sector-specific coefficients and 
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the income levels.  
 
4.4.3 Descriptive analysis 
The features of the dataset used in this study are summarized in Table 2. It consists of 
605 sectors from 40 economies across approximately 12 years with more than 7,000 
observations in total. The heterogeneity of GDP per capita and aggregate GDP indicates 
that the sample covers economies of different income levels and scales. The variation of 
production structure can also be seen from the large standard deviations of the various 
intangible-tangible ratios.  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics   
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
log(energy intensity) overall 1.76  1.76  -7.42  11.99  N =    7662 
 between  1.66  -2.70  8.32  n =     637 
 within  0.64  -2.95  6.57  T-bar = 12.03 
log(Intangible/Tangible) overall -2.69  2.08  -13.06  10.79  N =    7662  
between  1.82  -10.14  6.25  n =     637  
within  1.03  -16.21  6.82  T-bar = 12.03 
log(RD/Tangible) overall -5.48  2.39  -17.90  10.78  N =    7332  
between  2.20  -12.34  5.89  n =     612  
within  0.94  -27.19  -0.58  T-bar = 12.00 
log(CI/Tangible) overall -3.97  2.36  -17.97  10.23  N =    7104  
between  2.08  -9.82  5.78  n =     588  
within  1.13  -15.86  5.69  T-bar = 12.08 
log(BE/Tangible) overall -3.92  1.62  -13.70  4.40  N =    7377  
between  1.45  -10.99  1.57  n =     614  
within  0.74  -13.88  2.04  T-bar = 12.01 
log(OC&ST/Tangible) overall -6.33  1.82  -15.74  3.00  N =    7406  
between  1.67  -12.72  -0.29  n =     620  
within  0.72  -21.78  -2.79  T-bar = 11.95 
log(GDP per capita) overall 2.47  1.14  -0.96  4.36  N =    7662  
between  1.14  -0.73  4.16  n =     637  
within  0.14  1.97  3.04  T-bar = 12.03 
log(GDP) overall 12.09  1.68  8.18  16.19  N =    7662  
between  1.67  8.38  16.04  n =     637  
within  0.15  11.54  12.70  T-bar = 12.03 
Notes: The unit of GDP per capita is thousand 1995 USD; the unit of GDP is million 1995 USD; the unit 
of energy intensity is trillion joules (TJ) per million 1995 USD. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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To illustrate the overall relationship between intangible capital and sectoral energy 
intensity, scatter plots and best fitting lines are drawn for the overall intangible tangible 
ratio as well as its various categories (please see Figure 1, sectoral fixed effects have 
been controlled). Significant negative relationship can be easily seen in all of the 
subfigures with varying slopes. However, the correlation itself is not causal relationship 
and the heterogeneous impacts of intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity still 
remain unclear. The next section will further discuss these issues. 
 
 
Figure 1 Scatter plots of the relationship between intangible capital and sectoral energy 
intensity (sectoral fixed effects controlled) 
Source: Authors’ own calculation.  
 
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 An overall picture 
Table 3 demonstrates the heterogeneous impacts of intangible capital and income level 
122 
on sectoral energy intensity. The negative relationship between intangible capital, income 
level and sectoral energy intensity can be clearly seen. When controlling for income level 
and intangible-tangible ratio, the larger the economy a sector belongs to, the less energy 
efficient the sector is, which might be caused by the diseconomy of scale.  
 
The overall intangible capital and its four major components have consistent impacts on 
energy intensity. On average, a 1% increase in overall intangible-tangible ratio leads to a 
0.09% decline in sectoral energy intensity; a 1% increase in R&D tangible ratio leads to 
a 0.10% decrease in sectoral energy intensity; a 1% increase in computerized information 
(CI) tangible ratio leads to a 0.05% drop in sectoral energy intensity; a 1% increase in 
brand equity (BE) causes 0.29% reduction in sectoral energy intensity; a 1% rise in 
organization capital and staff training (OC&ST) leads to a 0.176% decrease in sectoral 
energy intensity.  
 
In respect of the role of income level, a 1% increase in GDP per capita generally leads to 
an approximately 5% decrease in sectoral energy intensity. When it comes to the 
heterogeneous effects across service and non-service sectors as well as high, and low and 
middle income economies, it is found that the impacts of intangible capital and income 
level in reducing sectoral energy intensity are larger in service sectors and low and middle 
income economies. For the impacts of intangible capital, the differences can be as large 
as 10 times and as small as 10%. As for the impacts of income level, the difference is 
much smaller.  
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Table 3 Heterogenous impacts of intangible capital and income level on sectoral energy intensity (Fixed effects) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. CI denotes computerized information; BE stands for brand equity; OC&ST indicates organization capital and staff 
training. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
Fixed effects 
Sectoral energy intensity All Intangible R&D CI BE OC&ST 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intangible -0.0923*** -0.0275** -0.104*** -0.0459*** -0.0517*** -0.00559 -0.294*** -0.219*** -0.176*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0128) (0.0152) (0.0147) (0.0127) (0.00879) (0.0267) (0.0305) (0.0181) (0.0164) 
Intangible×service 
 -0.0669***  -0.128***  -0.0287*  -0.0361  -0.0728*** 
  (0.0249)  (0.0346)  (0.0147)  (0.0460)  (0.0110) 
Intangible×low  
 -0.200***  -0.0528  -0.171***  -0.114**  -2.807 
income  (0.0418)  (0.0693)  (0.0351)  (0.0495)  (2.537) 
GDP pc -5.460*** -4.801*** -6.748*** -5.875*** -5.943*** -4.555*** -5.846*** -5.137*** -5.553*** -4.985*** 
 (0.731) (0.603) (0.762) (0.642) (0.776) (0.599) (0.696) (0.582) (0.736) (0.628) 
GDP pc×service 
 -0.0777  -0.0757  -0.0238  -0.0634  -0.0708 
  (0.163)  (0.166)  (0.144)  (0.153)  (0.167) 
GDP pc×low income 
 -2.274***  -2.190***  -3.495***  -2.045***  -2.202*** 
  (0.316)  (0.323)  (0.421)  (0.284)  (0.335) 
GDP 4.914*** 4.969*** 6.143*** 5.964*** 5.441*** 4.287*** 5.196*** 5.139*** 4.938*** 5.090*** 
 (0.773) (0.681) (0.805) (0.726) (0.838) (0.661) (0.734) (0.655) (0.776) (0.707) 
Constant -44.64*** -46.77*** -56.02*** -55.78*** -48.70*** -38.19*** -47.25*** -48.14*** -45.18*** -48.15*** 
 (7.603) (6.828) (7.855) (7.224) (8.138) (6.461) (7.167) (6.521) (7.593) (7.063) 
Observations 7,288 7,288 6,899 6,899 6,796 6,796 7,035 7,035 7,090 7,090 
R-squared 0.233 0.296 0.235 0.287 0.211 0.282 0.327 0.367 0.244 0.288 
Number of id 603 603 576 576 562 562 586 586 594 594 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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To establish relatively robust causality between intangible capital and sectoral energy 
intensity, the system GMM method is adopted to eliminate the possible endogeneity. 
Relevant results are revealed in Table 4. Compared with the fixed effects regressions, the 
negative relationship between intangible capital, its major components and energy 
intensity remains robust with a small decline in scale. Specifically, a 1% rise in overall 
intangible-tangible ratio is predicted to improve sectoral energy intensity by 0.02%; a 1% 
increase in R&D tangible ratio on average reduces sectoral energy intensity by 0.09%; a 
1% growth in computerized information tangible ratio generally leads to a 0.005% drop 
in sectoral energy intensity; a 1% rise in brand equity tangible ratio is predicted to 
decrease energy intensity by 0.25%; a 1% increase in organization capital and staff 
training tangible ratio on average causes a 0.17% decline in sectoral energy intensity. As 
for the impacts of income level, due to the collinearity caused by using lagged and 
differenced income level as instruments, in many cases it becomes insignificant or 
positive. The coefficients of aggregate GDP also become insignificant. The results from 
the system GMM regressions are an improvement on earlier studies (Hao and van Ark, 
2013): they evidence a causal relationship between intangible capital and sectoral energy 
intensity. However, the outcomes demonstrated above only compare the impacts of 
intangible capital and income level across different groups. The next section will have a 
deeper look at this rich dataset by carrying out additional analysis. 
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Table 4 Heterogenous impacts of intangible capital and income level on sectoral energy intensity (system GMM) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; CI denotes computerized information; BE stands for brand equity; OC&ST indicates organization capital and 
staff training; the system GMM estimation in the study uses both the differenced and the lagged intangible capital as instruments. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
system GMM 
Sectoral energy intensity All Intangible R&D CI BE OC&ST 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intangible -0.0248* -0.0153 -0.0809** -0.0838*** -0.00451 -0.00722 -0.252*** -0.154*** -0.168*** -0.349*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0108) (0.0330) (0.0279) (0.0144) (0.0102) (0.0420) (0.0432) (0.0505) (0.00509) 
Intangible×service  -0.0889***  -0.141***  0.00518  -0.0464  -0.0825*** 
  (0.0219)  (0.0233)  (0.0140)  (0.0348)  (0.000707) 
Intangible×low   -0.0888***  -0.0200  0.0244  0.00295  0.0799 
income  (0.0343)  (0.0261)  (0.0162)  (0.0456)  (0.135) 
GDP pc 0.0191 0.124 -0.238*** -0.217*** -0.153* -0.00224 0.0376 0.156** 0.00809 0.0983* 
 (0.0797) (0.0830) (0.0851) (0.0635) (0.0928) (0.0729) (0.0999) (0.0717) (0.104) (0.0572) 
GDP pc×service  -0.350***  -0.271***  -0.275***  -0.249***  -0.276*** 
  (0.0531)  (0.0564)  (0.0465)  (0.0842)  (0.0348) 
GDP pc×low income  0.306**  -0.740***  -0.107  -0.215**  -0.536*** 
  (0.145)  (0.0757)  (0.144)  (0.109)  (0.0537) 
GDP -0.0552 -0.0408 0.104 0.145*** 0.0799 0.0278 -0.00348 0.00421 -0.0228 -0.0868** 
 (0.0637) (0.0508) (0.0684) (0.0294) (0.0718) (0.0506) (0.0904) (0.0446) (0.0846) (0.0407) 
Constant 1.076 1.091** -0.411 -0.512* -0.176 0.643 0.0701 -0.00311 -0.152 0.697* 
 (0.654) (0.451) (0.701) (0.291) (0.645) (0.449) (0.870) (0.406) (0.842) (0.406) 
Observations 4,347 5,231 4,138 4,138 4,097 4,912 4,212 4,212 4,243 4,243 
R-squared N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Number of id 600 601 574 574 560 560 584 584 591 591 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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4.5.2 Fully analysing the heterogenous impacts: a multilevel regression approach 
To take better advantage of this large dataset, multilevel regressions are conducted to 
assign economy and sector-specific coefficients to all individual sectors. Table 5 
illustrates the baseline results from multilevel regressions. The coefficients of the 
intangible-tangible ratio remain close to those in Table 3 and 4 except for ‘All 
Intangible’ the scale of which is significantly larger. As for income level, all coefficients 
become insignificant, which indicates that the heterogeneity of its impacts in reducing 
sectoral energy intensity might be high. The diseconomy of scale, as revealed by the 
positive coefficients of aggregate GDP, remains similar to the results in Table 3. Table 6 
aims to test the linear and quadratic relationship between the impacts of intangible 
capital on sectoral energy intensity and income level. Under the linear framework, it is 
found that intangible capital in an economy of higher income is likely to have lower 
impacts on sectoral energy intensity. Specifically, a 10% increase in income level is 
associated with a 0.0009 increase in the coefficient of overall intangible-tangible ratio, 
which is roughly 0.5% of the baseline result. For various categories of intangible 
capital, the increase ranges from 0.002 to 0.003, which is approximately 1% to 3% of 
the baseline coefficients.  
 
When it comes to the quadratic relationship, an inverted U-shape relationship is 
observed. Specifically, the impact of overall intangible capital in reducing sectoral 
energy intensity first increases along with rising income, and when income reaches 
6,759 USD per capita the impact begins to decline; the counterparts of brand equity and 
organization capital and staff training both also demonstrate an inverted U-shape 
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pattern, with turning points respectively of 5772 USD per capita and 6653 USD per 
capita. As for R&D and computerized information, the turning point is too large for the 
data range and as a result they do not have a ‘real’ quadratic relationship.   
 
Another interesting question to investigate is the heterogeneous impacts across sectors. 
Figure 2 depicts an overall picture of this heterogeneity. The pattern of the 
heterogeneous impacts is consistent with the results in Table 3 and 4: the service group 
is likely to have a higher impact than the non-service group. Within the service group, 
financial intermediation (J), real estate activities (70), education (M), and health and 
social work (N) are the largest beneficiaries from intangible capital in terms of energy 
intensity. The transport sectors (60, 61, 62 and 63) are the smallest beneficiaries from 
intangible capital within the service group. When it comes to the non-service group, the 
coefficients of machine nec11 (29), electrical and optical equipment (30t33), transport 
equipment (34t35) and manufacturing nec, recycling (36t37) have the largest scale; the 
counterparts of coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel (23), rubber and plastics (25), 
other non-metallic mineral products (26), basic metals fabricated metal products 
(27t28), and electricity, gas and water supply (E) have the smallest scale, which can be 
as low as 60% less than the benchmark coefficients. The heterogeneity of the effects of 
intangible capital in reducing energy intensity might be due to the heterogeneity in 
production structure.
 
                                                   
11 ‘nec’ means ‘not else classified’. 
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Table 5 Baseline results derived from multilevel regressions 
Multilevel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All Intangible R&D CI BE OC&ST 
Intangible -0.207*** -0.0930*** -0.0940*** -0.318*** -0.155*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0189) (0.0233) (0.0500) (0.0251) 
GDP pc 0.616 -0.227 0.878 -0.103 1.010 
 (0.690) (0.796) (0.846) (0.664) (0.721) 
GDP 1.470*** 2.378*** 1.415** 1.740*** 1.136** 
 (0.520) (0.603) (0.637) (0.502) (0.548) 
Constant -21.09*** -30.03*** -20.89*** -22.67*** -18.36*** 
 (5.408) (6.126) (6.233) (5.062) (5.594) 
Observations 7,288 6,899 6,796 7,035 7,090 
Number of economies 39 36 34 37 38 
Number of sectors 603 576 562 586 594 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; CI denotes computerized information; BE stands for brand equity; OC&ST indicates organization 
capital and staff training. The dependent variable is sectoral energy intensity. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 6 Income level and the impacts of intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity 
 Random coefficients of intangible-tangible ratio (economy level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES All Intangible All Intangible R&D R&D CI CI BE BE OC OC 
GDP pc 0.00869*** -0.0707*** 0.0250*** 0.0474*** 0.0292*** 0.0932*** 0.0279*** -0.171*** 0.0197*** -0.0775*** 
 (0.00140) (0.00574) (0.000687) (0.00292) (0.000899) (0.00400) (0.00329) (0.0139) (0.00112) (0.00497) 
(GDP pc)2  0.0185***  -0.00507***  -0.0140***  0.0451***  0.0221*** 
  (0.00129)  (0.000644)  (0.000856)  (0.00307)  (0.00110) 
Constant -0.0360*** 0.0245*** -0.0533*** -0.0715*** -0.0686*** -0.125*** -0.113*** 0.0487*** -0.0509*** 0.0274*** 
 (0.00389) (0.00572) (0.00193) (0.00301) (0.00257) (0.00429) (0.00927) (0.0143) (0.00313) (0.00495) 
Observations 7,288 7,288 6,976 6,976 6,822 6,822 7,096 7,096 7,180 7,180 
R-squared 0.005 0.032 0.159 0.167 0.134 0.167 0.010 0.039 0.041 0.092 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; CI denotes computerized information; BE stands for brand equity; OC&ST indicates organization 
capital and staff training. The dependent variable is the individual deviations from the baseline coefficients of the various types of intangible capital in Table 5. The effect of 
intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity is negative, which means the smaller (more negative) the coefficient the larger the effect. When there is a U-shape relationship 
observed in the above table, it actually indicates an inverted U-shape relationship between the income level and the effect of intangible capital in reducing sectoral energy 
intensity. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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Figure 2 Heterogenous impacts of intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity across various sectors (compared with baseline results) 
 
Notes: the percentages here are the average impact difference of a sector from the baseline results. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
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4.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
Lowering sectoral energy intensity is a critical way to reduce energy use and then 
improve air quality and the environment. Although some efforts have been devoted to 
studying the relationship between innovation activities and energy intensity (Fisher-
Vanden et al., 2004; Herrerias et al., 2016; Newell et al., 1999) as well as the correlation 
between intangible investment and energy intensity (Hao and van Ark, 2013), a 
theoretical and comprehensive analysis of the relationship between intangible capital 
and energy intensity is absent from the literature.  
 
This study advances the knowledge on the relationship between intangible capital and 
sectoral energy intensity by taking advantage of a large dataset. Research questions 
examined include: Does intangible capital have a ‘real’ causal effect on sectoral energy 
intensity? How does the role of various types of intangible capital vary across 
economies and sectors? How does income level affect sectoral energy intensity in the 
context of different economies and sectors? 
 
This study finds that a relatively robust causal relationship between intangible capital 
(measured as intangible-tangible capital ratio) and sectoral energy intensity exists. The 
increasing use of intangible capital relative to tangible capital does reduce sectoral 
energy intensity. However, when the income level of an economy becomes higher, 
intangible capital’s reduction effect generally diminishes. A moderate quadratic 
relationship between the reduction effect of intangible capital on energy intensity and 
income level in some types of intangible capital is also identified. A moderate inverted 
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U-shape relationship exists in the overall intangible capital as well as economic 
competency (brand equity, organization capital and staff training), but no ‘real’ 
quadratic relationship is discovered for R&D and computerized information because the 
turning point is far beyond the data range.  
 
Across sectors, the sectors that have the largest and smallest effects of intangible capital 
in reducing energy intensity within service and non-service groups are also pinpointed. 
Within the service group, sectors requiring a high intangible capital ratio tend to have 
the largest effect, and sectors relying more on physical capital are likely to have the 
smallest. As for the non-service group, in equipment manufacturing sector, intangible 
capital tends to have the largest effect, and raw materials manufacturing as well as 
utility sectors often have the smallest. These findings demonstrate that intangible capital 
can enhance the reduction effect: between sectors within each of the service and non-
service sectors, the higher the ratio of intangible capital to tangible capital, the stronger 
the reduction effect.  
 
Through various disaggregated analyses and multilevel regression analyses, we found a 
few heterogenous results: 1) brand equity and organization capital improve sectoral 
energy intensity more than R&D; 2) intangible capital in low and middle income 
economies has a larger reduction effect on sectoral energy intensity than in high income 
economies; 3) sectors with high intangible capital ratios in the service group and 
equipment manufacturing sectors in the non-service group tend to enjoy larger effects 
from intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity reduction; 4) income level generally 
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decreases the effect of intangible capital in reducing sectoral energy intensity but a 
moderate inverted U-shape relationship between income level and the effect of 
intangible capital in reducing sectoral energy intensity is identified in aggregate 
intangible capital as well as some disaggregated intangible capital including brand 
equity and organization capital.   
 
The study offers the following policy implications: 
First, in addition to usual R&D, branding equity such as advertisement and staff training 
are found to be new instruments to reduce energy intensity. These new policy 
instruments that support the role of intangible capital in reducing energy intensity 
complement the literature.     
 
Second, in terms of global energy intensity reduction, the role of intangible capital 
should be strengthened in developing economies, where the marginal reduction effect of 
intangible capital is higher. This would also suggest cooperation and transfer of 
intangible investment because developing economies often have less intangible capital 
than developed ones.  
 
Lastly, within a country, development of sectors with high intangible and tangible 
capital ratio can reduce the overall intensity. Furthermore, the reduction effect of energy 
intensity would be boosted if a unit of intangible capital is allocated to the sector with 
higher intangible capital-capital ratio. For example, in the non-service sector, energy 
intensity could be reduced by reallocating intangible capital to the manufacturing 
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industry from other industries.   
 
Future research directions might include investigating firm-level evidence on the 
relationship between energy intensity and intangible capital when relevant data is fully 
available. 
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4.7 Appendix A 
This appendix demonstrates the derivation of structural decomposition analysis (SDA) 
equation in section 2. 
 
From the well-known Leontief input-output model, the following equilibrium equation 
is obtained: 
X = (I − A)−1𝑌                             (A.1) 
X is the vector of sectoral gross output; A is the matrix of technical coefficients and y is 
the vector of final demand. (I − A)−1 is the famous Leontief inverse. 
 
In the following, the diagonalization and transposition of a matrix are respectively 
denoted by ^ and ′. Assume e to be a vector of direct consumption of energy. Then the 
direct energy intensity ε is defined as follows: 
ε = e′X̂−1                               (A.2) 
Then the following is obtained: 
e = ε̂𝑋                                (A.3) 
Substitute the value of X, taking into account (A.1) and (A.3), then a small 
transformation leads to: 
E = ε̂(I − A)−1?̂? 
E shows the total consumption, direct and indirect, of the different sectors. The sum of 
all the elements in E is the total energy consumption. 
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4.8 Appendix B 
WIOD sectors, definition by NACE and the classification of sectors 
NACE WIOD sectors Classification 
AtB Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing Non-service 
C Mining and quarrying Non-service 
15t16 Food, beverages and tobacco Non-service 
17t18 Textiles and textile products Non-service 
19 Leather, leather products and footwear Non-service 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork Non-service 
21t22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing Non-service 
23 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel Non-service 
24 Chemicals and chemical products Non-service 
25 Rubber and plastics Non-service 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products Non-service 
27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products Non-service 
29 Machinery nec Non-service 
30t33 Electrical and optical equipment Non-service 
34t35 Transport equipment Non-service 
36t37 Manufacturing nec, recycling Non-service 
E Electricity, gas and water supply Non-service 
F Construction Non-service 
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles Service 
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade Service 
52 Retail trade, except motor vehicles and motorcycles Service 
H Hotels and restaurants Service 
60 Inland transport Service 
61 Water transport Service 
62 Air transport Service 
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities Service 
64 Post and telecommunications Service 
J Financial intermediation Service 
70 Real estate activities Service 
71t74 Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities Service 
L Public administration and defence, social security Service 
M Education Service 
N Health and social work Service 
O Other community, social and personal services Service 
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5. Intangible capital, productivity spillover and economic 
growth: Cross-country evidence 
 
Intangible capital has been well documented as an important source of economic 
growth. However, studies on its heterogeneous role remain rare. How do its output 
elasticity and productivity spillover of economic growth vary across sectors and 
economies at different development stages? This study advances the understanding on 
this issue by taking advantage of a rich dataset of 40 economies derived from the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD), spanning over 13 years (1995 – 2007). It is found that 
intangible capital significantly contributes to economic growth as a production factor as 
well as through its productivity spillover effect. Both its output elasticity and 
productivity spillover effect demonstrate an inverted U-shape relationship with income 
level and significantly vary across sectors. The productivity spillover effect is generally 
larger in service sectors than non-service sectors. The findings provide some useful 
implications for policy makers as well as studies on income inequality. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Intangible capital is the immaterial resources that enter the production process and is 
important for both the creation and the improvement of products as well as production 
process. Intangible capital has been widely accepted as a key production factor in the 
literature, especially for developed economies. Therefore, it is not surprising that much 
effort is devoted to studying its role as a source of growth and productivity spillover 
both at national level and sectoral level (Awano et al., 2010; Borgo et al., 2013; Chun 
and Nadiri, 2016; Corrado et al., 2017, 2013, 2009; Corrado and Hulten, 2010; Fukao et 
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al., 2009; Haskel and Wallis, 2013; Marrano et al., 2009; Miyagawa and Hisa, 2013; 
Niebel et al., 2017; van Ark et al., 2009). While the growth and productivity spillover 
effect of intangible capital is well documented, its heterogeneous output elasticity and 
productivity spillover effects across economies at different development stages and 
various sectors have received relatively little attention. The income share or output 
elasticity of intangible capital might be associated with changes in income level, and 
thus play an important role in the dynamic of income inequality. Moreover, the spillover 
effect of intangible capital might also significantly differ across economies and sectors, 
and understanding its pattern is of importance for policy makers. 
 
This study aims to advance the knowledge on the heterogeneous role of intangible 
capital in economic development by taking advantage of a rich worldwide dataset 
derived from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) developed within the 7th 
Framework Programme of the European Commission, and provide a more 
comprehensive analysis on how the role of intangible capital in economic growth varies 
across economies and sectors. Specifically, this study constructs a sectoral level dataset 
for 34 sectors across 39 economies1 spanning from 1995 to 2007 based on the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD) and makes use of the economy and sector-specific 
coefficients generated by the multilevel analysis to reveal how production structure and 
productivity spillover effects change between different economies and sectors. 
 
Another motivation of this study is to examine the role of income level in determining 
                                                   
1 Excluding China is due to the lack of data on the number of employees. 
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the output elasticity and productivity spillover of intangible capital. Physical capital’s 
income share has been well recognized to have an inverted U-shape relationship with 
income level (Kuznets, 1955; Milanovic, 1994), which is also supposed to be one of the 
key factors that drive the dynamic of income inequality. Specifically, at the early stage 
of development, physical capital is scarce and income is often distributed in favour of 
the owners of physical capital; as economic development passes a certain point, 
physical capital becomes sufficiently abundant to allow the income to be distributed 
more favourably towards the labour. Although the importance of intangible capital has 
been widely regarded, the relationship between its income share and income level has 
not received much attention. The study of its income share dynamic with respect to 
income level might provide key information for future research on income inequality. It 
is possible that the income share of intangible capital also demonstrates an inverted U-
shape relationship with income level but has a significantly different turning point. If 
such an interesting fact exists, then the stories on the dynamic of income inequality 
might need a new component. In addition to the income share, the productivity spillover 
effect has also been proved to be associated with income level. For instance, the 
productivity spillover of foreign direct investment (FDI) has an inverted U-shape with 
income level: it first increases as income increases due to increasing absorptive capacity 
(Findlay, 1978; Gerschenkron, 1962; Wang and Blomström, 1992), and then decreases 
as income increases because of decreasing technology gap (Kinoshita, 2001.; Lapan and 
Bardhan, 1973; Perez, 1997; Wang and Blomström, 1992). Although the productivity 
spillover of FDI has been well studied, relevant issues on intangible capital remain 
unclear. Understanding these relevant issues might provide useful insights for policy 
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makers, especially when some intangible investment is guided by public policies. 
 
When it comes to the methodology and data, this study differs from previous literature 
on intangible capital. When estimating the production function, most of the literature 
adopts the income share approach, which does not allow error term and therefore relies 
heavily on the measurement accuracy of intangible capital2. Some literature uses 
regressions with constant coefficients, which allows error term but causes the loss of 
sector and economy specific information. The estimation of the production function in 
this study is based on multilevel analysis instead of income share approach or 
regressions with constant coefficients and is a balance between tolerating the 
measurement inaccuracy of intangible investment and acquiring economy and sector-
specific information. This approach constitutes an improvement to previous approaches 
in the literature. Moreover, this study includes data with a more detailed sector 
classification as well as data from developing economies and thus allows further inquiry 
into the heterogeneous roles of intangible capital in sectoral production structure and 
productivity spillover, providing a new angle from which the roles of intangible capital 
are examined. From the perspective of the literature stream on intangible capital, this 
study complements the literature confirming intangible investment as a source of 
growth (Corrado et al 2009; Fukao et al. 2009; van Ark et al. 2009; Marrano et al 2009; 
Awano et al. 2010; Corrado and Hulten 2010; Borgo et al. 2013; Corrado et al. 2013; 
Haskel and Wallis 2013; Miyagawa and Hisa 2013; Chun and Nadiri 2016; Niebel et al. 
2017) and the literature confirming the existing of productivity spillover of intangible 
                                                   
2 Corrado et al. (2009) also admit the inaccuracy of the intangible capital measurement they propose, as 
revealed by the last sentence of their paper, ‘it is better to be imprecisely right than precisely wrong’. 
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capital (Corrado et al. 2017).  
 
This paper is organized as follows: section two discusses the definition and 
measurement of intangible capital; section three depicts the empirical strategies adopted 
as well as relevant data sources used; section four reports the empirical results; section 
five draws the conclusion. 
 
5.2 Intangible capital: definition and measurement 
To construct the series of intangible capital, the first step is to define and measure the 
flow of intangible investment. Two streams of definitions of intangible capital co-exist 
in the literature. One is based on the accounting concept of intangible assets and is 
acquired from firms’ balance sheets; this definition is often used in firm-level analysis 
(Marrocau et al. 2012). The other is derived from the aggregate estimates of firms’ 
intangible expenditure such as R&D, advertising and innovation (Corrado et al. 2009). 
Given that this study focuses on sectoral level, it is more appropriate to adopt the 
expenditure based approach. Three categories of intangible investment are calculated 
from the intermediates of the supply and use tables within the WIOD (for information 
of the WIOD, please see Timmer et al. (2015)) based on the capitalization criteria of 
Corrado et al. (2009), as summarized in Table 1. The accumulation of intangible capital 
follows the standard perpetual inventory method:   
IC𝑠,𝑡 = IC𝑠,𝑡−1(1 − 𝛿𝑠) + 𝐼𝑁𝑠,𝑡 
where IC refers to intangible capital; the subscripts s and t respectively denote the 
intangible capital s and the time; 𝛿 refers to the depreciation rate; 𝐼𝑁 is the intangible 
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investment. To implement the law of motion of intangible capital, an initial intangible 
capital stock must be chosen, which is according to   
IC𝑠,0 =
𝐼𝑁𝑠,0
𝑔𝑠 + 𝛿𝑠
 
where 𝑔𝑠 is chosen to match the average real growth rate of the intangible investment s 
in a sector. Compared with the national level measurement of Corrado et al. (2009) and 
the literature following it, this measurement might be of lower accuracy. The source of 
inaccuracy might be caused by the deviation of the measured outsourcing ratio from the 
actual outsourcing ratio, ‘other business activities’ intermediates including expenditure 
that is not intangible investment, the distribution of computerized information 
investment across sectors inconsistent with that of ‘computer and related services’ 
intermediate etc. However, since the econometrics approach used in this study has some 
tolerance of measurement error, the constructed dataset should satisfy the analysis 
requirement3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
3 If the measurement error is randomly distributed, it will not cause bias in the estimation results; if the 
measurement error is sector-specific, then it will be eliminated by the sector specific intercept. 
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Table 1 Measurement and depreciation rate of intangible investment 
Intangible investment Method    Depreciation rate4 
Computerized information Distribute the aggregate gross fixed investment 
in computerized information according to the use 
of ‘computer and related services’ intermediate 
0.33 
Innovative property Use ‘research and development services’ 
intermediate adjusted by the outsourcing ratio 
0.2 
Economic competency      
Brand equity (advertising) Use 60%5 of ‘other business activities’6 
adjusted by the outsourcing ratio 
0.6 
Organization capital and staff 
training7 
Use ‘education services’ intermediate adjusted 
by the outsourcing ratio 
0.4 
Notes: Outsourcing ratio is defined as the ratio of the value added to total intermediates. The reason why 
the intermediates statistics should be adjusted by the outsourcing ratio is that in the supply and use tables 
only outsourced intangible expenditure is counted and directly using the intermediate statistics neglects 
the internally produced intangible expenditure. 
Source: Authors’ own construction. 
 
5.3 Empirical strategies and data sources 
5.3.1 Empirical strategies 
Intangible capital has been widely confirmed as a critical production factor, and it is 
therefore necessary to incorporate intangible capital into the production function to 
avoid estimation bias. Therefore, the production function in the Cobbs-Douglas8 form 
should be  
Y𝑖,𝑗 = A𝑖,𝑗IC𝑖,𝑗
𝛼𝑖,𝑗K𝑖,𝑗
𝛽𝑖,𝑗L𝑖,𝑗
𝛾𝑖,𝑗                    (1) 
where Y is the value added of a sector; A represents the total factor productivity (TFP); 
IC stands for intangible capital; K symbolizes physical capital; L indicates labour; 
subscripts 𝑖, 𝑗 respectively denote sector 𝑖 in economy 𝑗. 
By taking the logarithm in both sides, the production function is then linearized as  
                                                   
4 The depreciation rate follows Corrado et al. (2009). 
5 Corrado et al. (2009) estimate 60% of the advertising expenditure should be capitalized. 
6 ‘Other business activities’ includes advertising expenditure and market research. 
7 Organization capital and staff training refers to the firm-specific human and structural resources 
(Corrado et al. 2009), which can be indicated by the education expenditure of firms. 
8 No restriction on return to scale is imposed in this case given the sectoral heterogeneity. 
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log(Y𝑖,𝑗) = log(A𝑖,𝑗) + 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 log(IC𝑖,𝑗) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 log(K𝑖,𝑗) + 𝛾𝑖,𝑗log (L𝑖,𝑗)    (2) 
To generate economy and sector-specific coefficients for each input, multilevel 
regressions are then applied. Specifically, a two-level hierarchy structure is identified: 
economy level and sector level. The output elasticity of each input factor thus comprises 
three elements: the baseline coefficient, the economy specific deviation as well as the 
sector-specific deviation. To complement the literature on the income inequality 
(Kuznets 1955; Milanovic 1994), it is helpful to study the relationship not only between 
income level and intangible capital income share9 but also between income level and 
tangible capital income share10. The first step is to construct two new variables to 
capture respectively intangible capital income share relative to that of labour as well as 
between that of tangible capital and relative to that of labour, which are as follows: 
D𝐼𝐶 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 − 𝛾𝑖,𝑗                           (3) 
and  
D𝐾 = 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 − 𝛾𝑖,𝑗                           (4) 
where D𝐼𝐶 is the intangible capital income share relative to that of labour; D𝐾 is the 
tangible capital income share relative to that of labour. Based on the measurements from 
(3) and (4), the linear and quadratic relationship between income level and the relevant 
capital income share is then tested: 
 D = a1ln(GDP per capita) + a2                  (5) 
and 
                                                   
9 Theoretically, the output elasticity of an input factor equals its income share.  
10 Physical capital’s income share has been well recognized to have an inverted U-shape relationship 
with income level (Kuznets, 1955; Milanovic, 1994), which is also supposed to be one of the key factors 
that drive the dynamic of income inequality. Examining the relationship between capital income share and 
per capita income will help better understand the income inequality dynamic in different development 
stages, as mentioned in the introduction. 
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D = b1ln(GDP per capita)
2 + b2ln(GDP per capita) + b3         (6) 
 
When output elasticity of each sector is acquired, the next step is to calculate the total 
factor productivity (TFP). Based on equation (2), the TFP is derived according to 
log(A𝑖,𝑗) = log(Y𝑖,𝑗) − 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 log(IC𝑖,𝑗) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 log(K𝑖,𝑗) + 𝛾𝑖,𝑗log (L𝑖,𝑗)    (7) 
The productivity spillover effect is often defined as the use of production factors in one 
firm contributing to the productivity of another firm. To examine the spillover effect of 
intangible capital on productivity within a sector, the below double differenced 
empirical model is assumed to eliminate the possible serial correlation, following 
Corrado et al. (2017)11 
∆(∆log A𝑖,𝑗) = 𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑗∆(∆log IC𝑖,𝑗) + 𝑑𝑘𝑖,𝑗∆(∆ log K𝑖,𝑗) + 𝑑𝑙𝑖,𝑗∆(∆ log L𝑖,𝑗) + constant𝑖,𝑗                                                       
(8) 
If there is a productivity spillover effect from intangible capital, then 𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑗 should be 
positive and significant. Given that the regression to be conducted is multilevel analysis, 
economy and sector-specific coefficients will then be derived, which forms the basis for 
research on the heterogeneity in the magnitude of the spillover effect across various 
economies and sectors. The analysis steps are similar to those on the heterogeneity in 
the output elasticity of intangible capital. Econometric analysis is conducted at economy 
level while graphing approach is applied at sectoral level. 
 
Finally, a partially replicated experiment based on Corrado et al. (2017) but with some 
                                                   
11 We assume the derivation of productivity measure in equation (7) is technically correct. Based on the 
assumption, regressing second-differenced productivity on second-differenced production factors examines 
the impact of increased use of production factors on productivity, assuming sectors/economies have their 
individual productivity/production factor growth acceleration. 
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new components is conducted to discuss the heterogenous spillover effects of the 
disaggregated intangible capital. 
 
5.3.2 Data sources and summary statistics 
The data used in this study mainly comes from the WIOD. The WIOD database has two 
main advantages compared with previously available data sources. First, throughout the 
data collection efforts, harmonization procedures were applied to ensure international 
comparability of the data. This ensures data quality and minimizes the risk of 
measurement errors. Second, the WIOD includes sectoral price deflators, the use of 
which allows one to retain important information and the heterogeneity of the sectors 
with respect to price dynamics. This represents an improvement over the use of 
aggregate national price deflators. A complete list of the 34 sectors included in the 
database is shown in Appendix A. The construction of intangible capital data, as 
mentioned in Section 2, is based on the intermediates statistics from the supply and uses 
tables within the WIOD. Value added, number of labour and tangible capital at sector 
level are derived from the Social Economic Accounts within the WIOD. All data 
derived from the WIOD is deflated to 1995 constant USD using sector-specific deflators 
and the exchange rate of 1995 USD. In terms of income level, the GDP per capita is 
obtained from the Penn World Table 8.112 and also deflated to 1995 constant USD. The 
relevant variables and their descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 2 below. The 
range and variation of the variables can be clearly seen, showing that the sample 
contains heterogenous observations from various economies and sectors. The mean of 
                                                   
12 For a detailed introduction to the Penn World Table 8.1, please see Feenstra et al. (2015). 
149 
sector value added is 3.2 billion constant 1995 USD; the average number of employees 
is 89 thousand; the average amount of tangible capital and intangible capital are 
respectively 7.5 billion and 512 million constant 1995 USD; the mean of GDP per 
capita is 14 thousand constant 1995 USD. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
ln(Value added) overall 8.14656 1.889557 2.139389 17.64552 N =    6385  
between  1.796914 3.072364 14.78587 n =     545  
within  0.62322 2.7139 11.60706 T-bar = 11.75 
ln(Labour) overall 4.562983 1.337652 0 6.904751 N =    6403  
between  1.365018 0 6.900729 n =     545  
within  0.151984 3.471657 6.061924 T-bar = 11.75 
ln(Tangible capital) overall 8.934774 1.762157 3.803996 14.43591 N =    6403  
between  1.761926 4.24738 14.42826 n =     545  
within  0.246267 7.371815 10.53017 T-bar = 11.75 
ln(Intangible capital) overall 6.311915 2.538113 -5.58173 21.77141 N =    6403  
between  2.357375 -2.12384 20.9065 n =     545  
within  0.960658 -4.50928 15.02492 T-bar = 11.75 
ln(GDP per capita) overall 2.579061 1.048186 -0.95819 4.359776 N =    6403  
between  1.063807 -0.91461 4.16471 n =     545  
within  0.141569 2.120187 3.126091 T-bar = 11.75 
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on data from the WIOD and the Penn World Tables 8.1. 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
Table 3 demonstrates the baseline results for the multilevel analysis. Consistent with the 
expectation, all three production factors are positive and statistically significant. 
Tangible capital on average has the largest output elasticity and labour follows. 
Unsurprisingly, intangible capital has the smallest but its magnitude (approximately two 
thirds of that of tangible capital) indicates that it is indeed a key production factor in 
today’s modern economy. Table 4 displays the relationship between income level and 
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income share of intangible capital and tangible capital. Under the linear framework, it is 
found that the income share of both types of capital relative to labour is decreasing 
along with rising income level, which is consistent with the literature on income 
inequality (Kuznets 1955; Milanovic 1994). However, the magnitude of the relationship 
across two types of intangible capital is significantly different. Specifically, a 10% 
increase in income level is associated with a 0.011 decrease in the gap between tangible 
capital income share and labour income share but only associated with a 0.0042 
decrease in the gap between intangible capital income share and labour income share, 
which might indicate that tangible capital plays a more important role in alleviating 
income inequality in the long run. Under the quadratic framework, an inverted U-shape 
relationship is identified in both types of capital, which complements the literature that 
identifies a Kuznets curve for the relationship between income inequality and income 
level (Kuznets 1955; Milanovic 1994). Both Kuznets (1995) and Milanovic (1994) 
argue that there is an inverted U-shape between income level and physical capital 
income, which may be one of the key drivers of the dynamics of income inequality. 
While the results in Table 4 confirm this relationship based on evidence from 39 
economies, it is worth noting that both the magnitude and the turning point of the 
relationship differ between the two types of capital. The inverted U-shape of intangible 
capital is ‘slimmer’ than that of tangible capital, as indicated by the larger scale of the 
coefficient of the square term. Moreover, the turning point of tangible capital is much 
lower than that of intangible capital: 1,120 1995 USD for tangible capital and 7,000 
1995 USD for intangible capital, which complements the results of Milanovic (1994). 
Milanovic (1994) finds that the turning point in the relationship between Gini Index and 
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income level is $2,100 per capita (at 1988 international price), which is between the 
turning point of intangible capital and tangible capital in this study. The two turning 
points revealed in this study might support a hypothesis that the increasing income 
inequality in the low and middle income stage is first driven by the increasing income 
share of both tangible capital and intangible capital and then mainly driven by the 
increasing income share of intangible capital. 
 
Table 3 Production function estimation (Multilevel analysis, baseline result) 
VARIABLES Coefficient Standard Error  Significance Level 
ln(Labour) 0.312 0.0571 *** 
ln(Tangible Capital) 0.365 0.0745 *** 
ln(Intangible Capital) 0.223 0.0315 *** 
Constant 2.652 0.648 *** 
Observations 6,385   
Number of economies 39   
Number of sectors 34   
Year FE YES   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
Table 4 Income level and income share of intangible and tangible capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Intangible Capital Intangible Capital Tangible Capital Tangible Capital 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0419*** 0.167*** -0.105*** 0.00511 
 (0.00262) (0.0144) (0.00274) (0.0153) 
ln(GDP per capita)2  -0.0429***  -0.0226*** 
  (0.00290)  (0.00308) 
Constant -0.0911*** -0.305*** 0.162*** 0.0491*** 
 (0.00756) (0.0163) (0.00791) (0.0173) 
Observations 5,302 5,302 5,302 5,302 
R-squared 0.046 0.084 0.217 0.225 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
When it comes to the productivity spillover effect of intangible capital, Table 5 gives an 
overall result that is consistent with Corrado et al. (2017). Intangible capital 
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demonstrates a positive and significant coefficient while both labour and tangible 
capital have a negative but insignificant coefficient, which indicates that the spillover 
effect does exist in intangible capital but is not significant for both labour and tangible 
capital. The coefficient of the spillover effect (0.04), however, is smaller than that of 
Corrado et al. (2017) (approximately 0.20), which might be due to the fact that the 
multilevel analysis in this study has controlled for sector fixed effects. Controlling for 
sector fixed effects allows individual sectors to have their own trend in the change in 
productivity growth rate, which might be an improvement compared with Corrado et al. 
(2017). For instance, some traditional sectors such as basic metals and fabricated metal 
products might demonstrate a decrease in the rate of productivity growth in contrast to 
some rising sectors, which might be correlated with the change in the rate of intangible 
capital growth. In order to quantitatively measure the magnitude of the spillover effect, 
it is necessary to first calculate the average growth rate of intangible capital and in this 
case it is 5.5%. Then the scale of the spillover effect of intangible capital is 
approximately 0.22 (5.5×0.04=0.22) percentage point, which is slightly above one 
fourth of that in Corrado et al. (2017). Nevertheless, the productivity spillover effect 
remains both economically and statistically significant, even after imposing an 
additional restriction (sector fixed effect). 
 
Table 5 Spillover effect of intangible capital (baseline results) 
VARIABLES  
∆(∆ ln Labour) -0.152 
 (0.179) 
∆(∆ ln Tangible Capital) -0.408 
 (0.297) 
∆(∆ln Intangible Capital) 0.0400*** 
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 (0.0129) 
Constant 0.0491 
 (0.0336) 
Observations 3,778 
Number of sector 33 
Number of economy 39 
Year FE YES 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
To further explore the heterogeneity in the spillover effect across various economies, 
both linear and quadratic frameworks are applied and the results are illustrated in Table 
6. It is found that income level is significantly and negatively correlated with the 
magnitude of the spillover effect and an insignificant quadratic relationship is also 
identified. Specifically, a 10% increase in income level is associated with a 0.001 
decline in the spillover effect, which is approximate 2.5% of the baseline coefficient. In 
respect of the quadratic relationship, the turning point is 2,300 1995 USD. The result 
provides new information for the literature on productivity spillover effects. The 
magnitude of the productivity spillover effect is often found to follow a quadratic 
relationship. For example, the productivity spillover effect of FDI first increases with 
increasing income due to absorptive capacity (Gerschenkron 1962; Findlay 1978; Wang 
and Blomström 1992), and then decreases as income increases because of decreasing 
technology gap (Lapan and Bardhan 1973; Wang and Blomström 1992; Perez 1997; 
Kinoshita 2001). In the case of intangible capital, the story might be similar. Intangible 
capital, in the context of low income economies, is often used by the leading firms. The 
spillover effects of various types of intangible capital including computerized 
information, innovative property, brand equity, organization capital and staff training 
might also be subject to absorptive capacity. When the economy passes a certain 
154 
threshold and the use of intangible capital becomes more common, the spillover effect 
then declines. Although this hypothetical mechanism cannot be proved, the inverted U-
shape relationship found in this study provides some hints on further studies on the 
mechanism. 
 
Table 6 Income level and the spillover effects 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
ln(GDP per capita) -0.00927*** 0.00538 
 (0.00122) (0.00683) 
ln(GDP per capita)2  -0.00300** 
  (0.00138) 
Constant 0.0245*** 0.00951 
 (0.00352) (0.00772) 
Observations 5,291 5,291 
R-squared 0.011 0.012 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
Another interesting question to explore is the heterogeneity of productivity spillover 
across sectors. Figure 1 provides the relevant information. From the figure, it is clear 
that the service group generally has a larger intangible capital spillover effect than the 
non-service group. Retail trade enjoys the largest scale while rubber and plastics has the 
smallest. Other sectors that significantly deviate from the baseline result comprise 
agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (AtB) (+), food, beverages and tobacco (15t16) 
(+), textiles and textile products (17t18) (+), other non-metallic mineral products (26) 
(+), construction (F) (+), sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles (50) (+), post 
and telecommunications (64) (+), real estate activities (70) (+), other community, social 
and personal services (O) (+), mining and quarrying (C) (-), pulp, paper, paper products, 
printing and publishing (21t22) (-), basic metals and fabricated metal products (27t28) 
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(-), machinery nec (29) (-), electrical and optical equipment (30t33) (-), electricity, gas 
and water supply (E) (-), wholesale trade and commission trade (51) (-), Inland transport 
(60) (-), supporting and auxiliary transport activities (63) (-), renting of machinery and 
equipment and other business activities (71t74) (-), and education (M) (-). There are 
also many sectors having a similar magnitude to the baseline result, including leather, 
leather products and footwear (19), coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel (23), 
chemicals and chemical products (24), transport equipment (34t35), manufacturing nec, 
recycling (36t37), air transport (62), financial intermediation (J), and public 
administration and defence, social security (L). The observations on the heterogeneity 
of spillover effect across various sectors might support a hypothesis that sectors relying 
more on intangible capital have a larger productivity spillover effect from intangible 
capital, which is consistent with Keller and Yeaple (2009) who find that firms in high-
tech sectors enjoy larger productivity spillover effect based on evidence from US firms. 
However, to confirm this hypothesis, further study is needed. 
 
Figure 1 Productivity spillover of intangible capital across sectors 
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Source: Authors’ own construction. 
 
To explore the heterogeneous productivity spillover effects of different components of 
intangible capital, it is beneficial to partially replicate the experiment of Corrado et al. 
(2017) but with some extra interaction terms to compare the heterogeneity coefficients 
across sector groups and income stages. Mutilevel analysis is no longer used because of 
the significantly increased number of variables, which might lead to the number of 
coefficients to be estimated surging. Specifically, intangible capital will be 
disaggregated into computerized information, innovative property and economic 
competency, and then lags of production factors will be added into the regressions. 
Moreover, interaction terms between service group as well as income level and various 
types of intangible capital are incorporated into the regressions. Relevant results are 
demonstrated in Table 7. Due to data availability issues, tangible capital is not classified 
into ICT and non-ICT, and labour hour is also not included into the regressions. 
Nevertheless, the experiment in this study focuses more on the heterogeneity of the 
spillover effect and may provide some useful information. The results in Table 7 are 
generally consistent with those of Corrado et al. (2017): the spillover effect of 
innovative property (R&D) is only found in its first lag and that of economic 
competency is found in the current period. However, no consistent evidence supports 
the spillover effect of computerized information, given that the sign of its coefficient 
changes after interaction terms are incorporated. When it comes to the heterogenous 
spillover effect, it is found that higher income is correlated with a lower spillover effect 
and the service group has a larger spillover effect than non-service group, both for R&D 
and economic competency, which is consistent with the findings in Table 6 and Figure 
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1. Specifically, the spillover effect of R&D in the service group is 1.5 percentage point 
higher than that of the non-service group, and that of economic competency is 16 
percentage point larger than the non-service group. When income increases by 10%, the 
productivity spillover effect of R&D is predicted to decline by 0.2 percentage point and 
that of economic competency will decrease by 0.7 percentage point, which is consistent 
with the results in Table 6. The findings on the role of different categories of intangible 
capital reveal that in the modern economy not only R&D but also non-R&D has 
significant impacts on productivity, and their interactions with income level and sector-
specific characteristics are consistent with the findings based on aggregated intangible 
capital data. 
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Table 7 Spillover effects of various types of intangible capital 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
L1. ∆(∆ln R&D) 0.00639 0.0503** 
 (0.0109) (0.0220) 
∆(∆ln EC) 0.285*** 0.407*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0349) 
∆(∆ln EC) × ln (GDP per capita)  -0.0685*** 
  (0.0114) 
L1. ∆(∆ln R&D) × ln (GDP per capita)  -0.0200*** 
  (0.00717) 
∆(∆ln EC) × Service  0.0147 
  (0.0135) 
L1. ∆(∆ln R&D) × Service  0.164*** 
  (0.0204) 
∆(∆ln CI) -0.0157*** 0.0397*** 
 (0.00591) (0.0143) 
L1. ∆(∆ln CI) -0.00503 -0.00473 
 (0.00598) (0.00587) 
∆(∆ln CI) × ln (GDP per capita)  -0.0197** 
  (0.00764) 
∆(∆ln CI) × Service  -0.0510*** 
  (0.00853) 
∆(∆ln Labour) -0.205 -0.183 
 (0.129) (0.126) 
∆(∆ln Tangible) -0.433* -0.458* 
 (0.263) (0.257) 
L1. ∆(∆ln Labour) -0.0735 -0.0216 
 (0.129) (0.127) 
L1. ∆(∆ln Tangible) 0.294 0.226 
 (0.249) (0.243) 
Constant -0.0451 -0.0532 
 (0.0354) (0.0346) 
Observations 2,967 2,967 
R-squared 0.181 0.223 
Year FE YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Source: Authors’ own calculation.
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5.5 Discussions and Conclusion 
In this study, the heterogeneous role of intangible capital in production and productivity 
spillover is investigated based on sectoral level data for 39 economies constructed from 
the WIOD, which contribute to the literature confirming intangible capital as a source of 
growth, the literature confirming the productivity spillover effect of intangible capital, 
and the literature related to income inequality as well as to the pattern of productivity 
spillover effects. In order to construct a sufficiently large dataset for the heterogeneity 
analysis, the method of this study might have sacrificed some accuracy compared with 
the method used in constructing national level data by Corrado et al. (2009) and the 
literature following it. The source of inaccuracy might be caused by the deviation of the 
measured outsourcing ratio from the actual outsourcing ratio, ‘other business activities’ 
intermediates including expenditure that is not intangible investment, the distribution of 
computerized information investment across sectors inconsistent with that of ‘computer 
and related services’ intermediate etc. Nevertheless, the econometric method deployed 
in this study has some tolerance of measurement error, which is likely to make the 
constructed dataset satisfy the analysis requirement11. Multilevel analysis that is a 
balance between tolerating the measurement inaccuracy of intangible investment and 
acquiring economy and sector-specific information is applied to retrieve the economy 
and sector-specific coefficients for the production function and spillover effect of 
intangible capital. A partially replicated experiment of Corrado et al. (2017) is then 
conducted to study the heterogenous spillover effects of the disaggregated intangible 
                                                   
11 If the measurement error is randomly distributed, it will not cause bias in the estimation results; if the 
measurement error is sector-specific, then it will be eliminated by the sector specific intercept. 
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capital.  
 
It is found that intangible capital significantly contributes to sectoral value added with 
an average output elasticity as large as two thirds of that of tangible capital. An inverted 
U-shape relationship between capital income share of both types of capital (relative to 
labour income share) and income level has also been identified based on the 
heterogeneous output elasticity derived from the multilevel analysis, which indicates 
both tangible and intangible capital might play an important role in the income 
inequality dynamic. Moreover, the turning point of intangible capital income share is 
larger than that of tangible capital income share, which might support a hypothesis that 
the increasing income inequality in the low and middle income stage is first driven by 
the increasing income share of both tangible capital and intangible capital, and then 
driven by the increasing income share of intangible capital.  
 
When it comes to the productivity spillover of intangible capital, the results are 
consistent with those of Corrado et al. (2017) but include further inquiry into the 
heterogeneity of the effect. Among labour, tangible capital and intangible capital, only 
intangible capital is found to have significant productivity spillover effects, aligned with 
the findings of Corrado et al. (2017). Income level is generally negatively correlated 
with the productivity spillover effect, and there is moderate evidence supporting an 
inverted U-shape relationship between the magnitude of the intangible capital spillover 
effect and income level, which complements the literature on the inverted U-shape 
relationship between income level and the productivity spillover effect (Gerschenkron 
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1962; Findlay 1978; Wang and Blomström 1992; Lapan and Bardhan 1973; Perez 1997; 
Kinoshita 2001). The sector-average spillover effect has also been qualitatively studied. 
Based on the graphic approach, the spillover effect shows a pattern of larger spillover 
effects in sectors relying more on intangible capital, which is consistent with the 
findings of Keller and Yeaple (2009) that firms in high-tech sectors enjoy larger 
productivity spillover effect based on evidence from US firms. 
 
Finally, a partially replicated experiment of Corrado et al. (2017) reveals the 
heterogenous spillover effects of different types of intangible capital. It is found that the 
first lag of R&D component and the current period of economic competency component 
demonstrates significant spillover effects on productivity, consistent with Corrado et al. 
(2017). However, no robust evidence supports the spillover effect of computerized 
information. The spillover effects of both R&D and economic competency show a 
consistent pattern: the effect is larger in the service group than the non-service group 
and decline as income increases.  
 
The findings of this study partially answer the questions on the heterogeneous output 
elasticity and productivity spillover of intangible capital across sectors and economies, 
which might provide useful information for explaining the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth. Policy makers might also find the information helpful 
by better understanding the changing roles of intangible capital in determining 
productivity spillover and then economic growth. Future research directions might 
include investigating firm-level evidence on the relationship between intangible capital 
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and productivity spillover when relevant data is fully available. 
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5.6 Appendix A 
WIOD sectors, definition by NACE and sector classification 
NACE WIOD sectors Classification 
AtB Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing Non-service 
C Mining and quarrying Non-service 
15t16 Food, beverages and tobacco Non-service 
17t18 Textiles and textile products Non-service 
19 Leather, leather products and footwear Non-service 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork Non-service 
21t22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing Non-service 
23 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel Non-service 
24 Chemicals and chemical products Non-service 
25 Rubber and plastics Non-service 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products Non-service 
27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products Non-service 
29 Machinery nec Non-service 
30t33 Electrical and optical equipment Non-service 
34t35 Transport equipment Non-service 
36t37 Manufacturing nec, recycling Non-service 
E Electricity, gas and water supply Non-service 
F Construction Non-Service 
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles Service 
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade Service 
52 Retail trade, except motor vehicles and motorcycles Service 
H Hotels and restaurants Service 
60 Inland transport Service 
61 Water transport Service 
62 Air transport Service 
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities Service 
64 Post and telecommunications Service 
J Financial intermediation Service 
70 Real estate activities Service 
71t74 Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities Service 
L Public administration and defence, social security Service 
M Education Service 
N Health and social work Service 
O Other community, social and personal services Service 
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6. Unmeasured investment and the puzzling Japanese lost 
decades* 
 
For the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s, the basic neoclassical growth theory predicts 
a steady Japanese economy, when in fact the Japanese economy was depressed. This 
study applies the new theory with intangible investment and non-neutral technology 
proposed by McGrattan and Prescott (2010) to the Japanese economy, and finds that the 
predictions derived from the new theory are much closer to the actual data. The 
improvement of this extension remains robust when tangible investment adjustment 
costs are added. This study is the first to apply the new theory to a country other than 
the US, and compared with existing literature on the lost decades of Japan, this study 
better explains the depression in labour hours by avoiding introducing a large, 
unjustified labour wedge or other exogenous inputs.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The basic neoclassical growth theory accounts well for the fluctuation of the Japanese 
economy prior to the 1990s, provided that productivity and government purchase 
shocks are incorporated. During the 1990s and 2000s, however, the behaviour of the 
Japanese economy often deviates from this model, as indicated not only by the 
depression in labour hours but also most macroeconomic variables1. Although Hayashi 
                                                   
* This chapter is also published in Crawford School Research Paper (No. 01/2017). 
1 See, for example, Figure 3 in Kobayashi and Inaba (2006). The basic real business cycle model explains 
the fluctuation of the Japanese economy well prior to the 1990s. From the 1990s, however, the deviation 
of the simulation results based on TFP shocks and government purchase shocks from the actual data 
keeps increasing over time. 
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and Prescott (2002) explain the pre-1995 counterfactual predictions by arguing that 
there was a policy change in the working hours limit, the deviations of the predictions 
from the actual data were persistent after 1995. Specifically, the model predicts a steady 
mid to late 1990s and early 2000s economy, when in fact it was depressed. For example, 
over the period of 1995 to 2007, Japanese nominal GDP fell from $5.33 to $4.36 trillion 
while the nominal wages at current USD fell around 10% according to statistics from 
the World Bank2. Accordingly, the 1990s and 2000s are called the lost decades or the 
lost 20 years of Japan. The existing literature argues that the decline in TFP is the main 
cause of the lost decades in Japan (Fukao and Kwon, 2006; Griffin and Odaki, 2009; 
Hayashi and Prescott, 2002), which is inconsistent with the counterfactual predictions 
generated by the neoclassical growth model when TFP shocks are incorporated.  
 
Following McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott (2014), this 
study extends the base model by introducing intangible investment and non-neutral 
technology change with respect to the production of intangible investment goods and 
finds that, in the light of the new theory proposed by McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and 
McGrattan and Prescott (2014), the lost decades in Japan are much less puzzling. Most 
intangible investment is excluded from gross domestic output (GDP) because it is 
difficult to measure. Examples of intangible investment include research and 
development (R&D), advertising, organization capital, staff training, etc. These 
investments3 are traditionally treated as expenditure and do not appear in the national 
                                                   
2 The World Bank data (http://data.worldbank.org/country/japan). 
3 From 2016, Japan began to capitalize innovative property including R&D, mineral exploration and 
evaluation as well as software using SNA08. Although a part of intangible investment is captured by 
SNA08, there is still a large proportion of intangible investment that remains uncaptured due to 
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account. However, these investments are made for realizing future profits and are 
reflected in the valuation of a company when the company goes public or is sold (Asker 
et al., 2015; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013; Hulten and Hao, 2008). The importance 
of intangible investment in economic activities has been widely confirmed in the 
literature (Arato and Yamada, 2012; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005; Awano et al., 2010; 
Borgo et al., 2013; Chun and Nadiri, 2016; Clausen and Hirth, 2016; Corrado et al., 
2013, 2009; Corrado and Hulten, 2010; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013, 2014; Fukao 
et al., 2009; Gourio and Rudanko, 2014a, 2014b; Haskel and Wallis, 2013; Marrano et 
al., 2009; Miyagawa and Hisa, 2013; Tronconi and Marzetti, 2011; van Ark et al., 2009), 
and missing this critical element might cause problems for macroeconomic theories. 
 
There is both macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence suggesting that the 
unmeasured investment was depressed during the lost decades. According to Fukao et 
al. (2009) and the intangible investment data they used, the growth rate of real 
intangible investment was low and sometimes negative during the lost decades. From 
1985 to 1992, real intangible investment in the Japanese economy grew by 48% while it 
only grew respectively by 14% and 9.6% from 1992 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2006 in 
real terms4. If we look at the industrial level data, it is clear that the intangible 
investment was significantly low compared with previous periods. Taking Japan’s 
semiconductor industry as an example, from 1985 to 1992, its intangible investment 
                                                   
measurement issues. The national account data used in this study is obtained from Penn World Table 8.1 
and does not include R&D, mineral exploration and evaluation, in order to separate most of the intangible 
investment from the output of goods and services. 
4 Data from JIP database 2011 (http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/JIP2011/). 
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quadrupled, while it decreased by 5% between 1999 and 20065. Moreover, during the 
Asian Financial Crisis, Japanese output and working hours fell significantly while 
labour productivity rose or fell much less than the output and working hours6, which is 
inconsistent with the predictions of current macro theories that assume business cycles 
are, at least partially, driven by shocks of total factor productivity. McGrattan and 
Prescott (2014) argue that the current business cycle theory is likely to miss the 
unmeasured intangible investment based on similar phenomena that took place in the 
US during the downturn of 2008–2009. 
 
The counterfactual predictions of the base neoclassical growth model for the Japanese 
economy during the lost decades is consistent with a theory that distinguishes measured 
income and economic income. When economic income does not move with measured 
income, measured productivity may deviate from actual productivity and the predictions 
based on the measured productivity are likely to be inconsistent with the real data. To 
uncover what actually happened during Japan’s lost decades, this study incorporates the 
intangible investment into the basic neoclassical growth model following McGrattan 
and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott (2014). There are two activities in the 
economy: the production of final goods and services, and the production of intangible 
investment goods7. Following McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and 
Prescott (2014), this study assumes hours allocated to these two activities are measured 
                                                   
5 Data from JIP database 2011 (http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/JIP2011/). 
6 Data from Total Economy Database (https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/). In 
terms of labour productivity per hour, it rose both in 1998 and 1999. In terms of labour productivity per 
person, it fell slightly in 1998 and rose in 1999. 
7 The intangible investment in this study is different from that in Corrado et al. (2009) and the literature 
based on Corrado et al. (2009). The intangible investment in this study is derived from macroeconomic 
theory while that of Corrado et al. (2009) is derived from the available data. 
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accurately, and reported income is underestimated by the amount of intangible 
investments. Given the inaccurate nature of intangible investment measurement, this 
study uses the extended model to determine the path for the intangible investment 
following McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and show why including the missing 
intangible investment is important for understanding the lost decades of Japan. 
 
This study allows the rates of technological change to differ across both the sector 
producing final goods and services and the sector producing intangible investment 
goods following McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott (2014)8. To 
generate working hours consistent with reality, one could have introduced large and 
variable shocks to leisure preference or labour market frictions, which is a common 
practice in business cycle research (McGrattan and Prescott, 2010). The advantage of 
the new theory proposed by McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott 
(2014) is that it can avoid introducing large changes of leisure preferences or labour 
market frictions that often cannot be justified by observations on tax rates, which makes 
this theory better satisfy the input justification criterion. That is, the exogenous input of 
this theory is more consistent with micro and macro evidence. 
 
Another requirement for a successful theory is to satisfy the prediction criterion. That is, 
a theory must not produce counterfactual predictions, at least. A stronger requirement is 
to make correct predictions for data that were not used to calibrate parameters. 
Therefore, this study follows Prescott and McGrattan (2007) by calibrating the model 
                                                   
8 For the rationale of this modelling choice, please see McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan 
and Prescott (2014). 
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using the initial year data instead of data of the research period as well as using only 
TFP shocks and government wedge shocks because if all exogenous inputs are used, 
then a perfect match between data and theory will be obtained no matter what theory is 
used. 
 
This study is the first to apply this new theory to an economy other than the US and 
therefore provides important evidence for the applicability of the new theory. To 
confirm the robustness of the extension proposed by McGrattan and Prescott (2010), an 
alternative neoclassical growth model with tangible investment adjustment costs is 
further applied. This study also provides a better explanation for the lost decades of the 
Japanese economy compared with previous literature. For example, Kobayashi and 
Inaba (2006) argue that labour market frictions play an important role in the lost 
decades of Japan but the increased frictions cannot be justified by observations on tax 
rates or structural changes. By applying the method proposed by McGrattan and 
Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott (2014) to the Japanese economy between 
19959 and 200610, it is found that the prediction results of the new theory are much 
more consistent with the actual data compared with those of the base model, which 
indicates that this new theory is also applicable to Japan. The findings suggest that the 
standard productivity measures greatly underestimate the actual fall in labour 
                                                   
9 Hayashi and Prescott (2002) have explained the pre-1995 deviations using the changed working hours 
limit. Moreover, the effective labour tax rate is an important element of the new theory proposed by 
McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott (2014) but the national account data needed 
in the calculation of the effective labour tax rate is unavailable for Japan before 1994. Therefore, 1995 is 
chosen as the initial year. 
10 During the Global Financial Crisis, both the base model and the model extended with intangible 
investment and non-neutral technology do not work well due to dramatic financial frictions, though the 
extended model works better. However, the prediction results of both models are consistent, which 
indicates that the movement of measured output and unmeasured investment is consistent in Japan during 
the GFC. Therefore, I choose 2006 as the terminal year. 
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productivity during most of the time in the Japanese lost decades. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The following section demonstrates the prediction 
results from the basic neoclassical theory. Section 3 provides the evidence of decreased 
intangible investment during the research period. Section 4 shows the extended theory 
and its predictions. Section 5 introduces the alternative model setting. Section 6 draws 
the conclusion. 
 
6.2 Predictions of the basic theory without intangible investment 
The starting point is the basic neoclassical growth model that is often used in the study 
of business cycles. The basic model used in this study is a simplified version of that 
used in McGrattan and Prescott (2010) by eliminating most of the tax rates except the 
labour income tax11. Therefore, it is closer to the model used in the business cycle 
accounting literature (Chari et al., 2007; Kersting, 2008; Kobayashi and Inaba, 2006). In 
the basic model, I treat TFP, labour income tax rate, population and the public 
consumption exogenously, which is consistent with McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and 
McGrattan and Prescott (2014).  
 
In a standard one-sector neoclassical growth model, given the initial capital stock 𝑘0, a 
representative household chooses consumption c, investment x and working hours h to 
maximize  
                                                   
11 Other tax rates or frictions except the labour income tax rate generally remain stable over the research 
period in Japan and therefore are already embodied in either the initial investment wedge that is 
normalized to 1 or the initial parameter settings. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the simplified version.  
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E0[∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝑈(𝑐𝑡, ℎ𝑡)𝑁𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
] 
subject to 
𝑐𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡 = (1 − 𝑡𝑤𝑡)𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 
𝑘𝑡+1 = [(1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡]/(1 + 𝑛) 
 
The lowercase variables are written in per capita terms and 𝑁𝑡 = 𝑁0(1 + 𝑛)
𝑡 is the 
population in time t. 𝑟𝑡 is the capital rent while 𝑤𝑡 is the labour wage rate. 
Households discount their utility at the discount rate 𝛽, and the capital depreciation rate 
is 𝛿. 𝑡𝑤𝑡 is the labour income tax, which is the main component of the labour wedge 
according to the theory of business cycle accounting. 
 
The aggregate production function is labour augmented and in the form of Cobbs-
Douglas, which is as follows: 
Y𝑡 = (𝐴𝑡𝐻𝑡)
1−𝑎𝑘𝐾𝑡
𝑎𝑘 
Capital letters denote aggregate variables. 𝐴𝑡 is TFP that varies over time, 𝐻𝑡 is the 
total working hours and 𝐾𝑡 is mainly the tangible capital stock12. 𝐾𝑡 is calculated by 
applying the perpetual inventory method to investment in the national account. Firms 
rent capital and employ labour. 𝑎𝑘 is the capital income share in the production. If 
profits are maximized, then both the rental rate of capital and the wage rate of labour are 
respectively equal to the marginal product of each. The clearing condition of the goods 
and service market is N𝑡(𝑐𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡) = Y𝑡. 𝑔𝑡 is the government purchase or the 
                                                   
12 It includes software, however. 
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government wedge. 
 
Following McGrattan and Prescott (2010), I first calibrate the model based on the data 
of the initial year, and then compute the model’s equilibrium path assuming households 
have perfect foresight13 of future changes in labour income tax rates, TFP, public 
consumption and populations. In Appendix A, I discuss the data sources of the variables 
and the parameterization of the model. The parameters used to compute the equilibrium 
path of this model are summarized in Table A1. The effective labour income tax rate, 
the public consumption, and the TFP are reported in Table A2. The process of 
computing the equilibrium path is described in detail in Appendix A. The tax rate 
change I consider in this study is the effective labour income tax rate 𝑡𝑤𝑡, which is 
constructed using the method proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994). The method proposed 
by Mendoza et al. (1994) is also used in Prescott (2004) and McGrattan and Prescott 
(2010). The data for constructing effective the labour income tax rate is obtained from 
OECD national account and revenue statistics14.  
 
The utility function used in this study is standard in the business cycle literature, as 
follows: 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑙)  =  𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑐 + 𝜓𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − ℎ) 
𝜓 is the leisure preference parameter. Assume a technology progress rate 𝛾, and the 
technical progress rate is derived from the average growth rate of GDP per working age 
                                                   
13 The simulation process is based on the fully nonlinear approach instead of the log-linearization 
approach, to ensure the accuracy of the simulation. Therefore, perfect foresight is assumed.  
14 OECD statistics (https://stats.oecd.org). 
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person between 1995 and 2006, which is standard in the business cycle literature. 
Therefore, we have the first order conditions as follows: 
𝜓?̂?𝑡
1 − ℎ𝑡
= (1 − 𝑡𝑤𝑡)
(1 − 𝑎𝑘)?̂?𝑡
ℎ𝑡
 
𝜇𝑡 = ?̂?𝐸𝑡𝜇𝑡+1[(1 − 𝛿) +
𝑎𝑘?̂?𝑡+1
?̂?𝑡+1
] 
where ?̂? = 𝛽/(1 + 𝛾), 𝜇 = 1/?̂?, 𝐸𝑡 denotes expectation. The hat on a variable 
indicates that it has been detrended by (1 + 𝛾)𝑡. For example, ?̂?𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡/(1 + 𝛾)
𝑡. 
 
To close the model, I add the resource constraint and the motion of capital: 
?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 
?̂?𝑡 = (𝐴𝑡ℎ̂𝑡)
1−𝑎𝑘?̂?𝑡
𝑎𝑘
 
?̂?𝑡+1 = [(1 − 𝛿)?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡]/[(1 + 𝑛)(1 + 𝛾)] 
 
The initial capital stock in 1995 is derived from the Penn World Table 8.115. Following 
McGrattan and Prescott (2010), I choose the depreciation rate 𝛿 based on the capital 
stock and the investment of Japan in 1995. Then I choose the utility parameter 𝜓 so 
that the model’s consumption share, investment share and factor inputs share are 
consistent with the Japanese level in 1995 (see Appendix A and B for details). Then, I 
incorporate technology changes and government purchase changes into the model above 
and obtain the prediction results as follows: 
                                                   
15 For the detailed introduction of Penn World Table 8.1, please see Feenstra et al. (2015). 
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Figure 1 Japan and basic model per capita hours worked 
(Annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
In Figure 1, I plot the model’s predicted per capita working hours and the actual per 
capita working hours, indexed so that 1995 equals 100. The difference between the two 
series is noticeable. Actual per capita hours were depressed during the research period 
while the predicted per capita hours mostly remained steady between 1995 to 2006.  
 
In Figure 2, I plot the model’s predicted output along with the real GDP of Japan. Both 
series are adjusted according to the population growth and a technological progress rate 
of 1.015𝑡. Although the depression in output was not as large as the depression in 
hours, the model predicts that the economy should have boomed.  
 
In Figure 3, I plot the model’s predicted tangible investment along with the actual 
tangible investment of Japan. Obviously, significant deviations from the actual data are 
observed. A similar phenomenon happens in consumption, which is displayed in Figure 
4. 
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Figure 2 Japan and the basic model real GDP per capita 
(Detrended by 1.015𝑡, annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
 
 
Figure 3 Japan and the basic model tangible investment per capita 
(Detrended by 1.015𝑡, annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
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Figure 4 Japan and the basic model consumption per capita 
(Detrended by 1.015𝑡, annual, 1995=100, 1995-2006) 
 
6.3 Evidence of decreased intangible investment  
I present evidence that suggests unmeasured intangible investment was low during most 
of the time between 1995 and 2006. If all incomes were included in national accounts, 
we would expect the growth rate of labour productivity per hour, labour hours and 
output to be low during a depression because if labour productivity per hour is high, 
firms employ more people and as a result the labour hours and output increase. An 
examination of Japan’s national accounts reveals that the growth rate of labour 
productivity was high compared with the growth rate of output and working hours in 
many years between 1995 and 2006 according to Figure 5, suggesting that the labour 
productivity per hour might be overstated. Since intangible investments are expensed in 
the national account, the measurement of labour productivity is overstated to a 
significant extent when these investments decreased more than the output of goods and 
services or grew less than the output of goods and services. Specifically, during the lost 
decades, firms might have cut intangible investment and transferred the resources that 
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had been used to produce intangible investment to the production of goods and services. 
As a result, measured labour productivity did not decrease as much as the actual labour 
productivity. 
 
Figure 5 The growth of GDP per capita, labour productivity per hour and average working hours 
in Japan (Annually) 
Source: Author’s own construction; data from Total Economy Database 
(https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/). 
 
 
Figure 6 The average working hours and compensation per hour in Japan 
(Compensation per hour detrended by 1.015𝑡, annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own construction; data from Total Economy Database 
(https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/) and OECD national account 
statistics. 
 
In Figure 6, I plot the average working hours and compensation per hour in Japan. The 
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average working hours have been adjusted according to the population growth rate, and 
the compensation per hour is adjusted according to the price level provided by the Penn 
World Table 8.1 and technology growth rate. Please note that labour compensation per 
hour is another indicator of labour productivity. It is evident that the movements of 
average working hours and compensation per hour are inconsistent during the research 
period. In some years, the compensation per hour grew while the working hours per 
labour declined, which may indicate that the unmeasured investment was low in many 
years. 
 
6.4 Predictions of the extended theory with intangible investment 
According to McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott (2014), the 
technology used in producing final goods and services should be different from that 
used in producing intangible investment. Therefore, the extended theory should include 
not only intangible investment but also non-neutral technology. The household problem 
remains the same as that in section 2 except that there is an additional investment 
choice. I examine the extended model’s predictions and show that these predictions 
conform with Japanese observations between 1995 and 2006. 
 
Extensions 
The aggregate production comprises two aggregation production relations: 
𝑦𝑡 = (A𝑡
1ℎ𝑡
1)1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖(𝑘𝑇𝑡
1 )𝑎𝑘(𝑘𝐼𝑡)
𝑎𝑖 
𝑥𝐼𝑡 = (A𝑡
2ℎ𝑡
2)1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖(𝑘𝑇𝑡
2 )𝑎𝑘(𝑘𝐼𝑡)
𝑎𝑖 
Firms produce final goods and services using intangible capital 𝑘𝐼, tangible capital 𝑘𝑇
1  
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and labour ℎ1. Firms produce new intangible capital 𝑥𝐼, such as new brands, new 
products R&D, staff training, etc., using intangible capital 𝑘𝐼, tangible capital 𝑘𝑇
2 and 
labour ℎ2. It is difficult to acquire the parameters of the intangible investment 
production because of the lack of data. For simplicity, I assume the income shares of the 
three production factors are the same between the two activities following McGrattan 
and Prescott (2010). According to McGrattan and Prescott (2010), varying the 
parameters of the production function of intangible investment does not change the 
implications of the new theory. 
 
Following McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott (2014), 𝑘𝐼 is an 
input to both sectors. It is not split between them as is the case for tangible capital and 
labour because it can be used in different productions simultaneously. For example, a 
brand name is used both to sell final goods and services and to develop new brands; 
new knowledge from R&D is used by both producers and researchers. Given initial 
capital (𝑘𝐼𝑡, 𝑘𝑇𝑡), the maximization problem of the household is  
E0[∑ 𝛽
𝑡𝑈(𝑐𝑡, ℎ𝑡)𝑁𝑡
∞
𝑡=0 ], 
subject to 
𝑐𝑡 + 𝑥𝑇𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡𝑥𝐼𝑡 = (1 − 𝑡𝑤𝑡)𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 + 𝑟𝑇𝑡𝑘𝑡 + 𝑟𝐼𝑡𝑘𝐼𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡. 
𝑘𝑇,𝑡+1 = [(1 − 𝛿𝑇)𝑘𝑇,𝑡 + 𝑥𝑇𝑡]/(1 + 𝑛) 
𝑘𝐼,𝑡+1 = [(1 − 𝛿𝐼)𝑘𝐼,𝑡 + 𝑥𝐼𝑡]/(1 + 𝑛) 
 
As before, all lowercase variables are in per capita units and there is a growth of 
population at rate 𝑛. The relative price of intangible investment is 𝑞𝑡. The rental rate of 
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intangible capital and tangible capital are respectively denoted by 𝑟𝐼𝑡 and 𝑟𝑇𝑡. The 
transfer payment is denoted by 𝑇𝑡 and is exogenous in the household’s decision 
problem. Labour income is 𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡. The first order conditions are as follows: 
𝜓𝑐?̂?
1−ℎ𝑡
= (1 − 𝑡𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖)?̂?𝑡
ℎ𝑡
1                          (1) 
𝜇𝑡 = ?̂?𝐸𝑡𝜇𝑡+1[(1 − 𝛿𝑇) +
𝑎𝑘?̂?𝑡+1
?̂?𝑡+1
]                       (2) 
𝑞𝑡𝜇𝑡 = ?̂?𝐸𝑡𝜇𝑡+1[𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿𝑇) +
𝑎𝑖(?̂?𝑡+1+𝑞𝑡+1𝑥𝐼𝑡+1)
?̂?𝑡+1
]                (3) 
?̂?𝑡
ℎ𝑡
1 =
𝑞𝑡𝑥𝐼𝑡
ℎ𝑡
2                                  (4) 
?̂?𝑡
𝑘𝑡
1 =
𝑞𝑡𝑥𝐼𝑡
𝑘𝑡
2                                  (5) 
The hat on a variable indicates that it has been detrended by (1 + 𝛾)𝑡. To close the 
model, I again add the resource constraint and the capital motion: 
?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡                               (6) 
?̂?𝑡 = (A𝑡
1ℎ𝑡
1)1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖(?̂?𝑇𝑡
1 )
𝑎𝑘
(?̂?𝐼𝑡)
𝑎𝑖                        (7) 
?̂?𝐼𝑡 = (A𝑡
2ℎ𝑡
2)1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖(?̂?𝑇𝑡
2 )
𝑎𝑘
(?̂?𝐼𝑡)
𝑎𝑖                       (8) 
?̂?𝑇,𝑡+1 = [(1 − 𝛿𝑇)?̂?𝑇,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑇𝑡]/[(1 + 𝑛)(1 + 𝛾)]                 (9) 
?̂?𝐼,𝑡+1 = [(1 − 𝛿𝐼)?̂?𝐼,𝑡 + ?̂?𝐼𝑡]/[(1 + 𝑛)(1 + 𝛾)]                 (10) 
 
Explaining the seemingly high wages 
I showed earlier that there is a large deviation between predictions of the basic growth 
model and the Japanese data. The model predicts that the after tax real wage should 
remain steady between 1995 and 2006, leading to steady per capita hours and output. 
With the extended model, the measurement of the real wage is different and is 
consistent with the behaviour of output and hours. 
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The basic model measures the real wage as 
?̅?𝑡 = (1 − 𝑎𝑘)
𝑦𝑡
(ℎ𝑡
1 + ℎ𝑡
2)
 
where 𝑎𝑘 is the capital share, 𝑦 is the measured value added, and ℎ𝑡
1 + ℎ𝑡
2 is the total 
working hours. The problem with the measurement of labour productivity on the right 
side of the equation is that some hours are used to produce intangible investment. The 
hours used to produce 𝑦 are ℎ𝑡
1 and, therefore, the real wage measurement should be 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝑎𝑘 − 𝑎𝑖)
𝑦𝑡
ℎ𝑡
1 
where 𝑎𝑖 is the intangible capital share. 
𝑦𝑡
ℎ𝑡
1 is the labour productivity in producing 
final goods and services. The labour hours ℎ𝑡
2 is used to produce intangible investment 
and is not part of the labour input in producing 𝑦. If the relative size of ℎ𝑡
2 to ℎ𝑡
1 + ℎ𝑡
2 
decreases, then ?̅?𝑡/𝑤𝑡 increases and the overstatement of true wages becomes more 
significant. 
 
Moreover, the technology used in producing intangible investment and final goods and 
services should be different due to their different nature, and therefore should be 
influenced by different productivity shocks. This would imply a decrease in A𝑡
2/A𝑡
1. My 
hypothesis is that A𝑡
2/A𝑡
1 did decrease significantly, which led to a decrease in the 
relative hours allocated to the intangible investment production, namely ℎ𝑡
2/(ℎ𝑡
1 + ℎ𝑡
2). 
 
Identifying the total factor productivities 
The scale of the inputs and outputs of both production functions has to be determined in 
order to identify the total factor productivities. This requires splitting the hours and 
tangible capital between two production activities as well as determining the magnitude 
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of intangible investment and capital. 
 
To identify how much labour is allocated to the two production activities, I use the fact 
that the after tax real wage rate equals the marginal rate of substitution between leisure 
and consumption, following McGrattan and Prescott (2010). That is, using equation (1) 
in the first order conditions of the extended theory. Then, we have 
ℎ𝑡
1 = (1 − 𝑡𝑤𝑡)
(1 − 𝑎𝑘 − 𝑎𝑖)?̂?𝑡
𝜓?̂?𝑡
(1 − ℎ𝑡) 
Please note that observations on consumption ?̂?𝑡, total hours ℎ𝑡, final goods and 
services ?̂?𝑡 and the labour tax rate 𝑡𝑤𝑡 are available. Hours used in producing 
intangible investment is determined residually, which is ℎ𝑡
2 = ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡
1.  
 
The marginal products of labour in the two activities should be equal, which is the 
equation (4) in the first order conditions of the extended theory. Therefore, we have 
𝑞𝑡?̂?𝐼𝑡 =
ℎ𝑡
1
ℎ𝑡
2 ?̂?𝑡                             (11) 
which is the measurement of intangible investment. As per McGrattan and Prescott 
(2010), the derivation of intangible investment relies heavily on theory and observations 
on consumption, total working hours, final goods and services as well as the labour tax 
rate. This method has an advantage over direct measurement when some or all of the 
intangible investment is not or cannot be measured (accurately) due to data availability 
issues. 
 
The allocation of tangible capital across the two activities is determined in a similar way 
to the allocation of labour hours. Specifically, the marginal products of tangible capital 
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in the two activities should also be equal, which is equation (5) in the first conditions of 
the extended theory. Re-arrange this equation, we have 
?̂?𝑡
1
=
?̂?𝑡?̂?𝑡
(𝑞𝑡?̂?𝐼𝑡 + ŷ𝑡)
 
Again, tangible capital allocated to the production of intangible investment is 
determined residually as 
?̂?𝑡
2
= ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡
1
 
 
If there is a sequence of the price 𝑞𝑡 of the intangible investment, the already-
computed sequence of outputs 𝑞𝑡?̂?𝐼𝑡 can be used to infer the sequence of the intangible 
investment, and with a given initial value for intangible capital stock ?̂?𝐼,1995, I can use 
equation (10) to determine the sequence of intangible stocks. To achieve the above, I 
calculate the sequence of the intangible investment price 𝑞𝑡 based on the intertemporal 
condition of intangible investment, which is equation (3) in the first order conditions of 
the extended theory: 
𝑞𝑡𝜇𝑡 = ?̂?𝐸𝑡𝜇𝑡+1[𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿𝑇) +
𝑎𝑖(?̂?𝑡+1 + 𝑞𝑡+1𝑥𝐼𝑡+1)
?̂?𝐼𝑡+1
] 
𝑞𝑡+1𝑥𝐼𝑡+1 is derived from equation (11), and ?̂?𝐼𝑡+1 is derived from equation (10), 
which is the motion of intangible capital. Since we have the observations on output and 
consumption, 𝑞𝑡+1 can be obtained given 𝑞𝑡. I normalize 𝑞1995=1 following 
McGrattan and Prescott (2007) and then the sequence of 𝑞 is obtained.  
 
Finally, I obtain the varying TFP and government wedge according to equation (6), (9) 
and (10), and incorporate them along with the effective labour tax rate into the extended 
model to derive the prediction results in the following section.  
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Model predictions 
Treating the TFP sequence and the government wedge sequence as the exogenous input, 
I calibrate the model based on the data in 1995, compute the equilibrium of all 
variables, and compare them with actual Japanese data. All of the parameters used in 
computing the equilibrium path are described in Appendix A and summarized in Table 
A1. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis is conducted in Appendix B. 
 
In Figure 7, I display the results for per capita total working hours. Unlike the 
comparative results from the basic model (Figure 1), the predictions here are much more 
consistent with the actual data. The extended model predicts a slight fall in hours used 
in producing final goods and investment during most of the time between 1995 and 
2006. However, because the fall in hours used in producing intangible investment is 
much more than those used in producing final goods and investment, the model predicts 
a significant depression in per capital total working hours.  
 
In Figure 8, unsurprisingly, the modelled per capita output and the actual per capita 
output are close. In Figure 9, the predicted per capita tangible investment is almost the 
same as the actual data. In Figure 10, the predicted per capita consumption also 
generally captures the trend of the actual data. 
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Figure 7. Extended model per capita total hours worked in Japan 
(Annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Figure 8. Extended model per capita real GDP in Japan 
(Annual, series detrended by 1.015𝑡, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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Figure 9. Extended model per capita tangible investment in Japan 
(Annual, series detrended by 1.015𝑡, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Figure 10. Extended model per capita consumption in Japan 
(Annual, series detrended by 1.015𝑡, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
What does all this mean for Japanese labour productivity? If some output is unmeasured 
relative to input, then the change in productivity is biased when the unmeasured output 
does not move together with the measured output. The extended model’s predictions for 
macro variables with or without intangible investment demonstrate how distorted the 
standard data and basic model are for assessing the lost decades of Japan. 
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In Figure 11, I compare two series of output per hour. One is output per hour without 
intangible investment included. The other is output per hour with intangible investment 
included. Obviously, with intangible investment incorporated, the puzzling labour 
productivity growth during the Asian Financial Crisis is no longer puzzling: labour 
productivity actually declined. Moreover, it is clear that the deviation of measured 
labour productivity and the actual labour productivity is significant. During the lost 
decades, the labour productivity of Japan was actually depressed, rather than booming.   
 
In Figure 12, I compare the extended model’s two measurements of total investment: 
one without intangible investment and the other with intangible investment. The two 
series of predictions are quite different, which indicates that the measured investment 
dramatically underestimates the actual decline in investment. 
 
In summary, the results above show that standard accounting measurements and 
predictions of the standard model without intangible investment do not accurately 
reflect what was going on in Japan between 1995 and 2006. Therefore, the extended 
model is needed when conducting aggregate analyses. 
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Figure 11. Labour productivity in Japan 
(Annual, series detrended by 1.015𝑡, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Figure 12. Extended model per capita investment in Japan 
(Annual, series detrended by 1.015𝑡, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
6.5 Results with alternative model settings 
In this section I test the robustness of the extension developed by McGrattan and 
Prescott (2010) with an alternative model with tangible investment adjustment costs. 
Christiano and Davis (2006) indicate that introducing tangible investment adjustment 
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costs can affect the prediction results of neoclassical growth models. In this section, I 
modify the capital accumulation equations in both the basic model and the extended 
model to incorporate quadratic tangible investment adjustment costs.  
 
In both the basic model and the extended model, the law of the motion of tangible 
capital turns into 
?̂?𝑡+1 = [(1 − 𝛿)?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 − Φ(
?̂?𝑡
?̂?𝑡
)?̂?𝑡] /(1 + 𝑛) 
where 
Φ (
?̂?𝑡
?̂?𝑡
) =
𝜙
2
(
?̂?𝑡
?̂?𝑡
− 𝜆𝑇)
2 
The constant 𝜆𝑇 of tangible capital is set at 𝜆𝑇 = 𝑛𝑎 − (1 − 𝛿) so that the adjustment 
cost is equal to zero at steady state. The parameter 𝜙 is calibrated to match the 
marginal Tobin’s Q to one: 
dlog𝑞𝑇
dlog(
?̂?
?̂?
)
= 1 
where 𝑞𝑇 is the effective price of tangible investment relative to consumption: 
𝑞𝑇 =
1
1 − Φ′
 
This leads to 𝜙 =
?̂?
?̂?
. 
 
The simulation results are similar to the original models: the basic alternative model 
fails to generate satisfying predictions and the extended alternative model improves the 
predictions significantly. Therefore, the extension proposed by McGrattan and Prescott 
(2010) is robust. The value of the additional parameter 𝜆𝑇 as well as the simulation 
results are demonstrated in Appendix C. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
The basic neoclassical growth model accounts well for the Japanese economy prior to 
the 1990s, provided that variations in population growth, depreciation rates, total factor 
productivity (TFP) and government purchase are incorporated. The behaviour of the 
Japanese economy during the 1990s and 2000s, however, is often significantly 
inconsistent with the model predictions, which is also inconsistent with the argument in 
the literature that the decline in TFP is the main cause of the lost decades in Japan 
(Fukao and Kwon, 2006; Griffin and Odaki, 2009; Hayashi and Prescott, 2002). 
 
Following McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and McGrattan and Prescott (2014), I find 
that the unmeasured intangible investment as well as the non-neutral technological 
change in intangible investment production led to the puzzling behaviour of the 
Japanese economy between 1995 and 2006. This change resulted in a depression in 
intangible investment, which is not reflected in the measured output. After applying the 
new theory, the puzzling lost decades in Japan become less puzzling.  
 
This study is the first to apply this new theory to a country other than the US and finds 
that the new theory works well in Japan, even using a simpler version. Significant 
improvements in predictions are seen compared with the standard neoclassical model. 
The results remain robust when tangible investment adjustment costs are added. It also 
provides important evidence of the applicability of this new theory to other economies 
and strengthens the argument of McGrattan and Prescott (2010) that the new theory 
with intangible investment should be used in aggregate analyses. 
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6.7 Appendix A Data and parameters 
The main sources of data in this study are the Penn World Table 8.1, OECD revenue and 
national accounts statistics, and the World Bank DataBank. The variables from the Penn 
World Table 8.1 that this study has used include total labour hours, real GDP, 
consumption share, investment share, government and net export share, labour 
compensation share; the variables from OECD revenue and national accounts statistics 
are used to calculate the effective labour income tax based on the method proposed by 
Mendoza (1994); the working age population (age 15–64) data is obtained from the 
World Bank DataBank. The calibration process used in this study follows McGrattan 
and Prescott (2007) and are demonstrated in Table A1. The exogenous inputs for 
simulation of the standard model and the extended model are respectively demonstrated 
in Table A2 and Table A3. 
 
Table A1 Model parameters 
Parameter Expression Value 
Common parameters   
Growth in population 𝑛 -0.003 
Growth in technology 𝛾 0.015 
Discount factor 𝛽 0.98 
Standard model, no intangible investment   
Utility parameter 𝜓 4.44 
Depreciation rate 𝛿 0.07 
Capital share 𝑎𝑘 0.35 
Extended model, with intangible investment   
Utility parameters 𝜓 3.43 
Tangible depreciation rate 𝛿𝑇 0.07 
Intangible depreciation rate16 𝛿𝐼 0 
Tangible capital share 𝑎𝑘 0.3276 
Intangible capital share 𝑎𝑖 0.2064 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
                                                   
16 The depreciation rate of intangible capital follows McGrattan and Prescott (2010). However, I will 
conduct sensitivity analysis in Appendix B to show that the choice of the depreciation rate does not affect 
the results much. 
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Growth in population is derived from the working age population data; growth in 
technology is obtained from the average growth rate in value added per unit of labour; 
the discount factor follows McGrattan and Prescott (2010).  
 
Parameters calculation and exogenous inputs for the standard model 
Calibration is based on level data in 1995 instead of the average data and the following 
equations: 
δ =
?̂?
?̂?
+ 1 − (1 + 𝑛)(1 + 𝛾) 
𝑟 =
[1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿)]
𝛽
 
ak =
𝑟?̂?
?̂?
 
ψ =
(1 − 𝑡𝑤,1995)(1 − 𝑎𝑘)(1 − ℎ)?̂?
?̂?ℎ
 
z = (
?̂?
?̂?
)𝑎𝑘/(𝑎𝑘−1)
?̂?
ℎ
 
z is the initial technology level; other notations are the same as those in the text. The 
exogenous inputs include the TFP, effective labour income tax and the government 
wedge, which are listed in Table A2. 
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Table A2 Exogenous inputs for the standard model 
Year Labour income tax Government wedge Technology parameter 
 𝑡𝑤 𝑔 A 
1995 0.226005 0.148440931 3.19515 
1996 0.226332 0.145587261 3.225424 
1997 0.230106 0.154571707 3.255914 
1998 0.225499 0.157813769 3.161069 
1999 0.224183 0.160119394 3.167338 
2000 0.236472 0.168758844 3.222646 
2001 0.240673 0.165521832 3.24456 
2002 0.236517 0.175462343 3.281042 
2003 0.236543 0.183147381 3.325961 
2004 0.243221 0.191610003 3.376623 
2005 0.251445 0.19400152 3.396088 
2006 0.257525 0.19977311 3.39723 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
Parameters calculation and exogenous inputs for the extended model 
Again, calibration is based on level data in 1995 and the following equations: 
𝑟𝑇 =
[1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝑇)]
𝛽
 
𝑟𝐼 =
𝑞[1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝐼)]
𝛽
 
?̂?𝐼 =
?̂? − 𝑟𝑇?̂?𝑇 − 1995 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑟𝐼 − 𝑞[(1 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝑛) − 1 + 𝛿𝐼]
 
?̂?𝐼 = ((1 + γ)(1 + 𝑛) − 1 + δ𝐼)?̂?𝐼 
𝑎𝑘 =
𝑟𝑇?̂?𝑇
?̂? + 𝑞?̂?𝐼
 
𝑎𝑖 =
𝑟𝐼?̂?𝐼
?̂? + 𝑞?̂?𝐼
 
z1 = (
?̂?
ℎ1
1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖?̂?𝑇
1 𝑎𝑘?̂?𝐼
𝑎𝑖
)
1
1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖 
z2 = (
?̂?𝐼
ℎ2
1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖?̂?𝑇
2𝑎𝑘?̂?𝐼
𝑎𝑖
)
1
1−𝑎𝑘−𝑎𝑖 
z1 and z2 are respectively the initial production technology of final goods and services 
and intangible investment. The exogenous inputs include TFP for final goods and 
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services and intangible investment, effective labour income tax and the government 
wedge. 
 
Table A3 Exogenous inputs for the extended model 
Year Labour income tax Government wedge Technology parameter 
𝑡𝑤 𝑔 A1 A2 
1995 0.226005 0.148440931 1.331588 0.421171 
1996 0.226332 0.145587261 1.381845 0.457688 
1997 0.230106 0.154571707 1.376854 0.437985 
1998 0.225499 0.157813769 1.269788 0.369422 
1999 0.224183 0.160119394 1.237311 0.320089 
2000 0.236472 0.168758844 1.276741 0.343663 
2001 0.240673 0.165521832 1.280091 0.336908 
2002 0.236517 0.175462343 1.247973 0.249418 
2003 0.236543 0.183147381 1.254313 0.200235 
2004 0.243221 0.191610003 1.30684 0.251584 
2005 0.251445 0.19400152 1.357024 0.328368 
2006 0.257525 0.19977311 1.409351 0.408921 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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6.8 Appendix B Varying the depreciation rate of intangible capital 
The depreciation rate of intangible capital is chosen to be 0 following McGrattan and 
Prescott (2010). In the following I will vary the depreciation to show that the results 
remain robust given different depreciation rates of intangible capital. 
𝛿𝐼 = 0.1,  
 
Figure B1 Extended model per capita total hours worked in Japan with 𝛿𝐼 = 0.1 
(Annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Figure B2 Extended model per capita real GDP in Japan with 𝛿𝐼 = 0.1 
(Annual, series detrended by 1.015𝑡, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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𝛿𝐼 = 0.2,  
 
Figure B3 Extended model per capita total hours worked in Japan with 𝛿𝐼 = 0.2 
(Annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Figure B4 Extended model per capita real GDP in Japan with 𝛿𝐼 = 0.2 
(Annual, series detrended by 1.015𝑡, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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6.9 Appendix C Simulation results of models with tangible capital 
adjustment costs 
According to the calibration method of 𝜆𝑇 in section 5, the value of 𝜆𝑇 is 0.0821. 
Simulation results of the alternative models are demonstrated as follows: 
The basic alternative model 
 
Figure C1 Basic alternative model per capita total hours worked in Japan 
(Annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Figure C2 Basic alternative model per capita real GDP in Japan 
(Annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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The extended alternative models 
 
Figure C3 Extended alternative model per capita total hours worked in Japan 
(Annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
Figure C4 Extended alternative model per capita real GDP in Japan 
(Annual, 1995=100, 1995–2006) 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to the literature on intangible capital and economic development 
by addressing the following questions which are dealt within each chapter of the thesis: 
What is the role of intangible capital in China’s sectoral economic growth? What are the 
firm-level determinants of intangible investment in China? How does the effect of 
organization capital on firm performance vary between SOEs and non-SOEs in China? 
How does the role of intangible capital in sectoral energy intensity reduction differ across 
economies and sectors? How does the output elasticity and productivity spillover effect 
of intangible capital change between economies and sectors? What is the role of 
unmeasured intangible investment in explaining the Japanese real business cycles during 
the lost decades? 
 
Chapter 1 confirms the important role of intangible capital in sectoral economic growth 
in China, and the significant contributions of intangible capital to economic growth 
remain robust across various forms of sensitivity analysis including bootstrap, IV-GMM, 
the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach and changes in the depreciation rate. The 
relative importance of different categories of intangible capital in different industries has 
also been revealed: the role of R&D is important across all non-service industries while 
the role of economic competency is paramount across all non-agriculture industries. The 
usage of intangible capital in production in China, however, remains relatively small 
compared with that in advanced economies, which is consistent with China’s role at the 
assembly end of global value chains and the fact that the investment in design / intellectual 
property / brands remains the preserve of more developed economies. Despite its 
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relatively low intangible capital stock, China is catching up and there is every reason to 
believe that rapid growth in intangible capital will become an increasingly important 
driver of China’s economic growth. 
 
Chapter 2 reveals that more human capital, larger firm size and better institutional quality 
increase the propensity and the amount of intangible investment, and fiercer market 
competition generally decreases both the propensity and the amount to invest in 
intangibles. Specifically, firms facing an oligopoly market are more likely to invest in 
intangibles while firms facing a competitive market are less likely to invest in intangibles. 
The only exception is organization investment, where an inverted U-shape relationship 
with market competition is identified. Evidence on the propensity is more statistically 
robust than that on quantities. One interesting finding is that higher human capital is 
associated with a lower propensity for outsourced R&D, which is consistent with the fact 
that higher human capital can lower the costs of producing intangible investment. Another 
interesting discovery is that better institutional quality is associated with lower 
organization investment. A possible reason for this is that institutional quality is 
associated with the baseline organization capital and further investment is unlikely to 
improve productivity much if the baseline capital is high. Having explored the 
determinants of investment in intangibles, this chapter continues to examine the positive 
impacts of various intangible investment and ICT investment on the productivity of 
Chinese firms, which are all found to be significantly associated with the increase in 
productivity. Finally, policy implications on promoting intangible investment are derived 
from the empirical evidence of this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 finds that organization capital does play an important role in production in 
Chinese listed firms based on consistent evidence from OLS, fixed effects and the 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) models. Service is likely to rely more on organization capital 
than non-service. A simple theoretical model is built to explain the low employee turnover 
and less efficient organization capital in SOEs. It is found that due to the life-long job 
security, SOEs invest more in organization capital because of low employee turnover but 
their organization capital has lower efficiency due to the overpayment to their employees. 
Empirical result confirms the higher organization investment and the lower effect of 
organization capital in improving financial performance in SOEs. The findings of this 
chapter provide strong support for the continuing reform and privatisation in SOEs.  
 
Chapter 4 compares the role of intangible capital in reducing sectoral energy intensity 
across economies and sectors and finds: 1) brand equity and organization capital improve 
sectoral energy intensity more than R&D; 2) intangible capital in low and middle income 
economies has a larger reduction effect on sectoral energy intensity than in high income 
economies; 3) sectors with high intangible capital ratio in the service group and 
equipment manufacturing sectors in the non-service group tend to enjoy larger effects 
from intangible capital on sectoral energy intensity reduction; 4) income level generally 
decreases the effect of intangible capital in reducing sectoral energy intensity but a 
moderate inverted U-shape relationship between income level and the effect of intangible 
capital in reducing sectoral energy intensity is identified in aggregate intangible capital 
as well as some disaggregated intangible capital including brand equity and organization 
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capital. The findings of this chapter provide possible policy directions on reducing energy 
intensity through promoting intangible investment. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the effect of intangible capital on sectoral economic growth and 
productivity spillover based on a cross-country dataset derived from the WIOD database. 
It is found that intangible capital significantly contributes to both sectoral economic 
growth and productivity spillover. Both the output elasticity and productivity spillover of 
intangible capital demonstrate an inverted U-shape relationship with income level. 
Heterogeneity in the productivity spillover of intangible capital is also significant: it is 
found that the spillover effect is generally larger in service sectors than non-service 
sectors. The findings of this chapter partially answer the questions on the heterogeneous 
roles of intangible capital across sectors and economies, which might provide useful 
information for explaining the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth. Policy makers might also find the information helpful by better understanding 
the changing roles of intangible capital in determining productivity spillover and then 
economic growth. 
 
Chapter 6 demonstrates how the extended neoclassical growth model, incorporating 
unmeasured intangible investment and non-neutral technology, better explains the 
economic fluctuations in Japan during the lost decades. It is found that the unmeasured 
investment declined more than the measured output during the research period, which 
results in underestimation of the productivity decline and then the significant deviation 
from the predicted output to the actual data, using the base neoclassical growth model. 
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When unmeasured intangible investment is accounted for through the extension, the 
simulation results from the neoclassical growth model improve significantly and are close 
to the actual data. This chapter strengthens the important role of intangible investment in 
explaining real business cycles, and indicates the necessity to monitor intangible 
investment. 
 
In conclusion, intangible capital plays a key role in economic growth and energy intensity 
as well as real business cycles. The heterogeneity in the role of intangible capital is also 
revealed, through economy and sector-specific parameters generated. It is also found that 
intangible investment can be increased by boosting human capital and institutional quality, 
and that monitoring intangible investment might improve the understanding of business 
cycles. 
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List of abbreviations 
CFOA Operation cash flow of asset 
CI Computerized information (a category of intangible capital) 
DMR Difference in the marginal return between intangible capital and tangible capital 
EC Economic competency (a category of intangible capital) 
FE fixed effects model 
ICT information and communication technology 
JIP Database Japan Industry Productivity Database  
LP Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
R&D/RD Innovative property (research & development), which is also a category of 
intangible capital 
RE Random effects model 
ROA Return of asset 
TFP Total factor productivity 
S&GA Selling & General Administration 
SNA08 System of National Account 2008 
SOE State own enterprise 
WIOD World Input Output Table 
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List of variables 
Chapter 1 
Variables Source 
Depreciation by industry China Input-Output Tables 1997, 2002, 2007 
and 2012, Bureau of Statistics of China Total wages by industry 
Value added by industry 
Computer services and software 
intermediate by industry 
Research industry intermediate by 
industry 
Culture, arts, radio, movie and television 
industry intermediate by industry 
Business service industry intermediate 
by industry 
Education industry intermediate by 
industry 
Average wages by industry Labour Statistics Yearbook of China 
GDP deflator The World Bank 
 
Chapter 2 
Variables Source 
R&D (Overall) China Enterprise Survey 2012, the 
World Bank R&D (Internal) 
R&D (Outsourced) 
Organization investment  
Software investment (dummy) 
Number of full-time employees 
Fixed asset 
IT equipment investment 
Average education years of permanent workers 
Export (dummy) 
Number of competitors 
NERI Index of Marketization National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) (Fan et al., 2011) 
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Chapter 3 
 
Variables Source 
Annual sales China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR) Book assets 
Number of employees 
Selling, general and administrative 
expense 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Proportion of state-owned shares 
Return of asset 
Total debt 
Total assets 
 
Chapter 4 
Variables Source 
Gross fixed investment in computerized 
information 
The Word Input-Output Table Database 
Computer and related services 
intermediate 
Research and development services 
intermediate 
Other business activities intermediate 
Education services intermediate 
Value added 
Total intermediate 
Energy use 
Physical capital stock 
GDP per capita the Penn World Table 8.1 
GDP 
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Chapter 5 
Variables Source 
Gross fixed investment in computerized 
information 
The Word Input-Output Table Database 
Computer and related services 
intermediate 
Research and development services 
intermediate 
Other business activities intermediate 
Education services intermediate 
Value added 
Total intermediate 
Physical capital stock 
Number of employees 
GDP per capita the Penn World Table 8.1 
GDP 
 
Chapter 6 
Variables Source 
Working age population growth The Penn World Table 8.1 
GDP 
Investment 
Capital stock 
Consumption 
GDP per capita 
Labour compensation 
Working hours Total Economy Database 
Labour productivity growth per hour 
 
